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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for go-kit/kit

  • Description: Vulnerabilities arising from mishandling malformed or malicious input during the request decoding process, particularly when using custom decoders instead of standard (JSON, Protobuf) ones.
  • How go-kit/kit Contributes: go-kit/kit provides the framework for defining decoders (transport/http.DecodeRequestFunc, transport/grpc's implicit Protobuf decoding). The implementation of these decoders is where vulnerabilities can be introduced. This is a direct contribution.
  • Example: A custom decoder that attempts to unmarshal a request body into an arbitrary struct without proper type checking or validation, leading to a potential RCE via unsafe deserialization. Another example: a decoder that doesn't limit the size of the input, allowing for a DoS attack via a very large request.
  • Impact: DoS, RCE, data breaches, injection attacks (SQLi, command injection, etc.).
  • Risk Severity: Critical (if RCE is possible) or High (for DoS and injection attacks).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Use standard decoders (JSON, Protobuf) whenever possible.
    • If custom decoders are necessary, rigorously validate all input before and after decoding. This includes:
      • Type checking.
      • Length limits.
      • Whitelist-based validation of allowed values.
      • Sanitization of data before using it in any sensitive operations.
    • Use a robust input validation library.
    • Implement resource limits (e.g., maximum request size).
  • Description: Middleware components that introduce vulnerabilities due to logic errors, incorrect ordering, or bypassing security checks.
  • How go-kit/kit Contributes: go-kit/kit's middleware pattern is a core feature. The implementation of the middleware logic is where vulnerabilities are introduced. This is a direct contribution, as the framework enables and encourages the use of middleware.
  • Example: An authentication middleware that incorrectly handles errors, allowing unauthenticated requests to proceed. Another example: a rate-limiting middleware that can be bypassed by manipulating request headers. A logging middleware that logs sensitive data from requests.
  • Impact: Bypassing security controls (authentication, authorization, rate limiting), data breaches, DoS.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the bypassed security control).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Thoroughly test all middleware components, including edge cases and error conditions.
    • Follow secure coding practices within middleware.
    • Ensure correct ordering of middleware (e.g., authentication before authorization).
    • Avoid logging sensitive data within middleware.
    • Use well-vetted, open-source middleware libraries whenever possible, and keep them up-to-date.
    • Implement robust error handling within middleware.
  • Description: Misconfiguration of transport-level settings, such as using weak TLS ciphers or protocols in the transport/http package.
  • How go-kit/kit Contributes: go-kit/kit's transport/http and transport/grpc packages allow for configuration of the underlying transport mechanisms (e.g., http.Server, gRPC server options). The framework directly provides the mechanisms for this configuration, making misconfiguration a direct risk.
  • Example: Using http.Server with TLSConfig that allows outdated TLS versions or weak ciphers. Not setting appropriate timeouts on the server.
  • Impact: Man-in-the-middle attacks, data breaches, DoS.
  • Risk Severity: High.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Use strong TLS configurations:
      • Enforce TLS 1.2 or higher.
      • Use a strong cipher suite.
      • Disable insecure protocols and ciphers.
    • Set appropriate timeouts (ReadTimeout, WriteTimeout, IdleTimeout) on the http.Server.
    • Regularly review and update TLS configurations.
    • Use a tool like testssl.sh to test the TLS configuration.