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Attack Tree Analysis for go-martini/martini

Objective: Gain Unauthorized Access or Cause DoS via Martini Exploits

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Gain Unauthorized Access or Cause DoS via Martini Exploits ├── 1. Dependency Injection Exploits [HIGH RISK] │ ├── 1.1.2 Exploit misconfigured dependency injection to override existing handler [CRITICAL] │ ├── 1.2.1 Overwrite a service with a malicious implementation (if dependencies are mutable) [CRITICAL] │ └── 1.3 Bypass Authentication/Authorization [HIGH RISK] │ ├── 1.3.1 Inject a handler that skips authentication checks [CRITICAL] │ └── 1.3.2 Modify existing authentication handler via DI to always succeed [CRITICAL] ├── 2. Middleware Chain Manipulation [HIGH RISK] │ ├── 2.1 Bypass Security Middleware [HIGH RISK] │ │ ├── 2.1.1 Find a route that doesn't include the security middleware (misconfiguration) [CRITICAL] │ └── 2.2.1 If middleware registration is externally controllable, inject malicious code [CRITICAL] │ └── 2.3.1 If configuration is exposed or modifiable, alter middleware order [CRITICAL] ├── 3. Context Manipulation │ └── 3.1.2 Overwrite critical context values to bypass checks [CRITICAL] └── 6. Exploit Unpatched Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK] └── 6.1 Leverage Known CVEs (if any exist) [HIGH RISK] └── 6.1.1 Research and exploit any documented vulnerabilities in Martini or its dependencies. [CRITICAL] └── 6.2 Fuzzing [HIGH RISK] └──6.2.1 Use fuzzing techniques to discover unknown vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: 1. Dependency Injection Exploits [HIGH RISK]

  • Overall Description: Martini's core functionality relies heavily on dependency injection. Attackers can exploit this to inject malicious code, override existing functionality, or bypass security mechanisms.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2 Exploit misconfigured dependency injection to override existing handler [CRITICAL]

  • Description: If the application's dependency injection configuration is flawed (e.g., allows external input to influence which handlers are registered), an attacker could replace a legitimate handler with a malicious one.
    • Example: An attacker might find a way to inject a handler that replaces the user authentication handler with one that always returns "true," granting access to all users.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: Very High
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Hard

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1 Overwrite a service with a malicious implementation (if dependencies are mutable) [CRITICAL]

  • Description: If Martini allows dependencies to be modified after initialization (which is generally a bad practice), an attacker could replace a core service (e.g., database connection, logging service) with a malicious version.
    • Example: An attacker could replace the database service with one that logs all queries, including sensitive data, to an attacker-controlled location.
    • Likelihood: Low
    • Impact: Very High
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Hard

Attack Tree Path: 1.3 Bypass Authentication/Authorization [HIGH RISK]

  • Overall Description: This focuses on using DI to circumvent security checks.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3.1 Inject a handler that skips authentication checks [CRITICAL]

  • Description: An attacker injects a handler before the authentication handler in the chain, effectively bypassing it. * Example: Injecting a handler that sets the "user" context variable to a valid user, regardless of the actual request. * Likelihood: Medium * Impact: Very High * Effort: Medium * Skill Level: Intermediate * Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 1.3.2 Modify existing authentication handler via DI to always succeed [CRITICAL]

  • Description: Similar to 1.1.2, but specifically targeting the authentication handler. * Example: Replacing the authentication handler with a stub that always authenticates the user. * Likelihood: Low * Impact: Very High * Effort: High * Skill Level: Advanced * Detection Difficulty: Very Hard

Attack Tree Path: 2. Middleware Chain Manipulation [HIGH RISK]

  • Overall Description: Martini uses middleware for various tasks, including security. Manipulating the middleware chain can allow attackers to bypass security checks or inject malicious code.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1 Bypass Security Middleware [HIGH RISK]

  • Overall Description: This focuses on avoiding security checks implemented as middleware.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1 Find a route that doesn't include the security middleware (misconfiguration) [CRITICAL]

  • Description: If a developer forgets to apply security middleware to a specific route, an attacker can access that route without authentication or authorization. * Example: An administrative API endpoint that was accidentally left unprotected. * Likelihood: Medium * Impact: High * Effort: Low * Skill Level: Novice * Detection Difficulty: Easy

Attack Tree Path: 2.2.1 If middleware registration is externally controllable, inject malicious code [CRITICAL]

  • Description: If the application allows external input to determine which middleware is loaded, an attacker can inject arbitrary code.
    • Example: A configuration setting that allows users to specify middleware plugins, which are then loaded by Martini.
    • Likelihood: Low
    • Impact: Very High
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 2.3.1 If configuration is exposed or modifiable, alter middleware order [CRITICAL]

  • Description: If the middleware order is determined by a configuration file or setting that an attacker can modify, they can change the order to bypass security checks.
    • Example: Moving the authentication middleware to the end of the chain, allowing other middleware to execute before authentication.
    • Likelihood: Low
    • Impact: Very High
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Novice
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy

Attack Tree Path: 3. Context Manipulation

Attack Tree Path: 3.1.2 Overwrite critical context values to bypass checks [CRITICAL]

  • Description: Martini's context.Context is used to pass data between handlers. If an attacker can modify critical values (e.g., user roles, permissions), they can bypass security checks.
    • Example: Injecting a value into the context that makes the application believe the user is an administrator.
    • Likelihood: Low
    • Impact: High
    • Effort: High
    • Skill Level: Advanced
    • Detection Difficulty: Hard

Attack Tree Path: 6. Exploit Unpatched Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK]

  • Overall Description: Due to the unmaintained nature of Martini, any existing or future vulnerabilities are unlikely to be patched.

Attack Tree Path: 6.1 Leverage Known CVEs (if any exist) [HIGH RISK]

  • Overall Description: This involves finding and exploiting publicly documented vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: 6.1.1 Research and exploit any documented vulnerabilities in Martini or its dependencies. [CRITICAL]

  • Description: Searching vulnerability databases (e.g., CVE, NVD) for known issues in Martini or its dependencies. * Example: Finding a CVE related to a specific version of Martini and using a publicly available exploit. * Likelihood: Low * Impact: Varies (potentially Very High) * Effort: Varies * Skill Level: Varies * Detection Difficulty: Varies

Attack Tree Path: 6.2 Fuzzing [HIGH RISK]

  • Overall Description: This involves using automated tools to find new vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: 6.2.1 Use fuzzing techniques to discover unknown vulnerabilities.

  • Description: Using fuzzing tools to send malformed or unexpected input to Martini's handlers and routing logic, hoping to trigger crashes or unexpected behavior that indicates a vulnerability. * Example: Using a fuzzer to send various combinations of characters and data types to a Martini API endpoint. * Likelihood: Medium * Impact: Varies (potentially Very High) * Effort: High * Skill Level: Advanced * Detection Difficulty: Hard