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Attack Tree Analysis for ethereum/go-ethereum

Objective: To steal cryptocurrency (Ether or tokens) from accounts managed by the application or to disrupt the application's interaction with the Ethereum network, causing financial loss or reputational damage.

Attack Tree Visualization

[Attacker Goal: Steal Cryptocurrency or Disrupt Network Interaction]

               -----------------------------------------------------                     -----------------------------------------
               |  1. Compromise Node's RPC/IPC/WebSockets Interface |                     | 3. Attack Smart Contracts via Node |
               -----------------------------------------------------                     -----------------------------------------
               /       |                                                                                    |
              /        |                                                                                     |
  [1.1] Auth   [1.3]DoS                                                                  [3.3] Reentrancy !!!
  Bypass !!!  on RPC/IPC                                                                  (via geth's
             Interface                                                                    transaction
                                                                                           pool/handling)
              /   \                                                                                             /      \
             /     \                                                                                           /        \
[1.1.1] Weak  [1.1.2]  [1.3.1]  [1.3.2]                                         [3.3.1] Exploit      [3.3.2] Exploit
Credentials  No Auth !!! Slowloris  Resource                                      geth's handling    geth's handling
             (Default)  (Slow      Starvation                                    of reentrant      of gas limits
                        HTTP)     (CPU/Mem)                                     calls              during reentrancy

Attack Tree Path: 1. Compromise Node's RPC/IPC/WebSockets Interface

  • Description: This is a primary attack vector focusing on gaining unauthorized access to the geth node's control interfaces.
  • Impact: High (Full control of the node, ability to steal funds, manipulate transactions, disrupt service)

Attack Tree Path: 1.1 Authentication Bypass (!!! Critical Node)

  • Description: Circumventing the authentication mechanisms protecting the RPC/IPC/WebSockets interfaces.
  • Impact: High (Direct access to node's functionalities)

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1 Weak Credentials

  • Description: Exploiting weak, default, or easily guessable passwords/API keys used for authentication.
    • Likelihood: Medium-High
    • Impact: High
    • Effort: Very Low
    • Skill Level: Novice
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy
    • Mitigation:
      • Enforce strong, unique passwords.
      • Use API keys instead of passwords.
      • Implement multi-factor authentication.
      • Regularly rotate credentials.
      • Use a secrets management solution.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2 No Authentication (Default) (!!! Critical Node)

  • Description: Exploiting the lack of authentication on the RPC/IPC interface, often due to misconfiguration or unintentional exposure.
    • Likelihood: High (if exposed)
    • Impact: High
    • Effort: Very Low
    • Skill Level: Novice
    • Detection Difficulty: Very Easy
    • Mitigation:
      • Always explicitly configure authentication for all interfaces.
      • Use --authrpc.jwtsecret for JWT-based authentication on the RPC.
      • Restrict IPC access to localhost or a trusted network using firewall rules.
      • Regularly audit network configurations.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3 Denial of Service (DoS) on RPC/IPC Interface

  • Description: Attack that aims to make RPC/IPC interface unavailable.
  • Impact: Medium-High

Attack Tree Path: 1.3.1 Slowloris (Slow HTTP)

  • Description: Exhausting server resources by opening many connections and sending data very slowly.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: Medium-High
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
    • Mitigation:
      • Configure appropriate timeouts and connection limits.
      • Use a reverse proxy (e.g., Nginx) with rate limiting.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3.2 Resource Starvation (CPU/Mem)

  • Description: Sending computationally expensive requests to exhaust CPU or memory.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: Medium-High
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
    • Mitigation:
      • Implement rate limiting and resource quotas.
      • Monitor resource usage and set alerts.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Attack Smart Contracts via Node

  • Description: This category focuses on attacks that leverage the geth node as a conduit to exploit vulnerabilities in smart contracts.

Attack Tree Path: 3.3 Reentrancy (!!! Critical Node)

  • Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities in smart contracts where a malicious contract can repeatedly call back into the calling contract before the first invocation completes, potentially leading to unexpected state changes and theft of funds. While primarily a smart contract issue, geth's transaction handling can influence the attack's success.
    • Impact: High (Potential for significant financial loss)

Attack Tree Path: 3.3.1 Exploit geth's handling of reentrant calls

  • Description: Leveraging potential subtle flaws in how geth processes transactions in its pool, specifically related to the order and handling of reentrant calls.
    • Likelihood: Low-Medium
    • Impact: High
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Advanced
    • Detection Difficulty: Hard
    • Mitigation:
      • Keep geth up-to-date.
      • Thoroughly audit smart contracts for reentrancy vulnerabilities.
      • Use established patterns to prevent reentrancy (e.g., Checks-Effects-Interactions).

Attack Tree Path: 3.3.2 Exploit geth's handling of gas limits during reentrancy

  • Description: Similar to 3.3.1, but focusing on potential issues with how geth enforces gas limits within the context of reentrant calls.
    • Likelihood: Low-Medium
    • Impact: High
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Advanced
    • Detection Difficulty: Hard
    • Mitigation:
      • Keep geth up-to-date.
      • Thoroughly test smart contracts for reentrancy and gas limit issues.
      • Use eth_estimateGas carefully and with safety margins.