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Attack Tree Analysis for gin-gonic/gin

Objective: Gain Unauthorized Access via Gin Exploitation

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Gain Unauthorized Access via Gin Exploitation ├── 1. Exploit Unintended Route Exposure [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├── 1.1 Misconfigured Route Groups [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├── 1.1.1 Accidental Exposure of Admin Routes (No Middleware) [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └── 1.1.2 Incorrectly Nested Groups (Bypassing Middleware) │ ├── 1.2.1 Overly Broad Wildcard Matching (*filepath) [CRITICAL NODE] │ └── 1.3 Debug Mode Enabled in Production [CRITICAL NODE] ├── 2. Exploit Data Binding Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├── 2.1 Mass Assignment via ShouldBind (or similar) [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├── 2.1.1 Binding to Unintended Fields in Struct [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├── 2.2.1 Unsafe XML/YAML Parsing via ShouldBindXML/ShouldBindYAML [CRITICAL NODE] │ └── 2.3 TOML Injection [CRITICAL NODE] ├── 3. Exploit Middleware Misconfiguration or Vulnerabilities │ ├── 3.1.2 Logic Errors in Middleware [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├── 3.1.3 Vulnerable Third-Party Middleware [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├── 3.2 Timing Attacks on Authentication Middleware [CRITICAL NODE] │ └── 3.3 Session Fixation/Hijacking (if using session middleware) [CRITICAL NODE] └── 5. Exploit Underlying net/http Vulnerabilities (Indirectly via Gin) ├── 5.1 HTTP Request Smuggling [CRITICAL NODE] └── 5.2 HTTP/2 Rapid Reset [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Unintended Route Exposure [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • 1.1 Misconfigured Route Groups [HIGH-RISK PATH]

    • 1.1.1 Accidental Exposure of Admin Routes (No Middleware) [CRITICAL NODE]

      • Description: Admin routes are defined without requiring authentication or authorization middleware, allowing anyone to access them.
      • Action: Review all route group definitions and ensure appropriate middleware (auth, authorization) is applied to sensitive groups. Use a linter or static analysis tool.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Novice
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium (if logs are monitored), Easy (if not)

    • 1.1.2 Incorrectly Nested Groups (Bypassing Middleware)

      • Description: Route groups are nested in a way that unintentionally bypasses middleware intended to protect them.
      • Action: Carefully review the nesting of route groups. Test middleware application thoroughly. Consider using a visual route map generator.
      • Likelihood: Low
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Medium
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Hard

  • 1.2.1 Overly Broad Wildcard Matching (*filepath) [CRITICAL NODE]

    • Description: A wildcard route (*filepath) is used without proper validation, allowing attackers to access arbitrary files or directories on the server.
    • Action: Use wildcards with extreme caution. Validate the filepath parameter within the handler. Consider more specific route definitions.
    • Likelihood: Low
    • Impact: High (potential for file system access)
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (if file access logs are monitored)

  • 1.3 Debug Mode Enabled in Production [CRITICAL NODE]

    • Description: Gin's debug mode is left enabled in a production environment, exposing sensitive internal information and application workings.
    • Action: Never enable Gin's debug mode (gin.SetMode(gin.ReleaseMode)) in a production environment. Use environment variables.
    • Likelihood: Low (should be caught in code review/testing)
    • Impact: Very High (full information disclosure)
    • Effort: Very Low
    • Skill Level: Novice
    • Detection Difficulty: Very Easy

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Data Binding Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • 2.1 Mass Assignment via ShouldBind (or similar) [HIGH-RISK PATH]

    • 2.1.1 Binding to Unintended Fields in Struct [CRITICAL NODE]
      • Description: ShouldBind (or similar) is used to bind request data directly to a model struct, including fields that should not be user-controlled.
      • Action: Use dedicated Data Transfer Objects (DTOs) for binding. DTOs should only contain the fields expected from user input. Use binding:"-".
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High (potential to modify sensitive data)
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Hard

  • 2.2.1 Unsafe XML/YAML Parsing via ShouldBindXML/ShouldBindYAML [CRITICAL NODE]

    • Description: XML or YAML data is parsed using ShouldBindXML or ShouldBindYAML without disabling external entity resolution, leading to XXE/YYE vulnerabilities.
    • Action: If using XML or YAML binding, ensure the underlying parser is configured to disable external entity resolution. Use safe parsers. Prefer JSON.
    • Likelihood: Low (if XML/YAML is used, and not configured securely)
    • Impact: Very High (potential for file system access, SSRF)
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Advanced
    • Detection Difficulty: Hard

  • 2.3 TOML Injection [CRITICAL NODE]

    • Description: TOML data is parsed without disabling external entity resolution.
    • Action: If using TOML binding, ensure the underlying parser is configured to disable external entity resolution.
    • Likelihood: Low (if TOML is used, and not configured securely)
    • Impact: High
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Advanced
    • Detection Difficulty: Hard

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Middleware Misconfiguration or Vulnerabilities

  • 3.1.2 Logic Errors in Middleware [CRITICAL NODE]

    • Description: Custom middleware contains logical errors that allow attackers to bypass security checks.
    • Action: Write comprehensive unit tests for custom middleware. Use code coverage tools.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High (bypass security checks)
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Hard

  • 3.1.3 Vulnerable Third-Party Middleware [CRITICAL NODE]

    • Description: A third-party Gin middleware contains a vulnerability that can be exploited.
    • Action: Carefully vet any third-party Gin middleware. Keep middleware dependencies updated. Monitor for security advisories.
    • Likelihood: Low
    • Impact: High (depends on the vulnerability)
    • Effort: Varies (depends on the vulnerability)
    • Skill Level: Varies (depends on the vulnerability)
    • Detection Difficulty: Varies (depends on the vulnerability)

  • 3.2 Timing Attacks on Authentication Middleware [CRITICAL NODE]

    • Description: Authentication middleware is vulnerable to timing attacks, allowing attackers to potentially guess credentials.
    • Action: Use constant-time comparison functions (e.g., crypto/subtle.ConstantTimeCompare).
    • Likelihood: Low
    • Impact: High (credential compromise)
    • Effort: High
    • Skill Level: Advanced
    • Detection Difficulty: Very Hard

  • 3.3 Session Fixation/Hijacking (if using session middleware) [CRITICAL NODE]

    • Description: Session management is misconfigured, allowing attackers to fixate or hijack user sessions.
    • Action: If using Gin's session middleware, ensure it's configured to prevent session fixation and hijacking. Generate new session IDs after authentication, use secure cookies, and set appropriate timeouts.
    • Likelihood: Medium (if session management is misconfigured)
    • Impact: High (account takeover)
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Hard

Attack Tree Path: 5. Exploit Underlying net/http Vulnerabilities (Indirectly via Gin)

  • 5.1 HTTP Request Smuggling [CRITICAL NODE]

    • Description: Vulnerabilities in Go's net/http package allow for HTTP request smuggling attacks.
    • Action: Keep Go updated. Consider using a reverse proxy (e.g., Nginx, Apache).
    • Likelihood: Very Low (requires specific server configurations)
    • Impact: Very High (potential for request hijacking, cache poisoning)
    • Effort: High
    • Skill Level: Expert
    • Detection Difficulty: Very Hard

  • 5.2 HTTP/2 Rapid Reset [CRITICAL NODE]

    • Description: Vulnerability in handling of HTTP/2 requests.
    • Action: Ensure Go version is patched.
    • Likelihood: Low (requires specific server configurations)
    • Impact: High (DoS)
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (performance degradation)