Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
92 lines (79 loc) · 7.32 KB

threat-modeling.md

File metadata and controls

92 lines (79 loc) · 7.32 KB

Threat Model Analysis for go-kratos/kratos

Threat: Insecure Access to Service Registry

Description: An attacker gains unauthorized access to the service registry (e.g., etcd, consul) by exploiting weak authentication or network exposure. They might read service metadata, modify service registrations, or deregister services, disrupting the application. Impact:

  • Data breaches through exposure of sensitive service information.
  • Man-in-the-middle attacks by redirecting traffic to malicious services.
  • Denial of service by disrupting service discovery and communication, rendering the application unavailable. Affected Kratos Component: Service Discovery Module, Registry Client (etcd, consul, etc.) Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies:
  • Implement strong authentication and authorization for service registry access.
  • Use TLS/SSL to encrypt communication with the service registry.
  • Follow security best practices for the chosen service registry (e.g., etcd, consul access control lists).
  • Apply principle of least privilege for registry access.

Threat: Service Registry Poisoning/Spoofing

Description: An attacker registers malicious services or modifies existing service registrations in the registry to impersonate legitimate services. This can be done with or without unauthorized registry access, exploiting registration vulnerabilities. Impact:

  • Man-in-the-middle attacks, intercepting communication between services and potentially stealing sensitive data.
  • Data breaches by redirecting sensitive data to attacker-controlled services designed to collect information.
  • Denial of service by disrupting service routing and communication flows, making parts of the application or the entire application unavailable. Affected Kratos Component: Service Discovery Module, Service Registration Functionality Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies:
  • Implement strong authentication and authorization for service registration and modification.
  • Utilize service mesh features like mutual TLS (mTLS) for service identity verification.
  • Implement validation and sanitization of service registration data.
  • Regularly audit service registry entries for unexpected or malicious registrations.

Threat: Insecure gRPC Endpoint Exposure

Description: Developers expose gRPC endpoints directly to the public internet without proper security measures like authentication, authorization, or TLS. Attackers can directly interact with these endpoints, potentially bypassing HTTP-focused security measures. Impact:

  • Increased attack surface, exposing internal service APIs directly to the internet.
  • Potential exploitation of gRPC-specific vulnerabilities.
  • Lack of standard web security protections often applied to HTTP endpoints, increasing vulnerability to attacks. Affected Kratos Component: gRPC Server Module, Endpoint Exposure Configuration Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies:
  • Prefer exposing HTTP endpoints for public access and reserve gRPC for internal service-to-service communication.
  • If public gRPC endpoints are necessary, implement strong authentication and authorization using gRPC interceptors and authentication middleware.
  • Enforce TLS/SSL for all gRPC communication, especially public-facing endpoints.
  • Consider using an API Gateway to manage and secure gRPC endpoints.

Threat: Middleware/Interceptor Bypass

Description: Attackers discover methods to bypass middleware (HTTP) or interceptors (gRPC), potentially by manipulating request headers, crafting specific requests, or exploiting framework vulnerabilities in middleware/interceptor processing within Kratos. Impact:

  • Circumvention of authentication and authorization checks, leading to unauthorized access to sensitive functionalities and data.
  • Exposure of sensitive data or functionality intended to be protected by middleware/interceptors.
  • Ability to perform actions that should be restricted, such as exceeding rate limits or accessing restricted resources, leading to system abuse or instability. Affected Kratos Component: Middleware (HTTP) Framework, Interceptor (gRPC) Framework, Request Handling Pipeline Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies:
  • Thoroughly test middleware/interceptor implementations and configurations to ensure they cannot be bypassed.
  • Implement defense-in-depth with multiple layers of security controls.
  • Regularly review and update middleware/interceptor logic to address potential bypass vulnerabilities.
  • Perform penetration testing to specifically look for middleware/interceptor bypass vulnerabilities.

Threat: Insecure Configuration Storage and Retrieval

Description: Sensitive configuration data (e.g., database credentials, API keys) is stored insecurely, such as in plain text configuration files or environment variables accessible to unauthorized users or processes. Attackers gaining access can retrieve these secrets. Impact:

  • Exposure of sensitive credentials, leading to unauthorized access to databases, APIs, and other critical systems.
  • Data breaches if database credentials or API keys are compromised and used to access sensitive data.
  • System compromise if configuration data can be modified by attackers to inject malicious settings or gain control. Affected Kratos Component: Configuration Management Module, Configuration Loading Mechanism Risk Severity: Critical Mitigation Strategies:
  • Avoid storing sensitive data directly in configuration files or environment variables.
  • Utilize dedicated secrets management solutions (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, Kubernetes Secrets) to securely store and retrieve sensitive configuration data.
  • Encrypt sensitive data at rest and in transit if stored in configuration files or the service registry.
  • Implement strict access control to configuration sources and secrets management systems.

Threat: Configuration Injection/Manipulation

Description: Attackers find vulnerabilities in Kratos's configuration loading or management mechanisms, allowing them to inject or manipulate configuration data. This could be through exploiting insecure APIs or weaknesses in configuration parsing logic. Impact:

  • Modification of application behavior to malicious purposes, such as redirecting traffic, disabling security features, or injecting malicious code through configuration settings.
  • Denial of service by injecting invalid or resource-intensive configurations that crash or overload the service.
  • Privilege escalation if configuration changes can grant attackers elevated permissions or access to sensitive resources within the Kratos application. Affected Kratos Component: Configuration Management Module, Configuration Loading Mechanism, Configuration Parsing Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies:
  • Implement strong input validation and sanitization for all configuration data.
  • Enforce strict access control to configuration sources and loading mechanisms.
  • Use immutable configuration where possible to prevent runtime modification.
  • Regularly audit configuration changes for unauthorized modifications and anomalies.