attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for golang-migrate/migrate

Objective: Compromise Application using migrate

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application using `migrate`
├───(OR)─ **[HIGH RISK PATH]** Exploit `migrate` Configuration Vulnerabilities
│   ├───(AND)─ Insecure Configuration Storage
│   │   ├───(OR)─ **[CRITICAL NODE]** Plaintext Credentials in Configuration Files
├───(OR)─ **[HIGH RISK PATH]** Exploit Migration File Handling Vulnerabilities
│   ├───(AND)─ **[HIGH RISK PATH]** Malicious Migration File Injection
│   │   ├───(OR)─ **[HIGH RISK PATH]** Compromised Development/Deployment Pipeline
│   ├───(AND)─ **[HIGH RISK PATH]** Vulnerabilities in Migration File Parsing/Execution
│   │   ├───(OR)─ **[HIGH RISK PATH]** SQL Injection via Migration Files
├───(OR)─ **[HIGH RISK PATH]** Exploit Vulnerabilities in `migrate` Binary/Dependencies
│   ├───(AND)─ **[HIGH RISK PATH]** Known Vulnerabilities in `migrate` Binary
│   │   ├───(OR)─ **[HIGH RISK PATH]** Outdated `migrate` Version with Known CVEs
│   └───(AND)─ Vulnerabilities in `migrate` Dependencies
│       ├───(OR)─ **[HIGH RISK PATH]** Outdated Dependencies with Known CVEs
├───(OR)─ **[HIGH RISK PATH]** Database User Privilege Escalation via `migrate` (less likely, but consider)
│   ├───(AND)─ **[HIGH RISK PATH]** `migrate` User Has Excessive Database Privileges

Attack Tree Path: Exploit migrate Configuration Vulnerabilities

• Attack Vector: Attackers target misconfigurations in how migrate is set up, focusing on weaknesses in configuration storage and handling.
• Sub-Vectors:
  • Insecure Configuration Storage:
    • [CRITICAL NODE] Plaintext Credentials in Configuration Files:
      • Vulnerability: Database credentials (usernames, passwords) are stored directly in configuration files in plain text.
      • Exploitation: An attacker gaining access to the configuration files (e.g., through web server vulnerabilities, misconfigured permissions, or insider threats) can easily retrieve these credentials.
      • Impact: Critical. Full database compromise, data breach, potential application takeover.
      • Mitigation:
        • Never store credentials in plaintext.
        • Use environment variables to inject credentials.
        • Employ secrets management systems (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault) to securely store and retrieve credentials.
        • Restrict access to configuration files using appropriate file system permissions.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Migration File Handling Vulnerabilities

• Attack Vector: Attackers aim to inject malicious migration files or exploit vulnerabilities in how migrate processes migration files.
• Sub-Vectors:

  • [HIGH RISK PATH] Malicious Migration File Injection:

    • [HIGH RISK PATH] Compromised Development/Deployment Pipeline:
      • Vulnerability: The development or deployment pipeline is compromised, allowing an attacker to inject malicious migration files into the application's migration source.
      • Exploitation: An attacker could compromise developer machines, CI/CD systems, or repositories to insert malicious SQL or Go code into migration files. These files are then executed by migrate during deployment or updates.
      • Impact: Critical. Full database compromise, application takeover, data manipulation, backdoors.
      • Mitigation:
        • Secure the entire development and deployment pipeline.
        • Implement strong access controls for repositories, CI/CD systems, and deployment environments.
        • Use code signing and integrity checks for migration files to ensure they haven't been tampered with.
        • Regularly audit the pipeline for vulnerabilities and unauthorized access.

  • [HIGH RISK PATH] Vulnerabilities in Migration File Parsing/Execution:

    • [HIGH RISK PATH] SQL Injection via Migration Files:
      • Vulnerability: Migration files contain dynamically constructed SQL queries without proper parameterization, leading to SQL injection vulnerabilities.
      • Exploitation: An attacker could potentially manipulate input used in migration files (though less direct than typical web application SQLi) or, more likely, exploit vulnerabilities introduced by developers writing insecure dynamic SQL within migration scripts.
      • Impact: High. Database compromise, data manipulation, data exfiltration.
      • Mitigation:
        • Thoroughly review and audit all migration files for SQL injection vulnerabilities.
        • Avoid dynamic SQL construction in migration files whenever possible.
        • Use parameterized queries or ORM features within migration scripts to prevent SQL injection.
        • Employ static analysis tools to detect potential SQL injection vulnerabilities in migration files.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Vulnerabilities in migrate Binary/Dependencies

• Attack Vector: Attackers target known vulnerabilities in the migrate binary itself or its dependencies.
• Sub-Vectors:

  • [HIGH RISK PATH] Known Vulnerabilities in migrate Binary:

    • [HIGH RISK PATH] Outdated migrate Version with Known CVEs:
      • Vulnerability: Using an outdated version of migrate that has known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs).
      • Exploitation: Attackers can exploit publicly known vulnerabilities in older versions of migrate if the application is not updated.
      • Impact: High (depending on the specific CVE). Potential for remote code execution, denial of service, or other forms of compromise.
      • Mitigation:
        • Regularly update migrate to the latest stable version.
        • Monitor security advisories and CVE databases for golang-migrate/migrate.
        • Implement a patch management process to ensure timely updates.

  • [HIGH RISK PATH] Outdated Dependencies with Known CVEs:

    • Vulnerability: migrate relies on third-party dependencies, and outdated versions of these dependencies may contain known CVEs.
      • Exploitation: Attackers can exploit vulnerabilities in outdated dependencies used by migrate.
      • Impact: High (depending on the specific CVE in the dependency). Potential for various forms of compromise depending on the vulnerable dependency.
      • Mitigation:
        • Regularly update migrate's dependencies.
        • Use dependency scanning tools to identify and remediate vulnerabilities in dependencies.
        • Monitor security advisories for migrate's dependencies.
        • Employ dependency management tools to track and update dependencies effectively.

Attack Tree Path: Database User Privilege Escalation via migrate

• Attack Vector: Attackers exploit excessive database privileges granted to the user account used by migrate.
• Sub-Vectors:
  • [HIGH RISK PATH] migrate User Has Excessive Database Privileges:
    • Vulnerability: The database user account used by migrate is granted overly broad privileges beyond what is strictly necessary for database migrations.
    • Exploitation: If an attacker compromises the application or gains access using the migrate user's credentials (e.g., through configuration vulnerabilities), they can leverage these excessive privileges to perform actions beyond migrations, such as data manipulation, creating new users, or even potentially compromising the database server itself.
    • Impact: High (depending on the extent of excessive privileges). Potential for data breaches, data manipulation, denial of service, or database server compromise.
    • Mitigation:
      • Apply the principle of least privilege.
      • Grant the migrate database user only the minimum necessary privileges required for migration operations. This typically includes permissions to create/modify tables, indexes, and potentially data, but should not include administrative privileges or permissions to access sensitive data outside of migration needs.
      • Regularly review and audit database user privileges to ensure they remain appropriately restricted.