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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for filosottile/mkcert

Attack Surface: Compromise of Local CA Private Key

  • Description: The private key of the local Certificate Authority (CA) created by mkcert is compromised.
  • How mkcert contributes to the attack surface: mkcert's primary function is to generate and store this local CA private key on the developer's machine, making it a central point of risk.
  • Example: Malware on a developer's laptop scans for and exfiltrates the mkcert CA private key. An attacker uses this key to issue a valid certificate for evil.example.com. When the developer visits https://evil.example.com, their browser trusts the certificate, enabling a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack.
  • Impact: Full compromise of locally trusted certificates, enabling MITM attacks, phishing, and impersonation of any website on systems trusting the compromised CA.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Developer Machines: Implement robust endpoint security measures like EDR, anti-malware, and host-based intrusion prevention systems (HIPS).
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Restrict access to developer machines and the CA private key storage location to authorized personnel.
    • Secure Key Storage: Utilize operating system-level security features to protect the CA private key file (e.g., file system permissions, encryption).
    • Regular Security Audits: Conduct periodic security audits of developer machines and development environments.
    • Educate Developers: Train developers on the importance of private key protection.

Attack Surface: Supply Chain Attacks Targeting mkcert Binaries

  • Description: The mkcert binaries or installation process are compromised, leading to the distribution of a malicious version.
  • How mkcert contributes to the attack surface: Developers rely on downloading and installing mkcert binaries. Compromise of the distribution source directly impacts the security of mkcert installations.
  • Example: An attacker compromises the GitHub repository or a package manager distribution channel for mkcert. They replace the legitimate binary with a backdoored version. Developers unknowingly install this malicious mkcert. The backdoored version could steal the CA private key, install a rogue CA, or execute other malicious code.
  • Impact: Compromise of developer machines, potential data breaches, and introduction of vulnerabilities into development environments through a trusted tool.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Verify Download Integrity: Always verify the SHA256 checksum of downloaded mkcert binaries against the official checksum provided on the mkcert GitHub releases page.
    • Use Reputable Installation Methods: Install mkcert from trusted sources like official GitHub releases or well-established package managers.
    • Software Composition Analysis (SCA) for Source Builds: If building mkcert from source, use SCA tools to analyze dependencies for vulnerabilities.
    • Regularly Update mkcert: Keep mkcert updated to the latest version for security patches.