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Attack Tree Analysis for fatedier/frp

Objective: Compromise Application via FRP

Attack Tree Visualization

  • 1. Exploit FRP Server [CRITICAL NODE]
    • 1.1. Exploit FRP Server Software Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] --> [HIGH-RISK PATH]
      • 1.1.1. Identify and Exploit Known CVEs in FRP Server --> [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    • 1.2. Bypass FRP Server Authentication/Authorization [CRITICAL NODE] --> [HIGH-RISK PATH]
      • 1.2.1. Brute-force/Dictionary Attack on FRP Server Credentials (if weak) --> [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    • 3. Exploit FRP Configuration Misconfigurations [CRITICAL NODE] --> [HIGH-RISK PATH]
      • 3.1. Insecure Access Control Lists (ACLs) on FRP Server --> [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • 3.1.1. Allowing Unauthorized Access to Proxied Services --> [HIGH-RISK PATH]
      • 3.2. Exposing Unintended Services via FRP --> [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • 3.2.1. Misconfigured Proxy Rules Exposing Internal Admin Panels or Sensitive Endpoints --> [HIGH-RISK PATH]
      • 3.3. Weak or Default Credentials for FRP Components --> [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • 3.3.1. Using Default Passwords for FRP Server Admin or Client Authentication --> [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    • 2.2. Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attack on FRP Client-Server Communication [CRITICAL NODE] --> [HIGH-RISK PATH]
      • 2.2.1. Intercept and Decrypt FRP Traffic --> [HIGH-RISK PATH]
      • 2.2.2. Modify FRP Traffic to Inject Malicious Payloads --> [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    • 5. Social Engineering targeting FRP Users/Administrators --> [HIGH-RISK PATH]
      • 5.1. Phishing Attacks to Obtain FRP Credentials --> [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • 5.1.1. Tricking Users into Revealing FRP Server/Client Passwords --> [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit FRP Server Software Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] --> [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting known or zero-day vulnerabilities in the FRP server software itself.
  • Likelihood: Medium (for known CVEs, depends on patching cadence), Low (for zero-days)
  • Impact: Critical (Remote Code Execution on FRP Server, full system compromise)
  • Effort: Medium (for known CVEs, public exploits may exist), High (for zero-days, requires significant research)
  • Skill Level: Medium (for known CVEs, understanding exploits), High (for zero-days, expert vulnerability researcher)
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (exploit attempts might be logged), High (zero-days are harder to detect)
  • Mitigation: Regularly update FRP Server to the latest version, implement vulnerability scanning, security audits and penetration testing, robust input validation and sanitization.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Bypass FRP Server Authentication/Authorization [CRITICAL NODE] --> [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Bypassing authentication mechanisms on the FRP server to gain unauthorized access to its control panel and functionality.
  • Likelihood: Medium (if weak passwords are used or default credentials not changed), Low (for authentication bypass vulnerabilities)
  • Impact: High (Unauthorized Access to FRP Server Control Panel/Functionality, potentially control over proxied applications)
  • Effort: Low (for brute-force), Medium (for authentication bypass vulnerabilities)
  • Skill Level: Low (for brute-force, script kiddie tools), Medium (for bypass vulnerabilities, competent hacker)
  • Detection Difficulty: Low (for brute-force, failed login attempts are easily logged), Medium (for bypass vulnerabilities, depends on the nature of the bypass)
  • Mitigation: Enforce strong passwords, implement account lockout policies, use multi-factor authentication, security audits and code reviews of authentication logic, regularly update FRP Server.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Insecure Access Control Lists (ACLs) on FRP Server --> [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Misconfiguring Access Control Lists on the FRP server to allow unauthorized access to proxied internal services.
  • Likelihood: Medium (configuration errors are common)
  • Impact: High (Unauthorized access to internal application)
  • Effort: Low (simple configuration review or probing)
  • Skill Level: Low (basic understanding of networking and access control)
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (access logs might show unauthorized access, depends on logging level and monitoring)
  • Mitigation: Implement strict ACLs, follow the principle of least privilege, regularly review and audit ACLs.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Exposing Unintended Services via FRP --> [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Misconfiguring proxy rules in FRP to unintentionally expose internal admin panels, sensitive endpoints, or other unintended services to the public internet.
  • Likelihood: Medium (configuration errors are common, especially in complex setups)
  • Impact: Critical (Unauthorized access to sensitive internal resources)
  • Effort: Low (configuration review, port scanning, web probing)
  • Skill Level: Low (basic networking and web probing skills)
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (access logs might show access to unexpected endpoints, depends on monitoring)
  • Mitigation: Carefully review and test proxy configurations, regularly audit exposed services, implement strong authentication on all services.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Weak or Default Credentials for FRP Components --> [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Using default or weak passwords for FRP server admin or client authentication.
  • Likelihood: Medium (default passwords are often overlooked)
  • Impact: High (Unauthorized access to FRP server/client control)
  • Effort: Low (checking default credentials is trivial)
  • Skill Level: Low (basic knowledge of default credentials)
  • Detection Difficulty: Low (login attempts with default credentials might be logged)
  • Mitigation: Change default passwords immediately, enforce strong password policies.

Attack Tree Path: 6. Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attack on FRP Client-Server Communication [CRITICAL NODE] --> [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Intercepting and potentially modifying communication between the FRP client and server if it is not properly encrypted using TLS/HTTPS.
  • Likelihood: Medium (assuming misconfiguration - lack of TLS)
  • Impact: Critical (Data Breach, Credential Theft, Potential to modify traffic and compromise proxied application)
  • Effort: Low (tools like Wireshark, readily available MitM frameworks)
  • Skill Level: Medium (network knowledge, using MitM tools)
  • Detection Difficulty: High (passive interception is very hard to detect, active MitM might be detectable with proper TLS configuration and monitoring)
  • Mitigation: Enforce TLS/HTTPS for FRP client-server communication (critical). Use strong ciphers, implement integrity checks.

Attack Tree Path: 7. Phishing Attacks to Obtain FRP Credentials --> [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Using phishing techniques to trick users or administrators into revealing their FRP server or client credentials.
  • Likelihood: Medium (phishing is a common and effective attack vector)
  • Impact: High (Unauthorized access to FRP components)
  • Effort: Low (phishing kits are readily available)
  • Skill Level: Low (basic social engineering and phishing skills)
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (depends on user awareness and phishing detection mechanisms)
  • Mitigation: Security awareness training for users, implement phishing detection mechanisms, use multi-factor authentication.