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Attack Tree Analysis for gogf/gf

Objective: Compromise GoFrame Application by Exploiting GoFrame Weaknesses

Attack Tree Visualization

Root Goal: Compromise GoFrame Application [CRITICAL NODE]

├───[1.0] Exploit Routing/Request Handling Vulnerabilities **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   └───[1.2] Parameter Pollution/Manipulation **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   └───[1.3] Denial of Service (DoS) via Request Flooding **[HIGH RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE - DoS]**
│       └───[1.3.1] Resource Exhaustion
│           └───[1.3.1.a] Send a large number of requests to overwhelm server resources (CPU, memory, connections) if rate limiting is not properly implemented in GoFrame or application code.
│               ├── Impact: High (Service disruption) **[CRITICAL NODE - Impact: High]**

├───[2.0] Exploit Configuration Management Weaknesses (gf.gcfg/TOML/YAML) **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   ├───[2.1] Insecure Configuration Storage **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   ├───[2.1.1] Configuration File Exposure **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   └───[2.1.1.a] Access publicly accessible configuration files (e.g., via misconfigured web server or directory traversal if static files are served incorrectly). **[CRITICAL NODE - Config Exposure]**
│   │   │       ├── Impact: High (Sensitive information disclosure) **[CRITICAL NODE - Impact: High]**
│   ├───[2.2] Sensitive Data Exposure in Configuration **[HIGH RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE - Sensitive Data Exposure]**
│   │   ├───[2.2.1] Credentials in Configuration Files **[HIGH RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE - Credentials in Config]**
│   │   │   └───[2.2.1.a] Extract database credentials, API keys, or other secrets stored directly in configuration files (if developers mistakenly commit secrets). **[CRITICAL NODE - Impact: Critical]**
│   │   │       ├── Impact: Critical (Full system compromise) **[CRITICAL NODE - Impact: Critical]**

├───[3.0] Exploit ORM (gdb) Related Vulnerabilities (if used)
│   ├───[3.1] ORM Injection Vulnerabilities (Less likely in GoFrame's ORM due to parameterized queries, but consider misuse) **[HIGH RISK PATH if `gdb.Raw` used]**
│   │   ├───[3.1.1] Raw SQL Injection via gdb.Raw or similar methods **[HIGH RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE - SQL Injection]**
│   │   │   └───[3.1.1.a] If application uses `gdb.Raw` or similar methods without proper sanitization, inject malicious SQL queries. **[CRITICAL NODE - Impact: Critical]**
│   │   │       ├── Impact: Critical (Database compromise) **[CRITICAL NODE - Impact: Critical]**
│   │   └───[3.1.3] Insecure Deserialization (if ORM involves complex object handling - less likely in typical GoFrame ORM usage)
│   │       └───[3.1.3.a] If ORM handles complex object deserialization from external sources, attempt to exploit deserialization vulnerabilities. **[CRITICAL NODE - Impact: Critical]**
│   │           ├── Impact: Critical (Remote Code Execution) **[CRITICAL NODE - Impact: Critical]**

├───[5.0] Exploit Session/Cookie Management Weaknesses (ghttp.Server) **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   ├───[5.2] Insecure Cookie Handling **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   ├───[5.2.1] Missing Secure/HttpOnly Flags **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │   │   ├───[5.2.1.a] Cookies without `Secure` flag transmitted over HTTP, susceptible to interception. **[CRITICAL NODE - Missing Secure Flag]**
│   │   │   │   ├── Impact: High (Session hijacking) **[CRITICAL NODE - Impact: High]**
│   │   │   └───[5.2.1.b] Cookies without `HttpOnly` flag accessible via JavaScript, vulnerable to XSS. **[CRITICAL NODE - Missing HttpOnly Flag]**
│   │   │       ├── Impact: High (Session hijacking, XSS attacks) **[CRITICAL NODE - Impact: High]**
│   │   └───[5.2.3] Session Hijacking via Network Interception **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   │       └───[5.2.3.a] Intercept session cookies over insecure connections (HTTP) if HTTPS is not enforced everywhere. **[CRITICAL NODE - HTTP Allowed]**
│   │           ├── Impact: High (Session hijacking) **[CRITICAL NODE - Impact: High]**

├───[6.0] Exploit File Upload/Static File Serving Vulnerabilities (ghttp.Server) **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   ├───[6.1] Unrestricted File Upload **[HIGH RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE - File Upload Vulnerabilities]**
│   │   ├───[6.1.1] Lack of File Type Validation **[HIGH RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE - Lack of File Type Validation]**
│   │   │   └───[6.1.1.a] Upload executable files (e.g., PHP, JSP, shell scripts) if server attempts to execute them or if they can be accessed directly. **[CRITICAL NODE - Impact: High]**
│   │   │       ├── Impact: High (Remote Code Execution) **[CRITICAL NODE - Impact: High]**
│   │   └───[6.1.3] Insecure File Storage Location **[HIGH RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE - Insecure File Storage]**
│   │       └───[6.1.3.a] Uploaded files stored in publicly accessible directories, leading to direct access and potential execution. **[CRITICAL NODE - Impact: High]**
│   │           ├── Impact: High (Remote Code Execution, data breach) **[CRITICAL NODE - Impact: High]**

