attack-surface.md

Attack Surface Analysis for gogf/gf

Attack Surface: 1. Unvalidated Request Parameter Input

• Description: Attackers exploit vulnerabilities arising from insufficient validation and sanitization of user-supplied data through HTTP request parameters. This can lead to injection attacks and unexpected application behavior.
• How gf Contributes: GoFrame's convenient parameter binding functions (ghttp.Request.Get*, ghttp.Request.Post*, ghttp.Request.Parse) simplify accessing request data, potentially leading developers to directly use input without proper validation, increasing the risk of vulnerabilities like SQL Injection, Command Injection, and Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).
• Example: A developer uses r.GetString("id") to fetch a user ID and directly uses it in a raw SQL query via gdb without validation. An attacker injects SQL code in the id parameter, leading to SQL Injection.
• Impact: Data breaches, unauthorized access, data manipulation, server compromise, denial of service.
• Risk Severity: High to Critical.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Input Validation using GoFrame's Validation: Utilize GoFrame's built-in validation features (gvalid package integrated with ghttp.Request.Parse) to define and enforce validation rules for all request parameters.
  • Sanitization/Escaping before Sensitive Operations: Sanitize or escape user input obtained via ghttp.Request.Get* and ghttp.Request.Post* before using it in sensitive operations like database queries (even with gdb ORM), system commands, or template rendering. Use context-aware escaping functions provided by Go or external libraries.
  • Parameter Type Checking: Leverage GoFrame's parameter binding to enforce expected data types. While not full validation, it can prevent some basic type-related injection attempts.

Attack Surface: 2. Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) via gtpl

• Description: Attackers inject malicious code into template directives when user-controlled input is directly embedded into templates processed by GoFrame's template engine (gtpl). This allows arbitrary code execution on the server.
• How gf Contributes: GoFrame's gtpl template engine, while efficient, can be vulnerable to SSTI if developers directly embed unsanitized user input into templates. The ease of use of gtpl might inadvertently encourage insecure template practices.
• Example: A developer uses {{.UserInput}} in a gtpl template, where UserInput is directly taken from ghttp.Request. An attacker injects template code like {{printf "%s" (exec "whoami")}} in the parameter, potentially executing arbitrary commands on the server when the template is rendered.
• Impact: Full server compromise, remote code execution, data breaches, denial of service.
• Risk Severity: Critical.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Strictly Avoid Embedding Unsanitized User Input in gtpl Templates: Treat user input as untrusted and avoid directly placing it within gtpl template directives.
  • Context-Aware Output Encoding in gtpl: If user input must be displayed in templates, use gtpl's built-in escaping functions or ensure context-aware output encoding is applied to prevent code injection. Understand gtpl's escaping capabilities and limitations.
  • Template Logic Separation: Separate template logic from data presentation as much as possible. Prepare data in Go code and pass pre-processed, safe data to templates for rendering.

Attack Surface: 3. Unrestricted File Upload via ghttp.Request

• Description: Attackers upload malicious files to the server due to lack of proper restrictions when using GoFrame's file upload handling features. This can lead to malware deployment and remote code execution.
• How gf Contributes: GoFrame provides functions like ghttp.Request.GetUploadFile and ghttp.Request.GetUploadFiles for handling file uploads. However, GoFrame itself does not enforce security policies on file uploads. Developers must implement all necessary security checks.
• Example: An application uses ghttp.Request.GetUploadFile to handle profile picture uploads but lacks file type validation. An attacker uploads a malicious executable file disguised as an image. If the server is misconfigured or vulnerabilities exist, this could lead to remote code execution.
• Impact: Remote code execution, malware deployment, data breaches, denial of service.
• Risk Severity: High to Critical.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • File Type Validation (Whitelist) using Go: Implement robust file type validation in Go code before processing uploaded files obtained via ghttp.Request.GetUploadFile*. Use a whitelist of allowed file extensions and MIME types.
  • File Size Limits in Go Code: Enforce file size limits in Go code to prevent DoS attacks. Check file sizes after receiving them via ghttp.Request and reject oversized files.
  • Secure File Storage Configuration: Configure file storage locations outside the web root and in non-executable directories. Ensure proper permissions are set on the file storage directory.
  • Filename Sanitization in Go Code: Sanitize filenames obtained from ghttp.Request.GetUploadFile* in Go code to prevent path traversal and other filename-based attacks before saving files.

Attack Surface: 4. Insecure Session Management via ghttp.Session

• Description: Vulnerabilities in session management mechanisms, when using GoFrame's ghttp.Session, allow attackers to hijack user sessions and gain unauthorized access.
• How gf Contributes: GoFrame provides session management through ghttp.Session. Insecure configuration or improper usage of ghttp.Session features can lead to session fixation, session hijacking, and other session-related vulnerabilities. Developers are responsible for secure session configuration.
• Example: Session cookies are not configured with HttpOnly and Secure flags when using ghttp.Session. An attacker uses XSS to steal the session cookie and hijack a user's session.
• Impact: Unauthorized access, account takeover, data breaches, privilege escalation.
• Risk Severity: High to Critical.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Secure ghttp.Session Cookie Configuration: When initializing or configuring ghttp.Session, explicitly set HttpOnly, Secure, and SameSite flags for session cookies. Refer to GoFrame documentation for session configuration options.
  • Session ID Regeneration with ghttp.Session: Use ghttp.Session's features to regenerate session IDs after successful login and other security-sensitive actions to prevent session fixation.
  • Secure Session Storage Configuration: Choose a secure backend for ghttp.Session storage (e.g., database, Redis) and configure it properly. Ensure the storage mechanism is protected and access is restricted.
  • HTTPS Enforcement for ghttp.Server: Ensure HTTPS is enforced for the entire application using GoFrame's ghttp.Server configuration to protect session IDs in transit.

Attack Surface: 5. Information Disclosure via Verbose Error Handling (Default Behavior)

• Description: Detailed error messages and stack traces, potentially exposed due to GoFrame's default error handling behavior, can reveal sensitive information about the application.
• How gf Contributes: GoFrame's default error handling might be verbose, especially in development mode, and could expose detailed error information including stack traces and internal paths. This default behavior, if not overridden for production, can lead to information disclosure.
• Example: An unhandled exception in a gdb database operation, if not properly handled, might display a detailed stack trace including database connection strings or internal file paths in the HTTP response, revealing sensitive information to an attacker.
• Impact: Information leakage, aiding attackers in reconnaissance and vulnerability exploitation.
• Risk Severity: Medium to High (can escalate to high if highly sensitive information is exposed).
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Custom Error Handling Middleware in GoFrame: Implement custom error handling middleware in GoFrame using ghttp.Middleware to intercept errors. Log detailed errors internally using glog but return generic, user-friendly error messages in HTTP responses for production environments.
  • Production Error Configuration: Configure GoFrame's error handling specifically for production to suppress verbose error output and prevent information disclosure. Review GoFrame's error handling configuration options.
  • Centralized Logging with glog: Utilize GoFrame's glog package for centralized and secure logging of detailed errors. Ensure logs are stored securely and access is restricted.