Attack Surface: Unauthorized Migration File Manipulation
- Description: Attackers gain write access to the directory containing migration files and inject malicious SQL code.
- How
migrate
Contributes:migrate
executes the SQL code contained within these files, providing a direct path for attackers to interact with the database through the tool's intended functionality. - Example: An attacker replaces a legitimate migration file with one containing
DROP TABLE users;
or SQL injection to extract data. - Impact: Complete database compromise (data loss, modification, exfiltration), potential for privilege escalation on the database server and potentially the host system.
- Risk Severity: Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Restrictive File System Permissions: The migration directory should have the strictest possible permissions. Only the application's user (and ideally a dedicated, low-privilege user) should have write access.
- Mandatory Code Review: All migration files must undergo rigorous code review by multiple developers before deployment.
- CI/CD Pipeline Integration: Automate checks in the CI/CD pipeline to prevent unreviewed or unauthorized migrations from being applied. Include static analysis for dangerous SQL patterns.
- Digital Signatures (Ideal, but Requires Custom Implementation): Sign migration files and verify signatures before execution using
migrate
. - Version Control Auditing: Use Git (or similar) to track all changes and provide an audit trail.
- Checksum Verification: Implement pre-migration hooks to calculate and verify checksums of migration files, integrating this check with
migrate
's execution flow.
- How
Attack Surface: Database Connection String Exposure
- Description: The database connection string, containing credentials, is leaked or exposed.
- How
migrate
Contributes:migrate
requires a database connection string to operate. This string is a direct input to the tool. If this string is compromised, it provides direct access to the database, bypassing application-level security. - Example: The connection string is hardcoded in the source code, accidentally committed to a public repository, or logged to an insecure location accessible to an attacker who then uses it with
migrate
. - Impact: Complete database compromise (data loss, modification, exfiltration).
- Risk Severity: Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Secure Configuration Management: Use a secrets management system (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, environment variables with very restricted access). Never hardcode credentials, especially those used by
migrate
. - Principle of Least Privilege: The database user in the connection string provided to
migrate
should have only the necessary permissions for migrations, not full administrative access. - Credential Rotation: Regularly rotate database credentials used by
migrate
. - Environment Variable Security: If using environment variables with
migrate
, ensure they are set securely and only accessible to the application process.
- Secure Configuration Management: Use a secrets management system (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, environment variables with very restricted access). Never hardcode credentials, especially those used by
- How
Attack Surface: Forced Migration to Vulnerable Versions
- Description: An attacker manipulates the application or
migrate
command directly to force a rollback to an older, known-vulnerable database schema.- How
migrate
Contributes:migrate
provides the functionality to specify the target migration version. If this control is exposed or misused, it can be abused. This is a direct feature of the tool. - Example: An attacker exploits an exposed API endpoint that allows setting the migration version used by
migrate
, forcing a rollback to a version with a known SQL injection vulnerability in a previous migration. - Impact: Exploitation of known vulnerabilities in older schema versions, leading to data breaches or other security issues.
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Restrict Version Control: Do not expose the ability to arbitrarily set the migration version used by
migrate
to untrusted users. Migrations should be applied sequentially and automatically as part of a controlled deployment. - Strict Input Validation: If version control is exposed for
migrate
commands, implement rigorous input validation to accept only valid version numbers. - Auditing: Log all
migrate
operations, including the version, timestamp, and initiating user/process.
- Restrict Version Control: Do not expose the ability to arbitrarily set the migration version used by
- How
Attack Surface: Driver-Specific Vulnerabilities
- Description: Exploitation of vulnerabilities within the database drivers used by
migrate
.- How
migrate
Contributes:migrate
relies on external database drivers (e.g.,pgx
for PostgreSQL) to interact with the database.migrate
directly uses these drivers. - Example: A vulnerability in the
pgx
driver allows for SQL injection, even if the migration files themselves are secure. The attacker usesmigrate
to trigger the vulnerable code path. - Impact: Varies depending on the driver vulnerability; could range from information disclosure to arbitrary code execution on the database server.
- Risk Severity: High (depending on the specific driver vulnerability)
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Keep Drivers Updated: Regularly update database drivers used by
migrate
to the latest patched versions. - Vulnerability Scanning: Use vulnerability scanning tools to identify and address known driver vulnerabilities that could be triggered via
migrate
.
- Keep Drivers Updated: Regularly update database drivers used by
- How