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Attack Tree Analysis for filosottile/mkcert

Objective: To gain unauthorized access to the application's data or functionality by leveraging vulnerabilities introduced through the use of mkcert in the development or (mistakenly) production environment.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application Using mkcert (Root Goal)
├───[OR]─ Exploit Weakness in mkcert Itself
│   └───[OR]─ Compromise mkcert Binary/Source Code [CRITICAL NODE]
│       └───[AND]─ Supply Chain Attack on mkcert Distribution [CRITICAL NODE]
│           └───[Impact]─ Malicious mkcert binary installs attacker-controlled root CA. [CRITICAL NODE]
├───[OR]─ Vulnerability in mkcert Installation Process
│   └───[OR]─ Man-in-the-Middle Attack during `mkcert -install` [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - Network Interception]
│       └───[Impact]─ User unknowingly installs attacker's root CA. [CRITICAL NODE]
├───[OR]─ Misuse/Misconfiguration of mkcert by Developers [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   ├───[OR]─ Accidental Deployment of mkcert-Generated Certificates to Production [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - Production Deployment of mkcert Certs]
│   │   └───[Impact]─ Private key exposure if production server is compromised. [CRITICAL NODE - Private Key Exposure]
│   └───[OR]─ Lack of Developer Awareness/Training [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - Developer Misunderstanding]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Supply Chain Attack on mkcert Distribution [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: An attacker compromises the mkcert project's distribution channels. This could involve:
    • Compromising the GitHub repository where mkcert source code is hosted.
    • Compromising the release process used to build and distribute mkcert binaries.
    • Compromising any infrastructure involved in hosting or delivering mkcert binaries.
  • Impact: If successful, the attacker can inject malicious code into the mkcert binary. Users downloading and installing this compromised binary would unknowingly install malware.
  • Criticality: This is a critical node because it has the potential for widespread impact, affecting all users who download the compromised version of mkcert.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Malicious mkcert binary installs attacker-controlled root CA [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: This is the direct consequence of a successful Supply Chain Attack. The malicious mkcert binary, when executed, would install an attacker-controlled root Certificate Authority (CA) into the user's system trust store.
  • Impact: Once the attacker's root CA is trusted, they can generate valid-looking certificates for any domain. This allows them to perform Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks against any HTTPS connection from the user's machine, including connections to the application being developed. They can also create phishing websites that appear to be trusted locally.
  • Criticality: This is a critical node because it represents the point where the attacker gains the ability to intercept and manipulate secure communications.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Man-in-the-Middle Attack during mkcert -install [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - Network Interception]

  • Attack Vector: An attacker positions themselves on the same network as a developer during the mkcert -install process. They then perform a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack to intercept network traffic. Specifically, they target the download of the root CA certificate that mkcert attempts to download during installation.
    • Network Interception [CRITICAL NODE - Network Interception]: The attacker uses techniques like ARP poisoning, DNS spoofing, or exploits a compromised network infrastructure to intercept network traffic between the developer's machine and the internet.
  • Impact: The attacker replaces the legitimate root CA certificate with their own attacker-controlled root CA certificate. The developer unknowingly installs this malicious root CA.
  • Criticality: This is a high-risk path because it directly leads to the user trusting a malicious root CA. Network Interception is a critical node within this path as it's the key action enabling the attack.

Attack Tree Path: 4. User unknowingly installs attacker's root CA [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: This is the outcome of either a Supply Chain Attack or a MITM attack during installation. The user, without realizing it, has added an attacker-controlled root CA to their trusted root certificate store.
  • Impact: As with the "Malicious mkcert binary installs attacker-controlled root CA" node, the attacker can now perform MITM attacks on any HTTPS connection from the user's machine and create locally trusted phishing sites.
  • Criticality: This is a critical node because it signifies the successful compromise of the user's trust store, enabling a wide range of attacks.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Misuse/Misconfiguration of mkcert by Developers [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Developers, due to lack of awareness or misjudgment, misuse or misconfigure mkcert in ways that create security vulnerabilities. This path encompasses several sub-vectors:
    • Accidental Deployment of mkcert-Generated Certificates to Production [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - Production Deployment of mkcert Certs]: Developers mistakenly use mkcert-generated certificates in a production environment instead of proper certificates from a public Certificate Authority. This can happen through:
      • Copying development certificates to production servers.
      • Using automated scripts or configurations that inadvertently deploy mkcert certificates to production.
    • Lack of Developer Awareness/Training [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - Developer Misunderstanding]: Developers are not adequately trained on the security implications of mkcert and certificate management in general. This lack of understanding leads to misconfigurations and misuse.

Attack Tree Path: 6. Production Deployment of mkcert Certs [CRITICAL NODE - Production Deployment of mkcert Certs]

  • Attack Vector: This is a specific instance of developer misuse where mkcert-generated certificates are deployed to a production environment.
  • Impact:
    • Private key exposure if production server is compromised [CRITICAL NODE - Private Key Exposure]: mkcert generates private keys locally. If these keys are deployed to production and the production server is compromised, the private keys are exposed.
    • Lack of proper certificate management and revocation in production. mkcert certificates are not designed for production and lack the robust management features of certificates from public CAs.
    • Potential browser warnings for end-users if they access the production application, as mkcert root CA is not trusted by default browsers. (Though, this is less of a security vulnerability and more of a usability issue in this context).
  • Criticality: This is a critical node because it directly leads to private key exposure in production, a severe security breach. Production Deployment of mkcert Certs is the critical action that triggers this.

Attack Tree Path: 7. Private Key Exposure [CRITICAL NODE - Private Key Exposure]

  • Attack Vector: This is the ultimate consequence of deploying mkcert certificates to production and the production server being compromised. The private keys associated with the mkcert certificates are exposed to the attacker.
  • Impact: With the private keys, the attacker can:
    • Impersonate the application.
    • Decrypt past communications if they were recorded.
    • Potentially compromise other systems or applications if the same keys are reused (key reuse is a bad practice, but possible).
  • Criticality: This is a critical node because private key exposure is a fundamental security compromise, allowing for significant damage and unauthorized access.

Attack Tree Path: 8. Developer Misunderstanding [CRITICAL NODE - Developer Misunderstanding]

  • Attack Vector: This is a root cause, not a direct attack step. It refers to developers lacking sufficient understanding of the security implications of using mkcert, certificate management, and PKI concepts.
  • Impact: Developer misunderstanding increases the likelihood of all misuse and misconfiguration scenarios, especially accidental production deployment and overly permissive certificate generation.
  • Criticality: This is a critical node because it's a foundational issue. Addressing developer awareness and training is essential to prevent a wide range of security problems related to mkcert and certificate management.