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Attack Surface Analysis for go-martini/martini

  • Description: Attackers manipulate URL parameters to inject malicious data, exploiting Martini's easy parameter access.
    • Martini Contribution: martini.Params provides direct, convenient access to route parameters, increasing the risk if developers omit validation. This is a direct consequence of Martini's design.
    • Example:
      • Route: /users/:id
      • Attack: /users/1; DROP TABLE users (SQL Injection) or /users/../../../etc/passwd (Path Traversal).
    • Impact: Data breaches, data modification, system compromise, denial of service.
    • Risk Severity: Critical (if used in database queries/system commands) / High (other sensitive operations).
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer: Strictly validate all martini.Params using a validation library. Define data types, formats, and ranges. Never use parameters directly in SQL queries or shell commands; use parameterized queries. Sanitize before use.
  • Description: Incorrect ordering of Martini middleware bypasses security checks or renders them ineffective.
    • Martini Contribution: Martini's security relies on the correct ordering of middleware, making this a Martini-specific concern. The developer is entirely responsible for this ordering.
    • Example: Authentication middleware after logging middleware, leading to sensitive data logging before authentication.
    • Impact: Information disclosure, authentication/authorization bypass.
    • Risk Severity: High.
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer: Carefully plan and document middleware order. Standard pattern: Logging -> Recovery -> Security (Auth, AuthZ, Input Validation) -> Business Logic. Thoroughly test.
  • Description: Unhandled panics expose sensitive information (stack traces) due to Martini's default behavior.
    • Martini Contribution: Martini's default martini.Recovery middleware logs stack traces, which can be exposed if not customized. This is a direct risk from the default configuration.
    • Example: A database error causes a panic, and the stack trace (revealing DB details) is returned to the attacker.
    • Impact: Information disclosure (leading to further attacks).
    • Risk Severity: High.
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer: Customize martini.Recovery (or replace it) to never expose stack traces in production. Log securely. Return generic 500 errors. Handle errors within handlers to prevent panics.
  • Description: Accidental exposure of internal APIs or administrative functions.
    • Martini Contribution: Martini's dynamic routing, while flexible, increases the risk of overlooking route exposure if not meticulously managed.
    • Example: An internal API endpoint /admin/config is exposed without authentication.
    • Impact: Information disclosure, unauthorized access, potential system compromise.
    • Risk Severity: High / Critical (depending on exposed functionality).
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer: Document all routes and access levels. Use consistent naming. Regularly review the routing configuration. Use tools to visualize routes. Implement authentication/authorization.
  • Description: Using an unmaintained framework (Martini) and its dependencies exposes the application to known, unpatched vulnerabilities.
    • Martini Contribution: This is a direct consequence of using Martini, as it is no longer actively maintained. This is the most significant long-term risk.
    • Example: A known vulnerability in a Martini dependency allows remote code execution.
    • Impact: Varies; could range from information disclosure to complete system compromise.
    • Risk Severity: High / Critical (depending on the vulnerability).
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer: Prioritize migrating to an actively maintained framework. This is the only effective long-term solution. While using Martini, investigate any reported vulnerabilities. Keep dependencies updated. Consider compensating controls (WAF rules).
  • Description: Security flaws within custom-built middleware.
    • Martini Contribution: Martini's architecture heavily relies on middleware. Any custom middleware is a potential attack point.
    • Example: Custom middleware with flawed input sanitization allows injection attacks.
    • Impact: Varies; could lead to various vulnerabilities.
    • Risk Severity: High / Critical.
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer: Thoroughly review and test all custom middleware. Follow secure coding practices. Use static analysis and linters. Keep middleware simple.