attack-surface.md

Attack Surface Analysis for golang-migrate/migrate

Attack Surface: Malicious Migration Files

• Description: migrate executes migration files. If an attacker can inject or modify these files, they can execute arbitrary code during the migration process via migrate.
• How migrate contributes to the attack surface: migrate's core functionality is to execute migration files. It inherently trusts the content of these files to be safe and valid migrations. This trust becomes an attack surface if the source or integrity of these files is compromised before being processed by migrate.
• Example: An attacker gains write access to the migration files directory. They replace a legitimate SQL migration file with one containing DROP DATABASE my_app_db;. When migrate up is executed, migrate will execute this malicious SQL, deleting the database.
• Impact: Full database compromise, data loss, data manipulation, denial of service, potential remote code execution on the database server through migrate's execution of malicious code.
• Risk Severity: Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Secure Migration File Storage: Protect the directory containing migration files with strict file system permissions. Ensure only authorized users and processes can write to this directory.
  • Code Review and Version Control for Migrations: Treat migration files as code. Implement mandatory code reviews for all migration changes and store them in version control to track modifications and ensure accountability.
  • Integrity Verification (Checksums/Signatures): Consider implementing mechanisms to verify the integrity of migration files before migrate executes them. This could involve checksums or digital signatures to detect unauthorized modifications.
  • Principle of Least Privilege (Database User for Migrations): Configure the database user used by migrate to have the minimum necessary privileges required specifically for migration tasks. Avoid granting excessive permissions that could be exploited by malicious migrations.

Attack Surface: Path Traversal in Migration File Loading

• Description: migrate loads migration files based on provided paths. If path validation is insufficient, attackers might use path traversal to make migrate load and execute files from unintended locations.
• How migrate contributes to the attack surface: migrate relies on file paths to locate and load migration files. If the application or migrate configuration allows for insufficiently validated path inputs, it opens the door for path traversal attacks exploiting migrate's file loading mechanism.
• Example: If the migration directory is configurable via an environment variable or command-line argument without proper sanitization, an attacker could set the path to MIGRATIONS_PATH=file:///../../../../tmp/malicious_migrations (or similar) to force migrate to load and execute migration files from a temporary directory they control.
• Impact: Execution of unintended migration scripts by migrate, potentially leading to database corruption, unauthorized data access, or denial of service.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Strict Path Input Validation: Thoroughly validate and sanitize any input that influences the migration file paths used by migrate. Use allowlists for permitted directories or enforce absolute paths.
  • Absolute Paths for Migration Directories: Configure migrate to use absolute paths for specifying migration directories. This reduces the risk of relative path interpretation vulnerabilities.
  • Secure Configuration Management: Ensure that configuration mechanisms used to specify migration paths (environment variables, configuration files) are themselves securely managed and not susceptible to manipulation by unauthorized parties.

Attack Surface: Exposure of Database Credentials in Migration Files

• Description: Developers might mistakenly embed database credentials within migration files or scripts used with migrate, making credentials accessible if these files are compromised.
• How migrate contributes to the attack surface: migrate's flexibility, especially with Go-based migrations and custom scripts, can inadvertently encourage developers to place configuration, including credentials, within the migration file context, increasing the risk of exposure if these files are not properly secured.
• Example: A Go migration file directly includes database connection details like db, err := sql.Open("postgres", "user=migrate_user password=hardcoded_password dbname=mydb sslmode=disable"). If this file is exposed or accidentally committed to version control, the credentials become accessible.
• Impact: Direct exposure of database credentials, allowing unauthorized access to the database if migration files are compromised.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Externalize Database Credentials (for migrate): Never hardcode database credentials directly in migration files or scripts used with migrate. Utilize environment variables, secure configuration files, or dedicated secrets management systems to provide credentials to migrate at runtime.
  • Secrets Management Best Practices: Implement robust secrets management practices for all database credentials used by the application and migrate. This includes secure storage, access control, rotation, and auditing of secrets.
  • Credential Scanning (for Migration Repositories): Regularly scan code repositories containing migration files and related scripts for accidentally committed credentials.

Attack Surface: Denial of Service through Malicious Migrations

• Description: Attackers can craft migration files that, when executed by migrate, consume excessive database resources, leading to denial of service.
• How migrate contributes to the attack surface: migrate executes the SQL or Go code within migration files without built-in resource governance. This allows for the execution of resource-intensive or inefficient migrations that can negatively impact database performance when triggered by migrate.
• Example: An attacker injects a migration file containing a highly inefficient SQL query (e.g., a Cartesian product join on large tables) or a Go migration that performs a computationally expensive operation. When migrate up is run, it executes this resource-intensive migration, potentially overloading the database and causing a denial of service.
• Impact: Database performance degradation, service disruption, or complete denial of service caused by migrations executed by migrate.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Thorough Migration Review and Testing (Performance Focus): In addition to functional testing, rigorously review and test migration files in a staging environment to assess their performance impact on the database before deploying them with migrate.
  • Database Resource Monitoring during Migrations: Implement database monitoring to track resource consumption (CPU, memory, I/O) during migration execution. Set up alerts to detect unusual resource spikes that might indicate a problematic migration.
  • Migration Timeouts (Application Level): Consider implementing application-level timeouts for migration execution. This can prevent indefinitely running migrations from causing prolonged outages, although it might require careful handling of partially applied migrations.
  • Rate Limiting Migrations (Automated Scenarios): In automated migration pipelines, implement rate limiting to control the frequency of migrations and prevent them from overwhelming the database, especially in rapid deployment scenarios.