Attack Surface: Overly Permissive Routes
- Description: Routes defined with broad patterns that unintentionally expose handlers to unexpected inputs or HTTP methods.
- How
mux
Contributes:mux
's flexible routing capabilities make it easy to create overly general routes if not used carefully. This is the core function ofmux
. - Example: A route
/api/{resource}/{id}
without restrictions on{resource}
could expose internal APIs./admin/{anything...}
without authentication. - Impact: Unauthorized access to sensitive data or functionality, potential for remote code execution (RCE) if the handler is vulnerable.
- Risk Severity: High to Critical.
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Specificity: Define routes as specifically as possible.
- Method Restriction: Use
mux.Methods()
to restrict HTTP methods. - Input Validation: Rigorous input validation within each handler.
- Regular Audits: Regularly review route configurations.
- Least Privilege: Handlers should operate with least privilege.
- How
Attack Surface: Incorrect Path Variable Handling
- Description: Failure to sanitize or validate path variables extracted by
mux.Vars(r)
.- How
mux
Contributes:mux
provides theVars()
function to extract path variables without sanitization or validation. This is a direct feature ofmux
. - Example:
/users/{id}
used directly in a SQL query (SQLi) or file access (path traversal). - Impact: SQL injection, path traversal, potentially RCE or data breaches.
- Risk Severity: High to Critical.
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Sanitization: Always sanitize path variables.
- Validation: Validate path variable format and range.
- Parameterized Queries: Use parameterized queries or ORMs (SQLi prevention).
- Safe File Access: Prevent path traversal.
- Type Conversion: Convert to the appropriate data type.
- How
Attack Surface: Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)
- Description: Using vulnerable regular expressions in route definitions (within
mux
) for matching.- How
mux
Contributes:mux
directly uses regular expressions for route matching, making this amux
-specific attack vector. - Example:
/products/{name:.*[a-z]+.*}
with malicious input causing backtracking. - Impact: Denial of service (DoS).
- Risk Severity: High.
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Regex Review: Carefully review and test all regexes.
- Avoid Complexity: Avoid overly complex regex patterns.
- Regex Analysis Tools: Use tools to detect ReDoS vulnerabilities.
- Input Length Limits: Limit input length.
- Timeouts: Implement request timeouts.
- Alternative Matching: Consider simpler matching if possible.
- How
Attack Surface: Unintended Route Overlap
- Description: Multiple routes unintentionally matching the same request.
- How
mux
Contributes:mux
's routing logic and precedence rules, if misconfigured, can lead to this overlap. This is inherent to howmux
handles route matching. - Example:
/users/{id}
and/users/profile
both potentially matching/users/profile
. - Impact: Execution of the wrong handler, leading to incorrect data, unauthorized access, or unexpected behavior.
- Risk Severity: High (depending on the consequences).
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Careful Design: Plan routes to avoid overlaps.
mux.Walk
: Usemux.Walk
to inspect routes.- Testing: Thoroughly test with various request patterns.
- Route Ordering: Register specific routes first.
- Explicit Matching: Use more explicit criteria.
- How