Mitigation Strategy: Principle of Least Privilege for Routes
- Step 1: Route Inventory: Create a comprehensive list of all routes defined in your
gorilla/mux
router by reviewing your code wheremux.HandleFunc
,mux.Handle
,mux.PathPrefix
, and similar functions are used. - Step 2: Route Specificity Analysis: For each route, analyze its pattern defined in
mux
. Identify routes that use overly broad patterns like/*
or very generic path variable names withinmux
route definitions. - Step 3: Refine Route Patterns: Modify broad route patterns in
mux
to be as specific as possible. For example, instead of/api/*
, define specific routes like/api/users
,/api/products
,/api/orders
usingmux
's routing functions. Replace generic path variables inmux
routes with more descriptive ones, e.g.,/users/{userID}
instead of/resource/{id}
if the ID refers to a user, withinmux
path definitions. - Step 4: Remove Unnecessary Catch-Alls: Eliminate catch-all routes (
/*
) defined inmux
if they are not absolutely necessary. If a catch-all is required (e.g., for serving static files or a single-page application), ensure it is handled by a dedicated, secure handler registered withmux
that performs strict input validation and access control. - Step 5: Regular Route Review: Establish a process for regularly reviewing and updating route definitions in
mux
as the application evolves. This ensures that routes remain aligned with the principle of least privilege and that no unintended endpoints are exposed throughmux
's routing.
- Unauthorized Access (Severity: High): Broad routes defined in
mux
can unintentionally expose sensitive endpoints. - Information Disclosure (Severity: Medium): Overly permissive routes in
mux
might inadvertently reveal more data than intended. - Attack Surface Increase (Severity: Medium): A larger number of exposed routes defined in
mux
increases the overall attack surface.
- Unauthorized Access: High reduction in risk. By limiting route scope in
mux
, you directly reduce the chances of unauthorized access. - Information Disclosure: Medium reduction in risk. More specific routes in
mux
help in better controlling data accessibility. - Attack Surface Increase: Medium reduction in risk. Reducing overly broad routes in
mux
effectively shrinks the attack surface.
Partially implemented in the core API routes (/api/v1/users
, /api/v1/products
, etc.) which are defined with specific paths and parameters using mux
.
Legacy routes under /legacy/*
are still using a broad path prefix in mux
and need to be reviewed and made more specific. Also, the admin panel routes under /admin/*
defined in mux
could be further refined instead of using a single prefix.
Mitigation Strategy: Explicit Route Definitions
- Step 1: Minimize Regex Usage: Review route definitions in
mux
for heavy reliance on complex regular expressions. Identify routes where regex is used for simple pattern matching that could be achieved with standardmux
path syntax. - Step 2: Simplify Regex (If Necessary): If regular expressions are necessary in
mux
routes, strive to make them as simple and readable as possible. Avoid overly complex or nested regex patterns that are difficult to understand and audit withinmux
route definitions. - Step 3: Prefer Concrete Paths: Whenever feasible, define routes in
mux
using concrete paths and path variables instead of relying on regex for path segment matching. For example, use/users/{id:[0-9]+}
inmux
instead of/users/([0-9]+)
. - Step 4: Thorough Regex Testing: If complex regex in
mux
is unavoidable, rigorously test the regex patterns with various inputs, including edge cases and potentially malicious inputs, to ensure they behave as expected and do not introduce vulnerabilities like ReDoS when used inmux
routes. - Step 5: Code Review for Regex Routes: Pay extra attention to code reviews for routes in
mux
that use regular expressions. Ensure that the regex patterns are well-understood by the reviewers and that their security implications are considered in the context ofmux
routing.
- Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) (Severity: High): Complex or poorly written regex in
mux
routes can be vulnerable to ReDoS attacks. - Route Bypass (Severity: Medium): Subtle errors in complex regex patterns in
mux
routes can lead to unintended route matching. - Maintainability Issues (Severity: Medium): Complex regex routes in
mux
are harder to understand, maintain, and audit.
- Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS): High reduction in risk. Simplifying or avoiding complex regex in
mux
directly reduces ReDoS risk. - Route Bypass: Medium reduction in risk. Explicit routes in
mux
are less prone to unintended matching. - Maintainability Issues: Medium reduction in risk. Simpler
mux
routes are easier to understand and maintain.
Mostly implemented. The project generally uses explicit path variables and simple path matching in mux
. Regex is only used in a few specific routes for input validation within path variables (e.g., /{id:[0-9]+}
in mux
).
One or two older routes in mux
still use slightly more complex regex for path segment matching which could be refactored to use standard mux
path variables.
Mitigation Strategy: Route Collision Awareness
- Step 1: Route Definition Review: Carefully review all route definitions in your
gorilla/mux
router, paying attention to routes that might have overlapping or similar patterns defined inmux
. - Step 2: Specificity Ordering: Understand
mux
's route matching behavior, which prioritizes more specific routes. Ensure that more specific routes are defined before more general or overlapping routes inmux
if you intend for the specific routes to take precedence. - Step 3: Route Conflict Detection (Manual or Automated): Manually analyze route definitions in
mux
for potential conflicts. For larger applications, consider developing or using a tool to automatically detect potential route collisions based on patterns defined inmux
. - Step 4: Clear Route Naming/Comments: Use clear and descriptive names or comments for route handlers and route definitions in
mux
. This helps in understanding the purpose of each route and identifying potential conflicts during reviews ofmux
routes. - Step 5: Testing for Route Behavior: Write integration tests that specifically test
mux
route matching behavior, especially in scenarios where routes might overlap. Verify that requests are routed to the intended handlers based on the defined route priorities inmux
.
- Route Hijacking/Bypass (Severity: Medium): Route collisions in
mux
can lead to requests being routed to unintended handlers. - Unexpected Behavior (Severity: Medium): Unclear route matching behavior in
mux
due to collisions can lead to unexpected application behavior.
- Route Hijacking/Bypass: Medium reduction in risk. Being aware of and preventing route collisions in
mux
reduces misrouting. - Unexpected Behavior: Medium reduction in risk. Clear
mux
route definitions and collision avoidance lead to more predictable behavior.
Partially implemented. Developers are generally aware of mux
route specificity, but a formal process for route collision detection and documentation for mux
routes is missing.
A documented process for route collision detection and prevention for mux
routes should be established. Automated tooling for detecting potential collisions in mux
route definitions could also be beneficial.
Mitigation Strategy: Path Variable Security
- Step 1: Identify Path Variables: Review all routes defined in
mux
and identify path variables used in each route (e.g.,/users/{userID}
,/products/{productID}
inmux
routes). - Step 2: Define Expected Input Format: For each path variable in
mux
routes, define the expected input format and constraints (e.g., integer, UUID, alphanumeric, specific length, allowed characters). - Step 3: Implement Validation in Handlers: Within route handlers associated with
mux
routes, usemux.Vars(r)
to retrieve path variables. Immediately after retrieval, implement input validation logic to check if the variable conforms to the defined expected format and constraints. - Step 4: Reject Invalid Input: If a path variable retrieved by
mux.Vars
fails validation, reject the request with an appropriate HTTP error code (e.g., 400 Bad Request). - Step 5: Sanitize Input (If Necessary): If sanitization is needed for path variables obtained from
mux.Vars
, perform sanitization after validation.
- Path Traversal Attacks (Severity: High): Without validation, path variables from
mux.Vars
used to construct file paths can be manipulated. - Injection Attacks (e.g., SQL Injection, Command Injection) (Severity: High): Path variables from
mux.Vars
used in queries or commands can be exploited if not validated. - Application Logic Errors (Severity: Medium): Invalid path variable input from
mux.Vars
can lead to unexpected application behavior.
- Path Traversal Attacks: High reduction in risk. Validating path variables from
mux.Vars
used for file access is crucial. - Injection Attacks: High reduction in risk. Validating path variables from
mux.Vars
before use in queries/commands reduces injection risks. - Application Logic Errors: Medium reduction in risk. Input validation of
mux.Vars
improves application robustness.
Partially implemented. Basic type validation for path variables from mux.Vars
is done in some handlers, but comprehensive validation is not consistent.
Need to implement consistent and comprehensive input validation for path variables obtained via mux.Vars
in all relevant route handlers.
Mitigation Strategy: Handler Security in Context of mux
- Step 1: Route-Specific Input Validation in Handlers: Implement input validation within your request handlers that are associated with specific routes defined in
mux
. Tailor validation to the expected parameters defined bymux
for each route. - Step 2: Secure Parameter Handling: When retrieving parameters from the request using
mux
's functions (e.g.,mux.Vars
,mux.Query
), treat these parameters as untrusted input within your handlers. Always validate and sanitize these parameters before using them in any operations within handlers associated withmux
routes.
- Injection Attacks (e.g., SQL Injection, Command Injection, Cross-Site Scripting) (Severity: High): Insecure handler logic processing parameters obtained via
mux
can lead to injection attacks. - Business Logic Errors (Severity: Medium): Handlers not properly validating parameters from
mux
can lead to unexpected behavior. - Data Integrity Issues (Severity: Medium): Handlers processing unvalidated parameters from
mux
can cause data corruption.
- Injection Attacks: High reduction in risk. Secure handlers processing
mux
parameters are essential for preventing injection. - Business Logic Errors: Medium reduction in risk. Input validation in handlers improves application robustness.
- Data Integrity Issues: Medium reduction in risk. Validating parameters in handlers helps maintain data integrity.
Partially implemented. Input validation exists in some handlers associated with mux
routes, but consistency and comprehensiveness are lacking.
Need to ensure all handlers associated with mux
routes implement robust input validation and secure parameter handling for all parameters obtained via mux
functions.