attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for go-gorm/gorm

Objective: Compromise application by exploiting vulnerabilities or weaknesses introduced through the use of the go-gorm/gorm library.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via GORM Exploitation [ROOT - CRITICAL]

• SQL Injection Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
  • Unsafe Query Construction [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    • Raw SQL Queries with User Input [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
      • [Action] Inject malicious SQL code into db.Raw() or db.Exec()
      • [Impact] Data Breach, Data Manipulation, Authentication Bypass [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    • Find, First, Where with Unsanitized User Input in Conditions [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
      • [Action] Inject SQL into Where clause conditions, especially when using string formatting or direct concatenation.
      • [Impact] Data Breach, Data Manipulation, Authentication Bypass [HIGH-RISK PATH]
• Mass Assignment Vulnerabilities (If misused in application logic) [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
  • [Action] Exploit mass assignment features (if used insecurely in application code, not directly GORM's fault but related to ORM usage) to modify unintended fields.
  • [Impact] Data Manipulation, Privilege Escalation [HIGH-RISK PATH]
• Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) via GORM Queries (Application Logic Issue, facilitated by ORM) [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
  • [Action] Manipulate IDs in GORM queries to access data belonging to other users or entities.
  • [Impact] Data Breach, Unauthorized Access [HIGH-RISK PATH]
• Configuration and Implementation Weaknesses Related to GORM [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
  • Insecure Database Credentials in Configuration [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    • [Action] Access configuration files or environment variables to retrieve database credentials used by GORM.
    • [Impact] Full Database Compromise, Data Breach [HIGH-RISK PATH]
  • Overly Permissive Database User Permissions [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    • [Action] Exploit overly broad database user permissions granted to the GORM-connected user to perform unauthorized actions within the database.
    • [Impact] Data Breach, Data Manipulation, Privilege Escalation within Database [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: SQL Injection Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Vector Description: Attackers exploit weaknesses in how the application constructs SQL queries using GORM, allowing them to inject malicious SQL code. This is primarily achieved through: * Raw SQL Queries with User Input: Using db.Raw() or db.Exec() with user-controlled input without proper sanitization or parameterization. * Unsanitized User Input in Where Clauses: Directly embedding user input into Where conditions using string formatting or concatenation, instead of using parameterized queries.

• Potential Impact:
  • Data Breach: Access to sensitive data stored in the database.
  • Data Manipulation: Modification or deletion of data, leading to data integrity issues.
  • Authentication Bypass: Circumventing authentication mechanisms to gain unauthorized access.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Always use parameterized queries: Utilize GORM's built-in parameterization features for all dynamic values in queries.
  • Avoid raw SQL queries with user input: If raw SQL is necessary, rigorously sanitize and validate all user-provided data. Consider if the operation can be achieved using GORM's query builder instead.
  • Input validation and sanitization: Sanitize user input before using it in any query, even with parameterization, as a defense-in-depth measure.
  • Code review and security testing: Regularly review code for potential SQL injection vulnerabilities and perform penetration testing.
  • Web Application Firewall (WAF): Implement a WAF to detect and block common SQL injection attempts.

Attack Tree Path: Mass Assignment Vulnerabilities (If misused in application logic) [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Vector Description: Attackers exploit the mass assignment feature of GORM (and ORMs in general) when it's not properly controlled in the application logic. By manipulating request parameters, they can modify fields that were not intended to be updated by users, potentially including sensitive or privileged fields. This is an application logic vulnerability, but facilitated by ORM features.

• Potential Impact:
  • Data Manipulation: Modifying data fields, potentially leading to data corruption or business logic bypass.
  • Privilege Escalation: Modifying user roles or permissions to gain unauthorized access or administrative privileges.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Explicitly define allowed fields for mass assignment: Use GORM's Select or Omit methods when creating or updating records based on user input to strictly control which fields can be modified.
  • Never blindly accept all user input for model updates: Carefully design update logic and validate user roles and permissions before performing mass assignments.
  • Input validation and authorization: Validate user input and enforce authorization checks to ensure users can only modify allowed fields.
  • Code review: Review code for potential misuse of mass assignment, especially in update operations.

Attack Tree Path: Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) via GORM Queries (Application Logic Issue, facilitated by ORM) [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Vector Description: Attackers exploit weaknesses in authorization logic when accessing data through GORM queries. By manipulating object identifiers (IDs) in requests, they can access data belonging to other users or entities without proper authorization. This is an application logic vulnerability, but ORMs can make it easier to overlook authorization checks if not implemented carefully.

• Potential Impact:
  • Data Breach: Unauthorized access to sensitive data belonging to other users or entities.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Implement robust authorization checks: Enforce authorization at the application logic level before executing GORM queries. Verify that the user has the right to access the requested data based on IDs or other identifiers.
  • Avoid relying solely on query conditions for authorization: Do not assume that simply filtering queries based on user IDs is sufficient for authorization. Implement explicit authorization logic.
  • Use secure session management and authentication: Ensure proper user authentication and session management to correctly identify and authorize users.
  • Authorization testing: Conduct thorough authorization testing to identify and fix IDOR vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: Configuration and Implementation Weaknesses Related to GORM [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Vector Description: Attackers exploit insecure configurations or implementation practices related to GORM, primarily focusing on: * Insecure Database Credentials in Configuration: Retrieving database credentials that are stored insecurely (e.g., hardcoded, in publicly accessible configuration files, or weakly protected environment variables). * Overly Permissive Database User Permissions: Exploiting database user accounts used by GORM that have overly broad permissions, allowing attackers to perform unauthorized actions within the database if they gain access to these credentials.

• Potential Impact:
  • Full Database Compromise: Complete control over the database, including all data.
  • Data Breach: Access to all data stored in the database.
  • Data Manipulation: Modification or deletion of any data in the database.
  • Privilege Escalation within Database: Gaining higher privileges within the database system itself.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Securely manage database credentials:
    • Never hardcode credentials: Store credentials in environment variables, secrets management systems, or secure configuration files with restricted access.
    • Use strong passwords and rotate them regularly.
    • Implement access control to configuration files and environment variables.
  • Apply the principle of least privilege to database user permissions:
    • Grant the database user used by GORM only the minimum necessary permissions required for the application to function (e.g., SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE on specific tables).
    • Avoid granting overly broad permissions like SUPERUSER, DBA, or ALL PRIVILEGES.
    • Regularly audit and review database user permissions.
  • Database security hardening: Implement general database security best practices, such as network segmentation, access control lists, and regular security updates.