Mitigation Strategy: Strict Route Definitions
-
Description:
- Review Existing Routes: Examine all routes defined using
gorilla/mux
. Identify any routes that use broad matchers (e.g.,{id}
,{filename:.+}
). - Refine Matchers: Replace broad matchers with more specific ones provided by
mux
. For example:- If
{id}
is expected to be a numeric ID, user.HandleFunc("/users/{id:[0-9]+}", ...)
- If
{filename}
must adhere to a specific format, use a regular expression that enforces that format, leveragingmux
's regex capabilities:r.HandleFunc("/files/{filename:[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+\.txt}", ...)
- If a parameter has a limited set of valid values, consider using a custom matcher function in combination with
mux.MatcherFunc
.
- If
StrictSlash
Consideration: Carefully evaluate the use ofStrictSlash(true)
. Understand its implications for redirects and potential security considerations (e.g., caching, redirect loops). Only use it if the behavior is fully understood and desired.- Test Thoroughly: After refining matchers, use a comprehensive suite of unit and integration tests to ensure that the routes behave as expected, including testing with invalid and malicious inputs. These tests should specifically target
mux
's routing logic. - Document Route Specifications: Clearly document the expected format and constraints for each route parameter, as enforced by the
mux
configuration.
- Review Existing Routes: Examine all routes defined using
-
List of Threats Mitigated:
- Path Traversal (High Severity): By using more restrictive matchers within the route definition, we limit the input that
mux
will even consider for a given route, reducing the attack surface. - Parameter Pollution (Medium Severity): Similar to path traversal, stricter matchers limit the characters and values that
mux
accepts as part of the route. - Unexpected Routing (Medium Severity): Ensures that requests are routed to the correct handlers by design, as enforced by
mux
's matching rules.
- Path Traversal (High Severity): By using more restrictive matchers within the route definition, we limit the input that
-
Impact:
- Path Traversal: Risk significantly reduced (from High to Low) at the routing level.
- Parameter Pollution: Risk reduced (from Medium to Low) at the routing level.
- Unexpected Routing: Risk reduced (from Medium to Low) at the routing level.
-
Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Numeric IDs are enforced using
[0-9]+
in/users/{id:[0-9]+}
. Filename validation is present in the handler for/files/{filename}
, but the route itself uses{filename:.+}
. -
Missing Implementation: The
/files/{filename}
route needs to be updated to use a more restrictive matcher withinmux
(e.g.,{filename:[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+\.txt}
). Other routes using generic path parameters (if any) need review and refinement within theirmux
definitions.
Mitigation Strategy: Careful Middleware Ordering (within mux
)
-
Description:
- Identify
mux
Middleware: List all middleware used directly withmux
(usingrouter.Use(...)
or subrouter-specific middleware). - Analyze Dependencies: Determine the dependencies between middleware components as they relate to routing. For example, authentication middleware should run before authorization middleware, and both should be registered with
mux
. - Establish Correct Order: Define the correct order of middleware execution within the
mux
context, ensuring that security-related middleware runs early in the chain. - Apply Order (using
router.Use
): Apply the middleware in the defined order usingrouter.Use(...)
or by chaining middleware appropriately within themux
router or subrouters. - Test Middleware Chain (with
mux
): Create integration tests that specifically test the behavior of the middleware chain as it interacts withmux
's routing, including scenarios where middleware should block or modify requests before they reach a handler.
- Identify
-
List of Threats Mitigated:
- Authentication Bypass (High Severity): Ensures that authentication checks (registered with
mux
) are performed before any sensitive operations are even considered bymux
. - Authorization Bypass (High Severity): Ensures that authorization checks (registered with
mux
) are performed after authentication and beforemux
routes the request to a handler. - CORS Misconfiguration (Medium Severity): Ensures that CORS headers (if handled by
mux
middleware) are set correctly before any other processing bymux
. - Rate Limiting Bypass (Medium Severity): Ensures that rate limiting (if handled by
mux
middleware) is applied before any resource-intensive operations are routed bymux
.
- Authentication Bypass (High Severity): Ensures that authentication checks (registered with
-
Impact:
- Authentication/Authorization Bypass: Risk significantly reduced (from High to Low) at the routing level.
- CORS Misconfiguration, Rate Limiting Bypass: Risk reduced (from Medium to Low) at the routing level.
-
Currently Implemented: Middleware order is generally correct, with authentication and authorization before request processing, all registered with
mux
. CORS middleware is applied globally usingrouter.Use
. -
Missing Implementation: Review the global application of CORS middleware within
mux
. Consider applying it more selectively to specific routes or subrouters usingmux
's features. Add more comprehensive integration tests to verify the middleware chain's behavior within the context ofmux
routing under various conditions.
