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Attack Tree Analysis for grafana/grafana

Objective: To compromise the application leveraging Grafana by exploiting vulnerabilities or misconfigurations within Grafana, leading to unauthorized access, data manipulation, or disruption of service.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via Grafana (Attacker Goal)
├─── OR ─ **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** Gain Unauthorized Access to Grafana **[CRITICAL NODE: Access Control]**
│    ├─── AND ─ Exploit Authentication/Authorization Weaknesses **[CRITICAL NODE: Authentication]**
│    │    ├─── **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** Exploit Default Credentials **[CRITICAL NODE: Default Credentials]**
│    │    │    └─── Access Grafana with default admin/admin credentials (if not changed)
│    │    ├─── **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** Brute-force/Credential Stuffing Attacks **[CRITICAL NODE: Password Policy & Monitoring]**
│    │    │    └─── Attempt to guess or reuse compromised credentials
│    │    └─── Insecure API Key Management **[CRITICAL NODE: API Key Security]**
│    │         └─── Obtain API keys through insecure storage or transmission and use them for access
│    ├─── AND ─ **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** Exploit Misconfigurations **[CRITICAL NODE: Secure Configuration]**
│    │    ├─── **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** Insecure Default Settings **[CRITICAL NODE: Default Settings Review]**
│    │    │    └─── Leverage insecure default settings that expose sensitive information or functionalities
│    │    ├─── **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** Weak Password Policies **[CRITICAL NODE: Password Policy Enforcement]**
│    │    │    └─── Exploit weak password policies to easily crack user passwords
│    │    └─── **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** Publicly Accessible Grafana Instance (without proper security) **[CRITICAL NODE: Network Security]**
│    │    │    └─── Access Grafana instance exposed to the internet without sufficient access controls
├─── OR ─ **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** Compromise Data Sources via Grafana **[CRITICAL NODE: Data Source Security]**
│    ├─── AND ─ **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** Exploit Data Source Plugin Vulnerabilities **[CRITICAL NODE: Plugin Security]**
│    │    ├─── **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** SQL Injection in Data Source Queries **[CRITICAL NODE: SQL Injection Prevention]**
│    │    │    └─── Inject malicious SQL queries through Grafana data source configuration or dashboard parameters
│    │    └─── **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** Data Exfiltration via Data Source Connections **[CRITICAL NODE: Data Egress Monitoring]**
│    │         └─── Leverage compromised Grafana to exfiltrate data from connected data sources
├─── OR ─ **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** Social Engineering Targeting Grafana Users **[CRITICAL NODE: User Security Awareness]**
     └─── AND ─ **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** Phishing/Social Engineering Attacks **[CRITICAL NODE: Phishing Prevention]**
          └─── **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** Phishing for Grafana Credentials **[CRITICAL NODE: Credential Phishing]**
          │    └─── Send phishing emails to Grafana users to steal their login credentials

Attack Tree Path: 1. [HIGH-RISK PATH] Gain Unauthorized Access to Grafana [CRITICAL NODE: Access Control]

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Exploiting weak or default credentials.
    • Brute-force or credential stuffing attacks against login forms.
    • Exploiting insecure API key management practices.
    • Bypassing authentication mechanisms due to vulnerabilities or misconfigurations.
    • Session hijacking if session management is weak or vulnerable to XSS.

Attack Tree Path: 2. [CRITICAL NODE: Authentication]

  • Attack Vectors (related to Authentication Weaknesses):
    • Exploit Default Credentials [CRITICAL NODE: Default Credentials]:
      • Using well-known default usernames and passwords (e.g., admin/admin) if they haven't been changed during Grafana setup.
    • Brute-force/Credential Stuffing Attacks [CRITICAL NODE: Password Policy & Monitoring]:
      • Automated attempts to guess user passwords through repeated login attempts.
      • Using lists of compromised credentials from data breaches to try and gain access (credential stuffing).
    • Insecure API Key Management [CRITICAL NODE: API Key Security]:
      • Finding API keys stored in insecure locations (e.g., configuration files, code repositories, publicly accessible locations).
      • Intercepting API keys during transmission if not properly encrypted.
      • Using leaked or stolen API keys to bypass standard authentication.

Attack Tree Path: 3. [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Misconfigurations [CRITICAL NODE: Secure Configuration]

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Leveraging insecure default settings that expose sensitive information or functionalities.
    • Exploiting weak password policies that make password cracking easier.
    • Accessing publicly exposed Grafana instances without proper access controls.

Attack Tree Path: 4. [CRITICAL NODE: Default Settings Review]

  • Attack Vectors (related to Insecure Default Settings):
    • Exploiting default settings that might enable unnecessary features or services.
    • Leveraging default configurations that might expose sensitive information in error messages or logs.
    • Using default settings that might have known vulnerabilities or weaknesses.

Attack Tree Path: 5. [CRITICAL NODE: Password Policy Enforcement]

  • Attack Vectors (related to Weak Password Policies):
    • Easily guessing passwords that are short, simple, or based on common patterns.
    • Successfully cracking passwords using offline or online password cracking tools due to lack of complexity requirements or password rotation.

Attack Tree Path: 6. [CRITICAL NODE: Network Security]

  • Attack Vectors (related to Publicly Accessible Grafana Instance):
    • Directly accessing Grafana login page from the internet if not protected by a firewall or VPN.
    • Scanning for and exploiting vulnerabilities in a publicly accessible Grafana instance.
    • Becoming a target for automated bot attacks and vulnerability scanners due to public exposure.

Attack Tree Path: 7. [HIGH-RISK PATH] Compromise Data Sources via Grafana [CRITICAL NODE: Data Source Security]

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Exploiting vulnerabilities in data source plugins to gain access to connected data sources.
    • Injecting malicious SQL queries through Grafana to manipulate or extract data from databases.
    • Exfiltrating sensitive data from connected data sources after compromising Grafana.

Attack Tree Path: 8. [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Data Source Plugin Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE: Plugin Security]

  • Attack Vectors:
    • SQL Injection in Data Source Queries [CRITICAL NODE: SQL Injection Prevention]:
      • Crafting malicious SQL queries within Grafana dashboards or data source configurations that are then executed against backend databases.
      • Bypassing input validation in data source plugins to inject SQL code.
    • Data Exfiltration via Data Source Connections [CRITICAL NODE: Data Egress Monitoring]:
      • Using a compromised Grafana instance to query and extract data from connected data sources that the attacker would not normally have access to.
      • Setting up malicious dashboards or queries to automatically exfiltrate data to attacker-controlled systems.

Attack Tree Path: 9. [HIGH-RISK PATH] Social Engineering Targeting Grafana Users [CRITICAL NODE: User Security Awareness]

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Phishing/Social Engineering Attacks [CRITICAL NODE: Phishing Prevention]:
      • Phishing for Grafana Credentials [CRITICAL NODE: Credential Phishing]:
        • Sending deceptive emails or messages that mimic legitimate Grafana login pages to trick users into entering their credentials.
        • Using social engineering tactics to persuade users to reveal their usernames and passwords.