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Attack Surface Analysis for golang-migrate/migrate

  • Description: Attackers gain write access to the directory containing migration files and inject malicious SQL code.
    • How migrate Contributes: migrate executes the SQL code contained within these files, providing a direct path for attackers to interact with the database through the tool's intended functionality.
    • Example: An attacker replaces a legitimate migration file with one containing DROP TABLE users; or SQL injection to extract data.
    • Impact: Complete database compromise (data loss, modification, exfiltration), potential for privilege escalation on the database server and potentially the host system.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Restrictive File System Permissions: The migration directory should have the strictest possible permissions. Only the application's user (and ideally a dedicated, low-privilege user) should have write access.
      • Mandatory Code Review: All migration files must undergo rigorous code review by multiple developers before deployment.
      • CI/CD Pipeline Integration: Automate checks in the CI/CD pipeline to prevent unreviewed or unauthorized migrations from being applied. Include static analysis for dangerous SQL patterns.
      • Digital Signatures (Ideal, but Requires Custom Implementation): Sign migration files and verify signatures before execution using migrate.
      • Version Control Auditing: Use Git (or similar) to track all changes and provide an audit trail.
      • Checksum Verification: Implement pre-migration hooks to calculate and verify checksums of migration files, integrating this check with migrate's execution flow.
  • Description: The database connection string, containing credentials, is leaked or exposed.
    • How migrate Contributes: migrate requires a database connection string to operate. This string is a direct input to the tool. If this string is compromised, it provides direct access to the database, bypassing application-level security.
    • Example: The connection string is hardcoded in the source code, accidentally committed to a public repository, or logged to an insecure location accessible to an attacker who then uses it with migrate.
    • Impact: Complete database compromise (data loss, modification, exfiltration).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Secure Configuration Management: Use a secrets management system (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, environment variables with very restricted access). Never hardcode credentials, especially those used by migrate.
      • Principle of Least Privilege: The database user in the connection string provided to migrate should have only the necessary permissions for migrations, not full administrative access.
      • Credential Rotation: Regularly rotate database credentials used by migrate.
      • Environment Variable Security: If using environment variables with migrate, ensure they are set securely and only accessible to the application process.
  • Description: An attacker manipulates the application or migrate command directly to force a rollback to an older, known-vulnerable database schema.
    • How migrate Contributes: migrate provides the functionality to specify the target migration version. If this control is exposed or misused, it can be abused. This is a direct feature of the tool.
    • Example: An attacker exploits an exposed API endpoint that allows setting the migration version used by migrate, forcing a rollback to a version with a known SQL injection vulnerability in a previous migration.
    • Impact: Exploitation of known vulnerabilities in older schema versions, leading to data breaches or other security issues.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Restrict Version Control: Do not expose the ability to arbitrarily set the migration version used by migrate to untrusted users. Migrations should be applied sequentially and automatically as part of a controlled deployment.
      • Strict Input Validation: If version control is exposed for migrate commands, implement rigorous input validation to accept only valid version numbers.
      • Auditing: Log all migrate operations, including the version, timestamp, and initiating user/process.
  • Description: Exploitation of vulnerabilities within the database drivers used by migrate.
    • How migrate Contributes: migrate relies on external database drivers (e.g., pgx for PostgreSQL) to interact with the database. migrate directly uses these drivers.
    • Example: A vulnerability in the pgx driver allows for SQL injection, even if the migration files themselves are secure. The attacker uses migrate to trigger the vulnerable code path.
    • Impact: Varies depending on the driver vulnerability; could range from information disclosure to arbitrary code execution on the database server.
    • Risk Severity: High (depending on the specific driver vulnerability)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Keep Drivers Updated: Regularly update database drivers used by migrate to the latest patched versions.
      • Vulnerability Scanning: Use vulnerability scanning tools to identify and address known driver vulnerabilities that could be triggered via migrate.