Mitigation Strategy: Route Ordering Awareness (within mux
)
-
Description:
- List All
mux
Routes: Create a list of all routes defined usingmux
, including those in subrouters. - Analyze Specificity (within
mux
): Identify routes that could potentially conflict based onmux
's matching rules. For example,/users/new
and/users/{id}
. - Order by Specificity (in
mux
definition): Order routes from most specific to least specific within themux
router definition. More specific routes (e.g.,/users/new
) should be defined before less specific routes (e.g.,/users/{id}
) in the code wheremux
routes are registered. - Test Route Matching (using
mux
): Create tests that specifically verify that requests are routed to the correct handlers bymux
, especially for cases where routes might overlap. These tests should interact directly with themux
router.
- List All
-
List of Threats Mitigated:
- Unexpected Routing (Medium Severity): Prevents requests from being unintentionally routed to the wrong handler due to overlapping route definitions as interpreted by
mux
.
- Unexpected Routing (Medium Severity): Prevents requests from being unintentionally routed to the wrong handler due to overlapping route definitions as interpreted by
-
Impact:
- Unexpected Routing: Risk reduced (from Medium to Low) due to correct
mux
route ordering.
- Unexpected Routing: Risk reduced (from Medium to Low) due to correct
-
Currently Implemented: Generally implemented correctly. Specific routes like
/users/new
are defined before more general routes like/users/{id}
in themux
configuration. -
Missing Implementation: A comprehensive review of all routes and subrouters within the
mux
configuration should be performed to ensure that there are no unintended overlaps or conflicts. Add tests specifically for edge cases and potential conflicts, interacting directly with themux
router.
Mitigation Strategy: Regular Expression Review (for mux
Routes)
-
Description:
- Identify Regex Routes (in
mux
): Identify all routes defined usingmux
that use regular expressions. - Review for Complexity (within
mux
context): Analyze each regular expression for complexity and potential for catastrophic backtracking, considering howmux
uses these expressions. - Simplify (If Possible, within
mux
): If possible, simplify the regular expression or use a different, non-regex matcher provided bymux
. - Test with Regex Tester (for
mux
compatibility): Use a regular expression testing tool, ensuring the expressions are compatible with Go'sregexp
package (whichmux
uses). Test with a variety of inputs, including malicious ones. - Document Regex Intent (for
mux
usage): Clearly document the intended purpose and behavior of each regular expression as it relates to its use withinmux
.
- Identify Regex Routes (in
-
List of Threats Mitigated:
- Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) (Medium Severity): Prevents attackers from crafting inputs that cause the regular expression engine (used by
mux
) to consume excessive CPU resources. - Unexpected Matching (Medium Severity): Ensures that the regular expression (within
mux
) matches only the intended inputs and does not have unintended side effects.
- Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) (Medium Severity): Prevents attackers from crafting inputs that cause the regular expression engine (used by
-
Impact:
- ReDoS: Risk reduced (from Medium to Low) at the routing level.
- Unexpected Matching: Risk reduced (from Medium to Low) at the routing level.
-
Currently Implemented: Limited. Some regular expressions are used in
mux
route definitions, but they haven't been thoroughly reviewed for ReDoS vulnerabilities. -
Missing Implementation: A comprehensive review of all regular expressions used in
mux
routes is needed. Each expression should be tested for ReDoS vulnerabilities and simplified if possible, within the context of howmux
uses them.
Mitigation Strategy: Subrouter Best Practices (within mux
)
-
Description:
- Define Clear Boundaries (using
mux
subrouters): Establish clear boundaries and responsibilities for each subrouter created usingmux.NewRouter().PathPrefix(...).Subrouter()
. Avoid overlapping or ambiguous path prefixes. - Consistent Middleware (applied to
mux
subrouters): Apply necessary middleware (authentication, authorization, etc.) consistently to subrouters using the subrouter'sUse(...)
method. Avoid situations where a subrouter bypasses security checks applied to the main router. - Isolate Concerns (with
mux
subrouters): Usemux
subrouters to logically group related routes and handlers, improving code organization and maintainability. - Test Subrouter Interactions (with
mux
): Create integration tests that specifically test the interactions between subrouters and their parent routers within themux
framework, including middleware behavior.
- Define Clear Boundaries (using
-
List of Threats Mitigated:
- Unexpected Routing (Medium Severity): Prevents requests from being routed to the wrong handler due to misconfigured
mux
subrouters. - Middleware Bypass (High Severity): Ensures that security-related middleware is applied correctly to all
mux
subrouters.
- Unexpected Routing (Medium Severity): Prevents requests from being routed to the wrong handler due to misconfigured
-
Impact:
- Unexpected Routing: Risk reduced (from Medium to Low) due to correct
mux
subrouter configuration. - Middleware Bypass: Risk reduced (from High to Low) due to correct
mux
subrouter middleware application.
- Unexpected Routing: Risk reduced (from Medium to Low) due to correct
-
Currently Implemented: Subrouters are used for API versioning (e.g.,
/v1/...
,/v2/...
) usingmux
. Middleware is applied to the main router. -
Missing Implementation: Explicitly apply security-related middleware to each
mux
subrouter, even if it's already applied to the main router. This provides an extra layer of defense and ensures consistency within themux
routing structure. Add integration tests to verifymux
subrouter behavior.