├───[7.0] Exploit Logging Vulnerabilities (glog) **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   ├───[7.1] Sensitive Data Logging **[HIGH RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE - Sensitive Data Logging]**
│   │   ├───[7.1.1] Logging Passwords/Secrets **[HIGH RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE - Logging Secrets]**
│   │   │   └───[7.1.1.a] Application code logs sensitive information (passwords, API keys, etc.) which can be exposed via log files. **[CRITICAL NODE - Impact: Critical]**
│   │   │       ├── Impact: Critical (Full system compromise) **[CRITICAL NODE - Impact: Critical]**
│   └───[7.2] Insecure Log Storage/Access **[HIGH RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE - Insecure Log Storage]**
│       ├───[7.2.1] Publicly Accessible Log Files **[HIGH RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE - Public Logs]**
│       │   └───[7.2.1.a] Log files stored in publicly accessible directories or exposed via misconfigured web server. **[CRITICAL NODE - Impact: High]**
│       │       ├── Impact: High (Sensitive information disclosure) **[CRITICAL NODE - Impact: High]**

├───[8.0] Dependency Vulnerabilities (Indirectly related to GoFrame usage) **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│   └───[8.1] Outdated GoFrame Dependencies **[HIGH RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE - Dependency Vulnerabilities]**
│       └───[8.1.1] Vulnerable Go Modules **[HIGH RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE - Vulnerable Modules]**
│           └───[8.1.1.a] GoFrame or application dependencies have known vulnerabilities that can be exploited. **[CRITICAL NODE - Impact: Varies]**
│               ├── Impact: Varies (From Information Disclosure to RCE) **[CRITICAL NODE - Impact: Varies]**

