Attack Surface: Improper Request Decoding (Especially in Custom Decoders)
- Description: Vulnerabilities arising from mishandling malformed or malicious input during the request decoding process, particularly when using custom decoders instead of standard (JSON, Protobuf) ones.
- How
go-kit/kit
Contributes:go-kit/kit
provides the framework for defining decoders (transport/http.DecodeRequestFunc
,transport/grpc
's implicit Protobuf decoding). The implementation of these decoders is where vulnerabilities can be introduced. This is a direct contribution. - Example: A custom decoder that attempts to unmarshal a request body into an arbitrary struct without proper type checking or validation, leading to a potential RCE via unsafe deserialization. Another example: a decoder that doesn't limit the size of the input, allowing for a DoS attack via a very large request.
- Impact: DoS, RCE, data breaches, injection attacks (SQLi, command injection, etc.).
- Risk Severity: Critical (if RCE is possible) or High (for DoS and injection attacks).
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Use standard decoders (JSON, Protobuf) whenever possible.
- If custom decoders are necessary, rigorously validate all input before and after decoding. This includes:
- Type checking.
- Length limits.
- Whitelist-based validation of allowed values.
- Sanitization of data before using it in any sensitive operations.
- Use a robust input validation library.
- Implement resource limits (e.g., maximum request size).
Attack Surface: Incorrectly Implemented Middleware
- Description: Middleware components that introduce vulnerabilities due to logic errors, incorrect ordering, or bypassing security checks.
- How
go-kit/kit
Contributes:go-kit/kit
's middleware pattern is a core feature. The implementation of the middleware logic is where vulnerabilities are introduced. This is a direct contribution, as the framework enables and encourages the use of middleware. - Example: An authentication middleware that incorrectly handles errors, allowing unauthenticated requests to proceed. Another example: a rate-limiting middleware that can be bypassed by manipulating request headers. A logging middleware that logs sensitive data from requests.
- Impact: Bypassing security controls (authentication, authorization, rate limiting), data breaches, DoS.
- Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the bypassed security control).
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Thoroughly test all middleware components, including edge cases and error conditions.
- Follow secure coding practices within middleware.
- Ensure correct ordering of middleware (e.g., authentication before authorization).
- Avoid logging sensitive data within middleware.
- Use well-vetted, open-source middleware libraries whenever possible, and keep them up-to-date.
- Implement robust error handling within middleware.
Attack Surface: Improper Transport Configuration (e.g., Weak TLS)
- Description: Misconfiguration of transport-level settings, such as using weak TLS ciphers or protocols in the
transport/http
package. - How
go-kit/kit
Contributes:go-kit/kit
'stransport/http
andtransport/grpc
packages allow for configuration of the underlying transport mechanisms (e.g.,http.Server
, gRPC server options). The framework directly provides the mechanisms for this configuration, making misconfiguration a direct risk. - Example: Using
http.Server
withTLSConfig
that allows outdated TLS versions or weak ciphers. Not setting appropriate timeouts on the server. - Impact: Man-in-the-middle attacks, data breaches, DoS.
- Risk Severity: High.
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Use strong TLS configurations:
- Enforce TLS 1.2 or higher.
- Use a strong cipher suite.
- Disable insecure protocols and ciphers.
- Set appropriate timeouts (ReadTimeout, WriteTimeout, IdleTimeout) on the
http.Server
. - Regularly review and update TLS configurations.
- Use a tool like
testssl.sh
to test the TLS configuration.
- Use strong TLS configurations: