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Threat Model Analysis for golang-migrate/migrate

Threat: Unauthorized Migration Execution

  • Threat: Unauthorized Migration Execution

    • Description: An attacker, without proper authorization, triggers the execution of database migrations. This is done by directly interacting with the migrate tool or any exposed application interfaces that wrap it, bypassing intended access controls. The attacker might use command-line access or exploit an improperly secured endpoint.
    • Impact:
      • Unintended schema changes.
      • Data loss or corruption.
      • Application instability or downtime.
      • Potential for complete database compromise if the attacker can execute arbitrary migrations.
    • Affected Component:
      • migrate CLI tool.
      • Any exposed HTTP endpoints that wrap migrate functionality (if applicable).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Secure any HTTP endpoints that interact with migrate using strong authentication and authorization. These endpoints should never be exposed to untrusted networks.
      • Implement strict access control on the server/environment where migrate is executed. Only authorized personnel should be able to run the tool.
      • Integrate migration execution into a secure CI/CD pipeline with mandatory approvals and reviews. Migrations should not be run manually in production.
      • Do not expose migration functionality directly to end-users.

Threat: Injection of Malicious SQL in Migration Files

  • Threat: Injection of Malicious SQL in Migration Files

    • Description: An attacker gains the ability to modify or create migration files, injecting malicious SQL code that will be executed by migrate. This is a direct attack on the input that migrate processes. The malicious SQL could drop tables, steal data, modify data, or even execute operating system commands (if the database allows it).
    • Impact:
      • Data loss, corruption, or unauthorized disclosure.
      • Complete database compromise.
      • Application downtime.
      • Reputational damage.
    • Affected Component:
      • Migration files (e.g., .sql files) – the direct input to migrate.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Implement mandatory code reviews for all migration files, with a strong focus on security and identifying potentially malicious SQL.
      • Use static analysis tools (SQL linters) to scan migration files for dangerous SQL patterns (e.g., DROP TABLE, TRUNCATE TABLE, dynamic SQL without proper sanitization). Integrate these tools into the CI/CD pipeline.
      • Employ a "least privilege" database user for migrate, limiting its permissions to the absolute minimum required for the specific migrations. This limits the damage potential of injected SQL.

Threat: Migration State Table Tampering

  • Threat: Migration State Table Tampering

    • Description: An attacker gains the ability to directly modify the migration state table (e.g., schema_migrations) that migrate uses to track applied migrations. This is a direct attack on a data structure managed by migrate. They could mark migrations as applied when they haven't been, or vice-versa, leading to inconsistencies or allowing the re-execution of potentially harmful migrations.
    • Impact:
      • Inconsistent database schema.
      • Data corruption or loss.
      • Application malfunction.
      • Potential for re-execution of malicious migrations (if the attacker can also inject malicious SQL).
    • Affected Component:
      • The migration state table (usually schema_migrations or a similar name) within the database – a core component managed by migrate.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strictly limit direct database access. Only the migrate tool (running with appropriate credentials) and authorized DBAs should have write access to the migration state table. Application code should never directly modify this table.
      • Implement database auditing to track all changes to the migration state table, allowing for detection and investigation of unauthorized modifications.

Threat: Denial of Service (DoS) via Resource-Intensive Migrations

  • Threat: Denial of Service (DoS) via Resource-Intensive Migrations

    • Description: An attacker repeatedly triggers migrations using the migrate tool (or an exposed interface to it) that consume significant database resources (CPU, memory, disk I/O). This is a direct attack leveraging migrate's functionality to cause a denial of service.
    • Impact:
      • Database unavailability.
      • Application downtime.
      • Potential for data corruption if migrations are interrupted mid-execution.
    • Affected Component:
      • migrate CLI tool.
      • Any exposed HTTP endpoints that wrap migrate functionality.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Implement rate limiting and other DoS protection mechanisms on any endpoints that trigger migrations through migrate.
      • Carefully design and thoroughly test migrations to ensure they are efficient and do not consume excessive resources. This is a preventative measure to reduce the effectiveness of a DoS attack.
      • Break down large migrations into smaller, more manageable steps, reducing the impact of any single migration.