└───[9.0] GoFrame Specific Vulnerabilities (Hypothetical - Requires Security Research)
    └───[9.1] Undiscovered GoFrame Framework Bugs
        └───[9.1.1] Code Execution Vulnerabilities
        │   └───[9.1.1.a]  Find and exploit a yet unknown vulnerability in GoFrame's core code that allows for remote code execution. **[CRITICAL NODE - Impact: Critical]**
        │       ├── Impact: Critical (Remote Code Execution) **[CRITICAL NODE - Impact: Critical]**
  • Attack Vector: Exploiting weaknesses in how the GoFrame application handles routing and incoming HTTP requests. This is a broad category encompassing various sub-vectors.
  • Focus Areas within this Path:
    • 1.2 Parameter Pollution/Manipulation [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Attack Vector: Manipulating request parameters (query parameters, POST data, headers) to bypass validation, alter application logic, or inject malicious data.
      • Example: HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP) to override expected parameters, or sending unexpected data types in request bodies.
    • 1.3 Denial of Service (DoS) via Request Flooding [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - DoS]:
      • Attack Vector: Overwhelming the application with a large volume of requests to exhaust server resources and cause service disruption.
      • Critical Node: DoS attacks are critical due to their potential to take down the application.
      • 1.3.1 Resource Exhaustion:
        • Attack Vector: Specifically targeting resource exhaustion by sending requests that consume excessive CPU, memory, or network connections.
        • 1.3.1.a Impact: High (Service disruption) [CRITICAL NODE - Impact: High]: The impact of successful DoS is high, leading to service unavailability.
  • Attack Vector: Targeting vulnerabilities arising from insecure configuration practices in GoFrame applications using gf.gcfg, TOML, or YAML configuration files.
  • Focus Areas within this Path:
    • 2.1 Insecure Configuration Storage [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Attack Vector: Configuration files are stored in a way that allows unauthorized access.
      • 2.1.1 Configuration File Exposure [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - Config Exposure]:
        • Attack Vector: Configuration files are publicly accessible, often due to misconfiguration of the web server or directory traversal vulnerabilities.
        • Critical Node: Exposure of configuration files is a critical vulnerability.
        • 2.1.1.a Access publicly accessible configuration files [CRITICAL NODE - Config Exposure]:
          • Attack Vector: Directly accessing configuration files via web browser or other means due to misconfiguration.
          • Impact: High (Sensitive information disclosure) [CRITICAL NODE - Impact: High]: Exposed configuration files often contain sensitive information.
    • 2.2 Sensitive Data Exposure in Configuration [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - Sensitive Data Exposure]:
      • Attack Vector: Sensitive information, such as credentials, is stored directly within configuration files.
      • Critical Node: Exposure of sensitive data in configuration is a critical vulnerability.
      • 2.2.1 Credentials in Configuration Files [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - Credentials in Config]:
        • Attack Vector: Database credentials, API keys, or other secrets are mistakenly hardcoded into configuration files.
        • Critical Node: Storing credentials in configuration is a critical security flaw.
        • 2.2.1.a Extract database credentials, API keys, or other secrets [CRITICAL NODE - Impact: Critical]:
          • Attack Vector: Retrieving sensitive credentials directly from configuration files.
          • Impact: Critical (Full system compromise) [CRITICAL NODE - Impact: Critical]: Compromised credentials can lead to full system compromise.
  • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities related to the GoFrame ORM (gdb), particularly when developers deviate from secure ORM practices.
  • Focus Areas within this Path:
    • 3.1 ORM Injection Vulnerabilities (Less likely in GoFrame's ORM due to parameterized queries, but consider misuse) [HIGH RISK PATH if gdb.Raw used]:
      • Attack Vector: Introducing malicious SQL code into database queries, bypassing the ORM's intended security mechanisms. This is especially relevant if gdb.Raw or similar raw query methods are used.
      • 3.1.1 Raw SQL Injection via gdb.Raw or similar methods [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - SQL Injection]:
        • Attack Vector: Using gdb.Raw or similar methods to construct SQL queries by directly concatenating user-provided input without proper sanitization or parameterization.
        • Critical Node: SQL Injection is a critical vulnerability.
        • 3.1.1.a If application uses gdb.Raw or similar methods without proper sanitization [CRITICAL NODE - Impact: Critical]:
          • Attack Vector: Exploiting the lack of sanitization when using raw SQL methods to inject malicious SQL.
          • Impact: Critical (Database compromise) [CRITICAL NODE - Impact: Critical]: Successful SQL injection can lead to complete database compromise.
      • 3.1.3 Insecure Deserialization (if ORM involves complex object handling - less likely in typical GoFrame ORM usage):
        • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities in the deserialization of complex objects handled by the ORM, if such functionality is used and improperly secured. While less common in typical GoFrame ORM usage, it's a high-impact potential vulnerability.
        • 3.1.3.a If ORM handles complex object deserialization from external sources [CRITICAL NODE - Impact: Critical]:
          • Attack Vector: Injecting malicious serialized objects that, when deserialized by the ORM, lead to code execution.
          • Impact: Critical (Remote Code Execution) [CRITICAL NODE - Impact: Critical]: Insecure deserialization can lead to Remote Code Execution.
  • Attack Vector: Targeting weaknesses in how the GoFrame application manages user sessions and cookies using ghttp.Server's session management features.
  • Focus Areas within this Path:
    • 5.2 Insecure Cookie Handling [HIGH RISK PATH]:
      • Attack Vector: Cookies are not handled securely, making them vulnerable to interception or manipulation.
      • 5.2.1 Missing Secure/HttpOnly Flags [HIGH RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: Session cookies are missing essential security flags.
        • 5.2.1.a Cookies without Secure flag [CRITICAL NODE - Missing Secure Flag]:
          • Attack Vector: Cookies are transmitted over HTTP, making them susceptible to interception in network traffic.
          • Impact: High (Session hijacking) [CRITICAL NODE - Impact: High]: Intercepted session cookies can be used for session hijacking.
        • 5.2.1.b Cookies without HttpOnly flag [CRITICAL NODE - Missing HttpOnly Flag]:
