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Threat Model Analysis for gin-gonic/gin

  • Description: An attacker can manipulate request data (JSON, query parameters, form data) to inject unexpected values or bypass type checks during Gin's data binding process. They might send strings where integers are expected, or craft JSON payloads with extra fields to overwrite intended data. This can lead to unexpected application behavior, data corruption, or even code execution if the application logic downstream is vulnerable.
  • Impact: Data corruption, business logic bypass, potential code execution in vulnerable application logic, information disclosure.
  • Gin Component Affected: ShouldBindJSON, ShouldBindQuery, Bind functions in context module.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement explicit data validation after Gin's binding using validation libraries or custom validation logic.
    • Define strict data schemas and types.
    • Sanitize and validate user inputs before processing them further.
    • Use secure coding practices to handle potential type mismatches and unexpected data.
  • Description: An attacker can exploit overly broad or wildcard routes (e.g., /*filepath) to access unintended resources or functionalities. They might craft requests to traverse directories, access administrative endpoints, or bypass access controls if routes are not defined with sufficient specificity and security in mind.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to resources, information disclosure, potential command execution (if combined with other vulnerabilities), privilege escalation.
  • Gin Component Affected: Router, route definition in gin package.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Follow the principle of least privilege when defining routes.
    • Use specific route paths instead of wildcards whenever possible.
    • Sanitize and validate input from wildcard route parameters.
    • Regularly review and audit route definitions.
  • Description: An attacker might find ways to bypass or manipulate middleware if it's misconfigured, contains logical flaws, or has vulnerabilities. They could craft requests that avoid execution of security middleware (e.g., authentication, authorization) or manipulate middleware behavior to gain unauthorized access or bypass security controls. Vulnerabilities in custom middleware logic can also be exploited.
  • Impact: Authentication bypass, authorization bypass, access control bypass, exposure of sensitive functionalities, potential data breaches.
  • Gin Component Affected: Middleware chaining and execution in gin package, custom middleware.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Ensure correct middleware chaining and execution order.
    • Thoroughly test custom middleware for security vulnerabilities.
    • Vet and audit custom middleware logic.
    • Use middleware for well-defined security functions and keep logic simple.
    • Implement unit tests for middleware chains.