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Attack Tree Analysis for evanw/esbuild

Objective: Execute Arbitrary Code OR Leak Sensitive Information via esbuild Exploit

Attack Tree Visualization

                                 +-------------------------------------------------+
                                 |  Attacker's Goal: Execute Arbitrary Code OR     |
                                 |  Leak Sensitive Information via esbuild Exploit  |
                                 +-------------------------------------------------+
                                                    | (Impact: Very High)
      +----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
      |                                                                                                                |

+-------------------------+ +--------------------------------+ | 1. Supply Chain Attack | | 2. Misconfiguration/Misuse | +-------------------------+ +--------------------------------+ | | +-----------------+ +-----------------+ +-----------------+ |1.1 !!!Compromise| |2.1 Insecure | |2.2 Expose | | esbuild!!! | | Plugins | | Source Maps| | Repository | | | | to Attacker | +-----------------+ +-----------------+ +-----------------+ | | | +-----------------+ +-----------------+ +-----------------+ |1.1.1 Inject | |2.1.1 Load | |2.2.1 Enable | | Malicious | | Untrusted | | Source Maps| | Code into | | Plugin | | in Prod | | esbuild | | | | | +-----------------+ +-----------------+ +-----------------+ |Likelihood: Very Low| |Likelihood: Medium| |Likelihood: High | |Impact: Very High | |Impact: High | |Impact: High | |Effort: Very High | |Effort: Low | |Effort: Very Low | |Skill: Expert | |Skill: Novice | |Skill: Novice | |Detection: Hard | |Detection: Medium| |Detection: Very Easy| +-----------------+ +-----------------+ +-----------------+

Attack Tree Path: 1. Supply Chain Attack -> 1.1 !!!Compromise esbuild Repository!!! -> 1.1.1 Inject Malicious Code into esbuild

  • Description: An attacker gains control of the official esbuild source code repository (e.g., through compromised credentials, social engineering, or exploiting a vulnerability in the repository hosting platform). They then inject malicious code directly into the esbuild codebase. This compromised version is then distributed to users.
  • Likelihood: Very Low
  • Impact: Very High (Complete control over applications using the compromised esbuild version)
  • Effort: Very High (Requires significant resources, planning, and potentially exploiting multiple systems)
  • Skill Level: Expert (Requires deep understanding of repository security, social engineering, and potentially vulnerability exploitation)
  • Detection Difficulty: Hard (Might only be detected after widespread damage or through careful code audits by the maintainers. Users would likely only detect it if they were specifically looking for it or if the malicious code had obvious side effects.)
  • Mitigation:
    • (Primarily for esbuild maintainers): Strict access controls, multi-factor authentication, regular security audits, code review processes, vulnerability scanning of the repository infrastructure.
    • (For users): Monitor for security advisories from the esbuild project. Consider using a Software Composition Analysis (SCA) tool to detect known vulnerable versions, although this won't catch a zero-day compromise.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Misconfiguration/Misuse -> 2.1 Insecure Plugins -> 2.1.1 Load Untrusted Plugin

  • Description: A developer integrates an esbuild plugin from an untrusted source (e.g., a random GitHub repository, a compromised npm package, or a malicious website). This plugin contains malicious code that executes during the build process.
  • Likelihood: Medium (Developers might be tempted to use unvetted plugins for convenience or due to lack of awareness of the risks.)
  • Impact: High (Arbitrary code execution during the build process, potentially leading to compromised build artifacts or exfiltration of sensitive data.)
  • Effort: Low (The attacker only needs to create and distribute the malicious plugin; the developer does the work of integrating it.)
  • Skill Level: Novice (for the developer using the plugin; the attacker creating the plugin would need Intermediate skills)
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Requires proactive code review and plugin vetting by the developer. Security tools might not detect a malicious plugin unless it uses known malicious patterns.)
  • Mitigation:
    • Thoroughly vet any third-party esbuild plugins before using them. Examine the plugin's source code, author reputation, and community activity.
    • Prefer well-maintained, widely-used plugins from reputable sources.
    • Consider writing your own plugins for critical functionality instead of relying on third-party options.
    • Use a package manager that supports integrity checks (e.g., npm with package-lock.json or yarn with yarn.lock) to help prevent the installation of tampered packages.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Misconfiguration/Misuse -> 2.2 Expose Source Maps to Attacker -> 2.2.1 Enable Source Maps in Prod

  • Description: A developer accidentally or intentionally enables source map generation in the production build configuration of esbuild. These source maps are then deployed to the production server, making them accessible to anyone who visits the website.
  • Likelihood: High (This is a very common mistake, often due to oversight, lack of awareness of the security implications, or incorrect build configurations.)
  • Impact: High (Exposes the original source code of the application, making it significantly easier for attackers to understand the application's logic, identify vulnerabilities, and craft exploits.)
  • Effort: Very Low (The attacker simply needs to inspect the network requests in their browser's developer tools to find the source map files.)
  • Skill Level: Novice (No special skills are required; anyone with basic web development knowledge can access source maps.)
  • Detection Difficulty: Very Easy (Easily detectable by inspecting network requests in the browser's developer tools. Automated security scanners can also detect exposed source maps.)
  • Mitigation:
    • Disable source map generation in production builds (sourcemap: false in the esbuild configuration).
    • Use separate build configurations for development and production environments.
    • Regularly review build configurations and deployment processes to ensure that source maps are not accidentally included in production builds.
    • Use a web application firewall (WAF) to block requests to .map files (although this is a secondary measure and should not be relied upon as the primary defense).