Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
62 lines (49 loc) · 6.53 KB

attack-surface.md

File metadata and controls

62 lines (49 loc) · 6.53 KB

Attack Surface Analysis for gogf/gf

Attack Surface: Template Injection (gview)

  • Description: User-supplied data is rendered directly into templates without proper escaping, allowing attackers to inject malicious code.
    • How gf Contributes: gf's gview template engine provides flexibility, but incorrect usage can lead to template injection. This is a direct consequence of using gview.
    • Example: Rendering user input directly in a template: {{.UserInput}} without using the built-in escaping functions (like {{.UserInput | html}} or the auto-escaping features).
    • Impact: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), potentially leading to session hijacking, data theft, or even Remote Code Execution (RCE) if the template engine allows it.
    • Risk Severity: Critical (if RCE is possible), High (for XSS)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers: Always use gf's built-in escaping functions (e.g., html, js, url) when rendering user-supplied data in templates. Enable auto-escaping if available. Avoid using "unsafe" template functions that bypass escaping. Sanitize user input before passing it to the template engine.

Attack Surface: SQL Injection (gdb - ORM Misuse)

  • Description: Improper use of the ORM or raw SQL queries allows attackers to inject malicious SQL code.
    • How gf Contributes: While gf's ORM aims to prevent SQLi, incorrect usage (e.g., string concatenation with user input) can bypass these protections. The vulnerability exists because of the ORM and how it's used.
    • Example: Using string concatenation to build a query: db.Table("users").Where("name = '" + userInput + "'").All().
    • Impact: Data breaches, data modification, data deletion, database server compromise.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers: Always use parameterized queries or prepared statements provided by the gf ORM. Avoid constructing SQL queries using string concatenation with user-provided input. Use the ORM's built-in methods for filtering, sorting, and updating data. Example of safe usage: db.Table("users").Where("name", userInput).All().

Attack Surface: Path Traversal (Static File Serving)

  • Description: Attackers manipulate file paths to access files or directories outside the intended web root.
    • How gf Contributes: gf's built-in static file serving functionality (ghttp.Server's static file handling) is the direct source of this potential vulnerability if misconfigured.
    • Example: An attacker might use a URL like /static/../../etc/passwd to try to access the system's password file.
    • Impact: Exposure of sensitive files (configuration files, source code, etc.), potentially leading to further compromise.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers: Carefully define the root directory for static file serving using ghttp.Server. Use gf's configuration options to restrict access to specific files or directories. Sanitize user-provided input used in file paths. Avoid serving sensitive files directly. Use a dedicated web server (like Nginx or Apache) for static file serving in production, as they often have more robust path traversal protection.

Attack Surface: Weak Cryptography (gcrypto)

  • Description: Using outdated or weak cryptographic algorithms or improper key management.
    • How gf Contributes: gf provides cryptographic functions (gcrypto), and the choice of which functions to use and how to use them directly impacts security. This is a direct attack surface of using gcrypto.
    • Example: Using MD5 for password hashing or hardcoding encryption keys in the codebase.
    • Impact: Compromise of sensitive data, authentication bypass.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers: Use strong, recommended cryptographic algorithms (e.g., SHA-256 or SHA-3 for hashing, AES-256 with a secure mode like GCM for encryption). Store cryptographic keys securely, outside of the codebase (e.g., using a key management system or environment variables). Generate strong, random keys. Avoid hardcoding keys. Follow cryptographic best practices (e.g., using appropriate initialization vectors and nonces).

Attack Surface: Denial of Service (DoS) via Request Body Limit

  • Description: Attackers send excessively large request bodies to exhaust server resources.
    • How gf Contributes: gf's ghttp.Server needs to be configured with appropriate limits to prevent this. The lack of a default, safe limit in ghttp.Server is a direct contributor.
    • Example: An attacker sends a multi-gigabyte request body to an endpoint that doesn't have a size limit.
    • Impact: Server resource exhaustion, service unavailability.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers: Use the ClientMaxBodySize option in ghttp.Server to set a reasonable limit on the size of request bodies.

Attack Surface: Overly Permissive CORS Configuration

  • Description: Misconfigured Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) allows unauthorized websites to interact with the application.
    • How gf Contributes: gf provides extensive CORS configuration options via ghttp.Server, increasing the risk of misconfiguration if not handled carefully. The extensive configuration options are the direct attack surface.
    • Example: Setting AllowAllOrigins: true in the ghttp.Server configuration allows any website to make requests to the application.
    • Impact: Data breaches, unauthorized actions, account takeover. Malicious websites can steal user data or perform actions on behalf of the user.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers: Explicitly define allowed origins, methods, and headers in the CORS configuration. Avoid using wildcards (*) for origins in production. Use specific origins (e.g., https://www.example.com). Test CORS configuration thoroughly. Use gf's built-in CORS middleware with careful, restrictive settings.