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Threat Model Analysis for gofiber/fiber

Threat: Fasthttp Request Smuggling

  • 1. Threat: Fasthttp Request Smuggling

    • Description: An attacker crafts a malicious HTTP request exploiting vulnerabilities in how fasthttp parses and handles HTTP headers (e.g., Transfer-Encoding, Content-Length). The attacker smuggles a second, hidden request within the first, bypassing security controls. This leverages fasthttp's non-standard HTTP implementation.
    • Impact:
      • Bypass of authentication and authorization.
      • Access to restricted resources.
      • Potential data modification/deletion.
      • Possible remote code execution (RCE) in severe cases, if the smuggled request interacts with vulnerable backend systems.
    • Affected Fiber Component: fasthttp (underlying HTTP server library), Fiber's request parsing logic (which relies on fasthttp).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • a. Reverse Proxy (Primary): Deploy a well-configured reverse proxy (Nginx, Apache, HAProxy) in front of the Fiber application. Configure the proxy to strictly enforce HTTP/1.1 compliance and reject ambiguous requests.
      • b. Fasthttp Updates: Stay absolutely current with fasthttp releases. Monitor security advisories and apply patches immediately.
      • c. WAF: Implement a Web Application Firewall (WAF) with rules to detect and block HTTP request smuggling, specifically tailored to fasthttp's behavior.
      • d. Monitoring: Detailed HTTP request logging and monitoring to detect unusual patterns.

Threat: Denial of Service (DoS) via Fasthttp Resource Exhaustion

  • 2. Threat: Denial of Service (DoS) via Fasthttp Resource Exhaustion

    • Description: An attacker sends many requests, or specially crafted requests, to exhaust server resources (CPU, memory, connections) within fasthttp. This could include slowloris attacks, large request bodies, or exploiting inefficiencies in fasthttp's connection handling.
    • Impact:
      • Application unavailability.
      • Service disruption.
      • Potential financial losses.
    • Affected Fiber Component: fasthttp (connection handling, request processing), Fiber's server configuration (concurrency limits, timeouts).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • a. Rate Limiting: Implement robust rate limiting using Fiber's middleware (e.g., fiber.Limiter) or a dedicated service. Configure limits based on IP, user ID, etc.
      • b. Connection Limits: Configure fasthttp's connection limits (via Fiber's server settings) to prevent a single client from consuming too many connections.
      • c. Request Timeouts: Set appropriate timeouts for requests to prevent slowloris and other slow-request vulnerabilities. Use Fiber's configuration.
      • d. Resource Monitoring: Monitor server resource usage (CPU, memory, connections) and set up alerts.
      • e. Reverse Proxy: A reverse proxy can help absorb some DoS attacks.
      • f. CDN: Use a CDN to distribute static content.

Threat: Third-Party Middleware Vulnerability (Authentication Bypass)

  • 3. Threat: Third-Party Middleware Vulnerability (Authentication Bypass)

    • Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in a third-party Fiber middleware used for authentication (e.g., a JWT middleware). The vulnerability might allow forging authentication tokens, bypassing authentication, or escalating privileges. This is directly related to Fiber because it's within Fiber's middleware ecosystem.
    • Impact:
      • Unauthorized access to protected resources.
      • Data breaches.
      • Account takeover.
      • Potential for complete system compromise.
    • Affected Fiber Component: The specific third-party middleware (e.g., github.com/gofiber/jwt), Fiber's middleware execution chain.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • a. Middleware Auditing: Thoroughly audit the source code of any third-party authentication middleware.
      • b. Vulnerability Scanning: Use a vulnerability scanner to identify known vulnerabilities.
      • c. Updates: Keep the middleware updated. Subscribe to security advisories.
      • d. Least Privilege (Middleware): Ensure the middleware has only minimum necessary permissions.
      • e. Custom Middleware (If Feasible): For critical authentication, consider writing your own middleware.
      • f. Defense in Depth: Implement additional security controls (e.g., multi-factor authentication).

Threat: Template Injection (using a vulnerable template engine with Fiber)

  • 4. Threat: Template Injection (using a vulnerable template engine with Fiber)
    • Description: If a template engine is used with Fiber, and user data is rendered into a template without proper escaping, an attacker can inject malicious code. This can lead to XSS or RCE. While not exclusively a Fiber issue, the integration with Fiber is the attack vector.
    • Impact:
      • XSS: Execute malicious JavaScript in other users' browsers.
      • RCE: Execute arbitrary code on the server.
    • Affected Fiber Component: The chosen template engine, Fiber's integration with the template engine.
    • Risk Severity: Critical (if RCE is possible), High (for XSS)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • a. Auto-Escaping Template Engine: Use a template engine that automatically escapes output by default (e.g., Go's html/template).
      • b. Manual Escaping (If Necessary): If the engine doesn't auto-escape, manually escape all user-supplied data.
      • c. Context-Aware Escaping: Ensure escaping is appropriate for the context.
      • d. Content Security Policy (CSP): Implement CSP to mitigate XSS.