threat-modeling.md

Threat Model Analysis for gogf/gf

Threat: ORM Data Tampering via Unsafe Methods

1. Threat: ORM Data Tampering via Unsafe Methods

• Description: An attacker crafts malicious input that, when used with gf's gdb ORM's Raw or Unsafe methods (or similar functions that bypass prepared statements), allows for SQL injection. The attacker might try to insert, modify, or delete data, or even execute arbitrary SQL commands. This directly involves the misuse of gf's database interaction methods.
• Impact: Data breach, data corruption, unauthorized data modification, potential server compromise (if the database user has excessive privileges).
• Affected gf Component: gdb (ORM module), specifically functions like Raw, Unsafe, and any custom query builders that don't use parameterized queries.
• Risk Severity: Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Strictly avoid using Raw or Unsafe unless absolutely necessary.
  • If Raw or Unsafe are unavoidable, always use parameterized queries (using ? placeholders and passing values separately). Never concatenate user input directly into the SQL string.
  • Prefer using the ORM's structured query builder methods (e.g., Where, Select, Insert, Update, Delete) whenever possible.
  • Implement input validation before data reaches the ORM layer (although this is a general mitigation, the core vulnerability is within gdb).
  • Use a Web Application Firewall (WAF) with SQL injection detection capabilities (general mitigation, but helpful).

Threat: Request Parameter Tampering with Insufficient Validation (Direct gf Usage)

2. Threat: Request Parameter Tampering with Insufficient Validation (Direct gf Usage)

• Description: An attacker manipulates HTTP request parameters. While this is a general web vulnerability, the direct gf involvement is the failure to properly utilize gf's gvalid module or creating inadequate custom validation within gf's request handling. The attacker exploits weaknesses in how gf's request processing and validation features are used.
• Impact: Unauthorized access to data or functionality, data corruption, business logic bypass, potential for other vulnerabilities.
• Affected gf Component: ghttp (HTTP server module), gvalid (validation module). The threat arises from incorrect or insufficient use of these modules.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Use gvalid extensively and define strict validation rules for all request parameters. This is the primary mitigation, directly addressing the gf component usage.
  • Validate data types, formats, lengths, ranges, and allowed values, leveraging gvalid's capabilities.
  • Validate nested data structures recursively, using gvalid's support for this.
  • Implement server-side validation using gvalid; do not rely solely on client-side validation.

Threat: Template Injection via Unsafe Template Rendering (Direct gf Usage)

3. Threat: Template Injection via Unsafe Template Rendering (Direct gf Usage)

• Description: An attacker injects malicious code into a template. The direct gf involvement is either disabling gview's auto-escaping, using custom template functions insecurely within gview, or loading templates from untrusted sources through gview. The vulnerability stems from misusing or bypassing gf's template engine's security features.
• Impact: Cross-site scripting (XSS), server-side code execution (in severe cases), data exfiltration, website defacement.
• Affected gf Component: gview (template engine module). The threat is directly tied to the use (or misuse) of this module.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Ensure that auto-escaping is enabled in gview (this is usually the default and is the primary gf-specific mitigation).
  • Load templates only from trusted sources (e.g., the application's file system) using gview's intended loading mechanisms.
  • Avoid passing unsanitized user input directly to gview's template rendering functions.
  • If custom template functions are necessary, ensure they properly escape any user-provided data using gf's escaping functions or Go's html/template package, integrating this securely with gview.

Threat: Denial of Service via Resource Exhaustion (Direct ghttp)

4. Threat: Denial of Service via Resource Exhaustion (Direct ghttp)

• Description: An attacker sends a large number of requests, uploads large files, or uses other techniques to consume server resources. This directly targets gf's ghttp server's ability to handle concurrent requests, manage connections, and enforce resource limits. The vulnerability lies in the inherent capabilities and limitations of the ghttp server itself.
• Impact: Application unavailability, service disruption.
• Affected gf Component: ghttp (HTTP server module).
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Implement rate limiting (using gf's built-in features if available and appropriate, or a third-party library integrated with ghttp). This is a key mitigation directly related to ghttp's request handling.
  • Configure timeouts for requests and connections within ghttp's configuration to prevent slowloris attacks. This is a direct configuration of the ghttp component.
  • Limit the size of file uploads through ghttp's configuration or handling.
  • Use a Web Application Firewall (WAF) (general mitigation).
  • Monitor server resource usage (general mitigation).
  • Use a load balancer (general mitigation).

Threat: Configuration Spoofing (Direct gf Configuration)

5. Threat: Configuration Spoofing (Direct gf Configuration)

• Description: An attacker gains access to and modifies the application's configuration files, impacting how gf components behave. This directly targets gf's configuration loading and management system. The vulnerability is the ability to alter the settings that control gf's behavior.
• Impact: Application compromise, data breach, denial of service, depending on the specific configuration changes.
• Affected gf Component: gf's configuration management system (how it loads and parses configuration files, and how those settings affect all other components).
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Protect configuration files with strict file system permissions (read-only for the application user). This is a general mitigation, but crucial for protecting gf's configuration.
  • Use environment variables for sensitive configuration values (e.g., passwords, API keys) that are then read by gf's configuration system.
  • Consider using a dedicated secrets management solution (general mitigation).
  • Implement configuration file integrity monitoring (general mitigation).

Threat: Component Misconfiguration Leading to Privilege Escalation (Direct gf Components)

6. Threat: Component Misconfiguration Leading to Privilege Escalation (Direct gf Components)

• Description: Misconfiguration of gf components, particularly those related to authentication, authorization (e.g., gaccess), or session management (gsession), creates vulnerabilities. This directly involves the incorrect setup of gf's security-related features.
• Impact: Unauthorized access to sensitive data or functionality, privilege escalation.
• Affected gf Component: Any gf component with security-related configuration options, including ghttp, gaccess, gsession, gdb. The threat is the incorrect configuration of these components.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Thoroughly understand the configuration options for all security-relevant gf components used. This is crucial for secure use of gf.
  • Follow security best practices and the principle of least privilege when configuring gf components.
  • Use a secure configuration management system (general mitigation, but important for managing gf's configuration).
  • Regularly audit component configurations for security weaknesses, specifically focusing on gf components.
  • Keep gf and its components up to date to benefit from security patches (general, but applies to gf).