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Attack Tree Analysis for gorilla/mux

Objective: Execute Unauthorized Actions or Access Restricted Data

Attack Tree Visualization

                                  [Attacker's Goal: Execute Unauthorized Actions or Access Restricted Data]
                                                    |
                                  ---------------------------------------------------
                                  |                                                 |
                                 [!! Exploit Mux Misconfigurations !!]      [Exploit Mux-Specific Vulnerabilities]
                                  |                                                 |
                  -----------------------------------          -----------------------------------
                  |                                 |          |
     [Incorrect  [!! Bypass Authentication/Authorization via !!] [Path Traversal via
      Middleware]  [!! Incorrect Route Ordering/Matching !!]   Custom Handlers]
                  |                                 |          |
  -----------------   --------------                  ----------
  |               |                                              |

[Bypass [Craft Input [Bypass Sanitization Auth to Bypass in Custom Handler] Checks Auth] in Custom Handler] | | (High-Risk Path 3) |

| | [!! Place Less Restrictive Route Before More Specific !!] [!! Place More Specific Route After Less Specific !!] | | | (High-Risk Path 1) | (High-Risk Path 2) | | [Craft Input] [Craft Input] | | [Bypass Auth] [Bypass Auth]

  • Description: The developer defines a less restrictive route (e.g., /public) before a more restrictive route that requires authentication (e.g., /public/admin). gorilla/mux matches routes in the order they are defined, so the less restrictive route will always match first, bypassing the authentication requirement for the more specific route.
  • Critical Nodes:
    • [!! Exploit Mux Misconfigurations !!]: The root cause is a developer error in configuring gorilla/mux.
    • [!! Bypass Authentication/Authorization via !!]: The ultimate consequence of this misconfiguration.
    • [!! Incorrect Route Ordering/Matching !!]: The specific type of misconfiguration.
    • [!! Place Less Restrictive Route *Before* More Specific !!]: The precise coding error.
  • Attack Steps:
    • [!! Place Less Restrictive Route *Before* More Specific !!]: The developer makes the initial mistake.
    • [Craft Input]: The attacker crafts a request (usually just a URL) that matches the less restrictive route but targets a resource that should be protected. For example, they might access /public/admin directly.
    • [Bypass Auth]: The attacker successfully accesses the protected resource without authentication.
  • Likelihood: High (Very common mistake)
  • Impact: Very High (Complete authentication bypass)
  • Effort: Very Low (Just visiting a URL)
  • Skill Level: Novice
  • Detection Difficulty: Easy to Medium (Might be visible in access logs, but could be mistaken for legitimate traffic)
  • Description: Similar to Path 1, but the developer defines a more specific route (e.g., /admin/users/{id:[0-9]+}) after a less specific route (e.g., /admin/users/{id}). The less specific route will match first, even if the input matches the more specific (and potentially more restrictive) route.
  • Critical Nodes:
    • [!! Exploit Mux Misconfigurations !!]: Developer error.
    • [!! Bypass Authentication/Authorization via !!]: Consequence.
    • [!! Incorrect Route Ordering/Matching !!]: Type of misconfiguration.
    • [!! Place More Specific Route *After* Less Specific !!]: The coding error.
  • Attack Steps:
    • [!! Place More Specific Route *After* Less Specific !!]: Developer error.
    • [Craft Input]: Attacker crafts a request that matches the less specific route, but targets a resource that should be handled by the more specific (and potentially authenticated) route.
    • [Bypass Auth]: Attacker bypasses authentication.
  • Likelihood: High (Common mistake)
  • Impact: Very High (Authentication bypass)
  • Effort: Very Low
  • Skill Level: Novice
  • Detection Difficulty: Easy to Medium
  • Description: A custom handler registered with gorilla/mux uses user-provided input to construct a file path without proper sanitization. An attacker can manipulate this input to access files outside the intended directory.
  • Critical Nodes:
    • [Exploit Mux-Specific Vulnerabilities]: While not a direct vulnerability in mux itself, the router directs traffic to the vulnerable handler.
    • [Path Traversal via Custom Handlers]: The specific vulnerability type.
  • Attack Steps:
    • [Bypass Sanitization in Custom Handler]: The attacker finds a way to circumvent any input validation or escaping mechanisms in the custom handler. This often involves using special characters like ../ to traverse the directory structure.
    • The attacker then uses this to read or write arbitrary files.
  • Likelihood: Medium (Depends on the quality of the custom handler)
  • Impact: High to Very High (Arbitrary file read/write, potential code execution)
  • Effort: Medium to High (Requires finding and exploiting a sanitization flaw)
  • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard (Might be hidden in logs, requires careful analysis)
  • Description: Authentication or authorization middleware is either implemented incorrectly, placed in the wrong order in the middleware chain, or has logic flaws that allow an attacker to bypass it.
  • Critical Nodes:
    • [!! Exploit Mux Misconfigurations !!]: Developer error in configuring or implementing middleware.
    • [!! Bypass Authentication/Authorization via !!]: The ultimate consequence.
    • [Incorrect Middleware]: The general category of the misconfiguration.
  • Attack Steps:
    • [Bypass Auth Checks in Custom Handler]: The attacker finds a flaw in the middleware's logic. This could be due to incorrect session handling, improper validation of tokens, or other vulnerabilities.
    • [Craft Input to Bypass Auth]: The attacker crafts a request that exploits the flaw in the middleware to gain unauthorized access.
  • Likelihood: Medium (Common mistake in middleware implementation)
  • Impact: High to Very High (Unauthorized access to protected resources)
  • Effort: Low to Medium (Depends on the complexity of the bypass)
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard (Requires analyzing logs and request patterns)