Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
96 lines (66 loc) · 7.73 KB

File metadata and controls

96 lines (66 loc) · 7.73 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for go-chi/chi

Objective: Compromise application using go-chi/chi by exploiting vulnerabilities within Chi itself or its usage (Focus on High-Risk Paths and Critical Nodes).

Attack Tree Visualization

Attack Goal: Compromise Application Using go-chi/chi [CRITICAL NODE] ├── OR │ ├── Exploit Routing Logic Vulnerabilities (Chi Specific) [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├── OR │ │ │ ├── Route Overlap/Shadowing Exploitation [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ ├── Parameter Injection/Manipulation in Route Matching [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├── Exploit Middleware Vulnerabilities (Chi Specific or Usage Related) [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├── OR │ │ │ ├── Middleware Bypass [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ ├── Middleware Logic Vulnerabilities (Custom Middleware) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ ├── Middleware Interaction Issues [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├── Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks (Chi Specific or Usage Related) [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├── OR │ │ │ ├── Route Exhaustion/Complexity DoS [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ ├── Middleware Processing DoS [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ ├── Request Handling DoS [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├── Information Disclosure (Chi Specific or Usage Related) [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├── OR │ │ │ ├── Verbose Error Messages [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ ├── Debug/Profiling Endpoints Exposed [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├── Dependency Vulnerabilities (Indirectly related to Chi usage) [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├── OR │ │ │ ├── Vulnerable Dependencies of Chi [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ ├── Vulnerable Dependencies in Application [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Vector: Developers unintentionally define routes that overlap or shadow each other. Attackers identify these overlaps and craft requests to access shadowed routes, potentially bypassing intended access controls or reaching unintended functionalities.

  • Risk: Access control bypass, information disclosure of route structure, unintended access to resources.

Attack Vector: Attackers manipulate route parameters in requests to inject malicious payloads or alter application logic. This is possible if application code doesn't properly validate and sanitize route parameters.

  • Risk: Path traversal, command injection (if parameters are misused), application logic manipulation, data breaches.

Attack Tree Path: Middleware Bypass

Attack Vector: Due to routing misconfigurations or flaws in middleware application logic, attackers craft requests that bypass intended middleware checks (e.g., authentication, authorization).

  • Risk: Access control bypass, security feature bypass, unauthorized access to protected resources.

Attack Vector: Custom middleware code contains security vulnerabilities (e.g., authentication bypass, authorization flaws, input validation issues). Attackers exploit these vulnerabilities by sending requests that trigger the vulnerable middleware logic.

  • Risk: Authentication bypass, authorization bypass, data breaches, privilege escalation, depending on the middleware's function.

Attack Vector: Incorrect ordering of middleware in the chain leads to logic flaws. For example, authorization might be performed before authentication, or logging might occur after data modification, creating exploitable conditions.

  • Risk: Logic flaws, security bypass, data integrity issues, unintended application behavior.

Attack Tree Path: Context Data Manipulation

Attack Vector: Attackers manipulate request elements (headers, parameters) in a way that influences the data stored in the request context by Chi or middleware. If application logic relies on this context data without proper validation, it can be exploited.

  • Risk: Application logic manipulation, potential for various vulnerabilities depending on how context data is used, including access control bypass or data manipulation.

Attack Vector: Applications with a large number of complex routes (e.g., using regular expressions) can be vulnerable to DoS. Attackers send requests designed to trigger expensive route matching operations, exhausting server resources.

  • Risk: Service unavailability, resource exhaustion, application downtime.

Attack Tree Path: Middleware Processing DoS

Attack Vector: Inefficient or resource-intensive middleware components can be exploited for DoS. Attackers send requests that trigger the execution of these inefficient middleware, overloading server resources.

  • Risk: Service unavailability, resource exhaustion, application downtime.

Attack Tree Path: Request Handling DoS

Attack Vector: Attackers exploit limitations in request parsing (e.g., header size limits, body size limits) by sending oversized requests. This can cause resource exhaustion or errors in request handling, leading to DoS.

  • Risk: Service unavailability, resource exhaustion, application downtime.

Attack Tree Path: Verbose Error Messages

Attack Vector: Applications configured to display verbose error messages in production can leak sensitive information (stack traces, internal paths, configuration details) in error responses. Attackers trigger error conditions to observe these verbose messages.

  • Risk: Information disclosure, revealing internal application details that can aid further attacks.

Attack Vector: Debug and profiling endpoints (e.g., /debug/pprof) are accidentally left enabled and accessible in production. Attackers discover and access these endpoints to extract sensitive information from debug/profiling data (memory dumps, performance metrics, internal state).

  • Risk: Information disclosure, revealing sensitive internal application state, potential for further exploitation based on leaked information.

Attack Vector: Chi or its dependencies contain known vulnerabilities. Attackers identify and exploit these vulnerabilities in applications using Chi.

  • Risk: Remote code execution, data breaches, denial of service, depending on the specific dependency vulnerability.

Attack Vector: Application dependencies used alongside Chi contain known vulnerabilities. Attackers exploit these vulnerabilities in the application, potentially impacting the Chi application's security and functionality.

  • Risk: Remote code execution, data breaches, denial of service, depending on the specific dependency vulnerability.