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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for gofiber/fiber

Attack Surface: Path Parameter Injection

  • Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities by injecting malicious code or unexpected input through path parameters in URLs. This can lead to attacks like SQL injection, command injection, or path traversal.
  • Fiber Contribution: Fiber's straightforward routing and easy access to path parameters (c.Params()) directly contribute to this attack surface. The simplicity can lead developers to directly use parameters in backend logic without sufficient sanitization, increasing the risk.
  • Example: A route /items/:item_id where item_id is used in a database query: SELECT * FROM items WHERE id = :item_id. An attacker could inject ' OR '1'='1 as item_id to bypass authentication or retrieve unauthorized data.
  • Impact: Data breach, unauthorized access, data manipulation, server compromise depending on the injection type and backend logic.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Input Validation: Rigorously validate path parameters against expected formats and types before using them.
    • Parameterization/Prepared Statements: Always use parameterized queries or prepared statements for database interactions to prevent SQL injection.
    • Input Sanitization/Escaping: Sanitize or escape path parameters before using them in commands or file system operations.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Limit database and system user privileges to minimize the impact of successful injection attacks.

Attack Surface: Request Body Parsing Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities arising from parsing request bodies (JSON, XML, etc.). This can include deserialization flaws or vulnerabilities in the underlying parsing libraries.
  • Fiber Contribution: Fiber's built-in middleware for body parsing, while convenient, directly exposes the application to vulnerabilities within the underlying Go standard library parsing packages (like encoding/json, encoding/xml). If these libraries have flaws, or if parsed data is mishandled, it becomes a Fiber-specific attack vector due to its direct integration.
  • Example: A JSON request body is parsed using Fiber's middleware. A vulnerability in encoding/json (or improper handling of deserialized data in the application) could be exploited by crafting a malicious JSON payload, potentially leading to denial-of-service or remote code execution.
  • Impact: Denial of Service, Remote Code Execution, Data Corruption, Information Disclosure.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the specific vulnerability and its exploitability)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Keep Dependencies Updated: Maintain Fiber and Go versions to the latest stable releases to benefit from security patches in standard libraries and Fiber itself.
    • Input Validation (Post-Parsing): Validate the parsed data after Fiber's middleware processes it. Do not solely rely on parsing being successful as a security measure.
    • Limit Request Body Size: Implement limits on request body size within Fiber configuration to mitigate potential buffer overflow or DoS attacks related to excessively large payloads.
    • Secure Deserialization Practices: If deserializing data into complex objects, employ secure deserialization patterns to prevent deserialization vulnerabilities.

Attack Surface: Custom Middleware Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Security flaws introduced in custom middleware, particularly those handling authentication and authorization, which are critical security functions.
  • Fiber Contribution: Fiber's middleware architecture, while powerful for modularity, places significant security responsibility on developers creating custom middleware. Flaws in custom authentication or authorization middleware directly translate to critical vulnerabilities in Fiber applications.
  • Example: A custom authentication middleware in Fiber that incorrectly verifies JWT signatures, allowing attackers to forge valid-looking JWTs and bypass authentication entirely. Or, an authorization middleware with flawed logic that permits unauthorized access to sensitive endpoints.
  • Impact: Authentication bypass, authorization bypass, complete compromise of application security, data breach, privilege escalation.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Middleware Development Practices: Adhere to rigorous secure coding practices when developing any middleware, especially security-critical ones.
    • Security Reviews & Code Audits: Mandate thorough security reviews and code audits specifically for custom middleware, ideally by security experts.
    • Leverage Established Security Libraries: Prioritize using well-vetted and established security libraries and frameworks for authentication and authorization within middleware, rather than implementing custom solutions from scratch.
    • Comprehensive Testing: Implement extensive unit and integration tests for middleware, focusing on security boundaries and edge cases, to ensure correct and secure logic.

Attack Surface: Middleware Ordering Issues

  • Description: Security bypasses resulting from incorrect ordering of middleware in the Fiber application's middleware chain.
  • Fiber Contribution: Fiber's middleware chain mechanism relies on the order of registration. Misunderstanding or misconfiguring this order can lead to critical security flaws where security middleware is bypassed due to incorrect placement in the chain.
  • Example: An authorization middleware intended to protect a specific route is registered after a middleware that handles and potentially exposes sensitive data. In this scenario, the authorization middleware might be ineffective, allowing unauthorized access to the sensitive data before authorization checks are performed.
  • Impact: Authorization bypass, unauthorized access to protected resources, data breach.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Careful Middleware Chain Design: Thoroughly plan and document the middleware chain order, ensuring security middleware is placed before any middleware that handles sensitive data or business logic.
    • Principle of Least Privilege in Middleware: Design middleware to operate with the least necessary privileges and ensure clear separation of concerns.
    • Testing Middleware Order: Include integration tests that specifically verify the correct execution order of middleware and that security middleware is effectively applied in the intended sequence.
    • Code Reviews Focused on Middleware Order: During code reviews, specifically scrutinize the middleware registration order and its implications for security.