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Attack Surface Analysis for hashicorp/consul

Attack Surface: Unauthorized Access to Consul Agents (HTTP API/CLI)

  • 1. Unauthorized Access to Consul Agents (HTTP API/CLI)

    • Description: Attackers gain unauthorized access to Consul agents, allowing them to query, modify, or disrupt the Consul cluster and registered services.
    • Consul Contribution: Consul's HTTP API and CLI provide powerful interfaces for interacting with the cluster. If these are exposed without authentication or with weak ACLs, they become direct attack vectors.
    • Example: An attacker accesses the /v1/kv/ endpoint on a publicly exposed Consul agent without authentication and retrieves sensitive configuration data.
    • Impact: Data breaches (secrets, configuration), service disruption, potential for complete cluster compromise.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Enable and Enforce ACLs: Implement a "deny by default" ACL policy. Create granular ACL rules. Use ACL tokens for all agent interactions.
      • Require TLS: Configure Consul to use HTTPS for all API communication (verify_incoming, verify_outgoing, verify_server_hostname). Use valid TLS certificates.
      • Network Segmentation: Restrict network access to Consul agent ports (8500, 8501, etc.) using firewalls. Only allow access from trusted networks.
      • Regular Auditing: Regularly review and audit ACL rules and agent configurations.

Attack Surface: Malicious Service Registration

  • 2. Malicious Service Registration

    • Description: Attackers register rogue services with Consul, potentially redirecting legitimate traffic.
    • Consul Contribution: Consul's service registration mechanism, if not properly secured via ACLs, allows any client with network access to register services.
    • Example: An attacker registers a service named "payments-api" that points to their own malicious server, redirecting clients.
    • Impact: Man-in-the-middle attacks, data theft, service disruption.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strict ACLs for Service Registration: Use ACLs to restrict service registration to authorized clients and services. Require specific tokens with service:write permissions.
      • Service Health Checks: Implement robust health checks. Consul will automatically deregister unhealthy services.
      • Intentions (Consul Connect): Use Consul Intentions to define explicit service-to-service communication rules.
      • Monitoring and Alerting: Monitor service registrations for suspicious activity.

Attack Surface: Gossip Protocol Exploitation (Serf)

  • 3. Gossip Protocol Exploitation (Serf)

    • Description: Attackers exploit the Serf gossip protocol to inject malicious nodes, disrupt the cluster, or eavesdrop.
    • Consul Contribution: Consul relies on the Serf gossip protocol for cluster membership and failure detection. This protocol, if unencrypted and accessible, is an attack vector.
    • Example: An attacker joins the Consul cluster's gossip network and injects false information about node status.
    • Impact: Cluster instability, denial of service, potential for data corruption.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Gossip Encryption: Enable encryption for Serf communication using the encrypt configuration option (gossip encryption key).
      • Network Segmentation: Restrict network access to the Serf ports (8301 TCP/UDP) to only other Consul servers.
      • Regular Key Rotation: Rotate the gossip encryption key periodically.

Attack Surface: Raft Consensus Protocol Compromise

  • 4. Raft Consensus Protocol Compromise

    • Description: Attackers compromise the Raft consensus protocol, potentially gaining control of the Consul cluster.
    • Consul Contribution: Consul uses Raft for data replication and leader election. Compromising Raft gives control over the cluster's state.
    • Example: An attacker gains access to a majority of Consul servers, allowing them to forge consensus and modify the cluster's state.
    • Impact: Complete cluster compromise, data manipulation, denial of service.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • TLS for Raft: Enable TLS for Raft communication (verify_incoming, etc.).
      • Network Segmentation: Strictly limit network access to the Raft port (8300 TCP) to only other Consul servers.
      • Strong Server Security: Harden the operating systems of Consul servers.
      • Autopilot: Utilize Consul's Autopilot features.

Attack Surface: Sensitive Data Exposure in KV Store

  • 5. Sensitive Data Exposure in KV Store

    • Description: Attackers gain unauthorized read access to the Consul Key/Value (KV) store.
    • Consul Contribution: Consul's KV store is used for configuration data. If not properly secured with ACLs, it can be a source of data breaches.
    • Example: An attacker with read access to the KV store retrieves database credentials.
    • Impact: Data breaches, unauthorized access to other systems.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Granular ACLs for KV Access: Use ACLs to restrict access to specific keys and prefixes within the KV store.
      • Secrets Management Integration: Avoid storing highly sensitive secrets directly in the KV store. Use a dedicated secrets management solution (like HashiCorp Vault).
      • Data Validation: Always validate and sanitize data retrieved from the KV store.
      • Encryption at Rest (Indirect): Encrypt sensitive data before storing it in Consul.