          • Attack Vector: Cookies are accessible via JavaScript, making them vulnerable to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks.
          • Impact: High (Session hijacking, XSS attacks) [CRITICAL NODE - Impact: High]: XSS can be used to steal session cookies and perform other malicious actions.
      • 5.2.3 Session Hijacking via Network Interception [HIGH RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: Session cookies are intercepted over insecure network connections.
        • 5.2.3.a Intercept session cookies over insecure connections (HTTP) [CRITICAL NODE - HTTP Allowed]:
          • Attack Vector: Allowing HTTP connections makes session cookies vulnerable to network sniffing.
          • Impact: High (Session hijacking) [CRITICAL NODE - Impact: High]: Intercepted session cookies can be used for session hijacking.
  • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities related to file uploads and static file serving functionalities in GoFrame applications using ghttp.Server.
  • Focus Areas within this Path:
    • 6.1 Unrestricted File Upload [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - File Upload Vulnerabilities]:
      • Attack Vector: The application allows uploading files without proper restrictions, leading to various vulnerabilities.
      • Critical Node: Unrestricted file upload is a critical vulnerability category.
      • 6.1.1 Lack of File Type Validation [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - Lack of File Type Validation]:
        • Attack Vector: The application does not validate the type of uploaded files, allowing attackers to upload malicious executable files.
        • Critical Node: Lack of file type validation is a critical flaw in file upload security.
        • 6.1.1.a Upload executable files (e.g., PHP, JSP, shell scripts) [CRITICAL NODE - Impact: High]:
          • Attack Vector: Uploading and potentially executing malicious scripts on the server.
          • Impact: High (Remote Code Execution) [CRITICAL NODE - Impact: High]: Executable file uploads can lead to Remote Code Execution.
      • 6.1.3 Insecure File Storage Location [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - Insecure File Storage]:
        • Attack Vector: Uploaded files are stored in publicly accessible directories, allowing direct access and potential execution.
        • Critical Node: Insecure file storage is a critical misconfiguration.
        • 6.1.3.a Uploaded files stored in publicly accessible directories [CRITICAL NODE - Impact: High]:
          • Attack Vector: Storing uploaded files in web-accessible locations.
          • Impact: High (Remote Code Execution, data breach) [CRITICAL NODE - Impact: High]: Insecure file storage can lead to RCE and data breaches.
  • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities related to logging practices in GoFrame applications using glog.
  • Focus Areas within this Path:
    • 7.1 Sensitive Data Logging [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - Sensitive Data Logging]:
      • Attack Vector: Sensitive information is inadvertently logged, making it accessible if logs are compromised.
      • Critical Node: Logging sensitive data is a critical security mistake.
      • 7.1.1 Logging Passwords/Secrets [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - Logging Secrets]:
        • Attack Vector: Application code logs passwords, API keys, or other secrets.
        • Critical Node: Logging secrets is a critical security flaw.
        • 7.1.1.a Application code logs sensitive information (passwords, API keys, etc.) [CRITICAL NODE - Impact: Critical]:
          • Attack Vector: Directly logging sensitive data in application logs.
          • Impact: Critical (Full system compromise) [CRITICAL NODE - Impact: Critical]: Exposed secrets in logs can lead to full system compromise.
    • 7.2 Insecure Log Storage/Access [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - Insecure Log Storage]:
      • Attack Vector: Log files are stored or accessed in an insecure manner, allowing unauthorized access.
      • Critical Node: Insecure log storage is a critical vulnerability.
      • 7.2.1 Publicly Accessible Log Files [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - Public Logs]:
        • Attack Vector: Log files are stored in publicly accessible directories or exposed via web server misconfiguration.
        • Critical Node: Publicly accessible logs are a critical security issue.
        • 7.2.1.a Log files stored in publicly accessible directories [CRITICAL NODE - Impact: High]:
          • Attack Vector: Storing logs in web-accessible locations.
          • Impact: High (Sensitive information disclosure) [CRITICAL NODE - Impact: High]: Publicly accessible logs can expose sensitive information.
  • Attack Vector: Exploiting known vulnerabilities in GoFrame's dependencies or application dependencies. While not directly a GoFrame framework vulnerability, it's a critical aspect of application security when using GoFrame.
  • Focus Areas within this Path:
    • 8.1 Outdated GoFrame Dependencies [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - Dependency Vulnerabilities]:
      • Attack Vector: Using outdated versions of GoFrame or its dependencies that contain known vulnerabilities.
      • Critical Node: Dependency vulnerabilities are a critical risk.
      • 8.1.1 Vulnerable Go Modules [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - Vulnerable Modules]:
        • Attack Vector: Specific Go modules used by GoFrame or the application have known security flaws.
        • Critical Node: Vulnerable modules are the specific components to target.
        • 8.1.1.a GoFrame or application dependencies have known vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE - Impact: Varies]:
          • Attack Vector: Exploiting publicly known vulnerabilities in dependencies.
          • Impact: Varies (From Information Disclosure to RCE) [CRITICAL NODE - Impact: Varies]: The impact of dependency vulnerabilities can range from information disclosure to Remote Code Execution, depending on the specific vulnerability.
  • Attack Vector: Hypothetical, undiscovered vulnerabilities within the GoFrame framework itself. These are less likely but represent a potential high-impact threat if they exist.
  • Focus Areas within this Path:
    • 9.1 Undiscovered GoFrame Framework Bugs:
      • Attack Vector: Zero-day vulnerabilities in GoFrame's core code.
      • 9.1.1 Code Execution Vulnerabilities:
        • Attack Vector: Hypothetical vulnerabilities that could allow for Remote Code Execution within the GoFrame framework.
        • 9.1.1.a Find and exploit a yet unknown vulnerability in GoFrame's core code [CRITICAL NODE - Impact: Critical]:
          • Attack Vector: Discovering and exploiting a zero-day RCE vulnerability in GoFrame.
          • Impact: Critical (Remote Code Execution) [CRITICAL NODE - Impact: Critical]: RCE vulnerabilities are always critical.