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Threat Model Analysis for hashicorp/consul

Threat: Unauthorized API Access

  • Threat: Unauthorized API Access
    • Description: An attacker gains access to the Consul HTTP API without proper authentication or with weak credentials. They could read/write to the KV store, register/deregister services, manipulate service mesh configurations, and gather information about the cluster. This could be achieved through brute-forcing weak tokens, exploiting misconfigured ACLs, or finding exposed API endpoints.
    • Impact: Complete compromise of the Consul cluster, leading to service disruption, data breaches (configuration data, service information), and potential lateral movement within the network. Application functionality dependent on Consul is severely impacted.
    • Affected Consul Component: Consul HTTP API (all endpoints), ACL system.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Enforce strong ACL policies with the principle of least privilege.
      • Disable anonymous API access.
      • Use strong, unique, and regularly rotated tokens for all agents and applications.
      • Audit ACL configurations regularly.
      • Bind the HTTP API to a secure, internal network interface.
      • Enable TLS encryption for all API communication.

Threat: Unencrypted Communication (Man-in-the-Middle)

  • Threat: Unencrypted Communication (Man-in-the-Middle)
    • Description: An attacker intercepts network traffic between Consul agents, servers, or clients because TLS encryption is not enabled. They can eavesdrop on sensitive data (service addresses, configuration, health checks) and potentially perform a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack to modify traffic or impersonate services.
    • Impact: Exposure of sensitive data, potential for service impersonation, manipulation of service discovery, and compromise of data integrity.
    • Affected Consul Component: Consul Agent communication (RPC), HTTP API, Gossip protocol.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Enable TLS encryption for all Consul communication (RPC, HTTP API, Gossip).
      • Use a trusted Certificate Authority (CA).
      • Configure agents/clients to verify server certificates (verify_incoming, verify_outgoing, verify_server_hostname).
      • Regularly rotate certificates.

Threat: Gossip Protocol Eavesdropping/Injection

  • Threat: Gossip Protocol Eavesdropping/Injection
    • Description: An attacker on the network eavesdrops on unencrypted gossip traffic or injects malicious agents into the Consul cluster. This could allow them to learn about the cluster topology, service locations, and potentially disrupt the cluster's operation.
    • Impact: Service discovery disruption, denial of service, potential for data leakage (service metadata), and compromise of cluster consensus.
    • Affected Consul Component: Consul Agent (Gossip protocol - Serf).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Enable gossip encryption with a strong, randomly generated, and regularly rotated key (encrypt configuration option).
      • Restrict network access to the gossip port (default 8301) to trusted agents only.
      • Use network segmentation.

Threat: Weak/Default Encryption Keys

  • Threat: Weak/Default Encryption Keys
    • Description: An attacker gains access to encrypted data (gossip, snapshots, or data at rest if configured) and is able to decrypt it because weak or default encryption keys were used.
    • Impact: Data breach, unauthorized access to sensitive information, potential for further compromise.
    • Affected Consul Component: Gossip protocol (Serf), Consul snapshots, potentially data at rest (if configured).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Always generate strong, random encryption keys.
      • Never use default keys.
      • Store keys securely (e.g., using a secrets management solution).
      • Regularly rotate keys.

Threat: K/V Store Data Breach

  • Threat: K/V Store Data Breach
    • Description: An attacker gains unauthorized read/write access to the Consul Key/Value (K/V) store due to misconfigured ACLs or a compromised token. They can steal sensitive configuration data (database credentials, API keys), modify application settings, or delete critical data.
    • Impact: Data breach, service disruption, application compromise, potential for lateral movement.
    • Affected Consul Component: Consul K/V Store, ACL system.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Implement strict ACL policies for the K/V store (principle of least privilege).
      • Regularly audit ACL configurations.
      • Consider using a dedicated secrets management solution (e.g., HashiCorp Vault) for highly sensitive data.

Threat: Service Mesh (Connect) Intention Bypass

  • Threat: Service Mesh (Connect) Intention Bypass
    • Description: An attacker exploits a misconfiguration or vulnerability in Consul Connect to bypass defined intentions, allowing unauthorized communication between services. This could involve crafting malicious requests or exploiting flaws in the intention enforcement mechanism.
    • Impact: Unauthorized access to services, data breaches, potential for lateral movement within the service mesh.
    • Affected Consul Component: Consul Connect (Service Mesh), Intentions.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Carefully define and thoroughly test intentions.
      • Regularly review and audit intention configurations.
      • Monitor for unexpected service communication patterns.
      • Use TLS for all service-to-service communication.

Threat: Consul Snapshot Tampering

  • Threat: Consul Snapshot Tampering
    • Description: An attacker gains access to Consul snapshot files and modifies them to inject malicious data or configurations. When the snapshot is restored, the malicious data is loaded into the Consul cluster.
    • Impact: Compromise of the Consul cluster upon restoration, leading to service disruption, data breaches, or other malicious activities.
    • Affected Consul Component: Consul Snapshot mechanism, potentially all Consul components upon restoration.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Store snapshots in a secure location with restricted access.
      • Use strong access controls and authentication for the storage location.
      • Implement integrity checks (checksums, digital signatures) before restoration.
      • Regularly audit access to snapshot files.

Threat: Denial of Service (DoS) against Consul

  • Threat: Denial of Service (DoS) against Consul
    • Description: An attacker floods the Consul cluster with requests (e.g., API requests, gossip traffic) or exploits a vulnerability to cause a denial of service, making Consul unavailable.
    • Impact: Application downtime, service disruption, inability to manage services or access configuration data.
    • Affected Consul Component: Consul Agent (all components), Consul Server (all components).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Implement rate limiting for API requests.
      • Use network firewalls and security groups to restrict access to Consul ports.
      • Monitor Consul resource usage (CPU, memory, network) and set alerts for anomalies.
      • Ensure sufficient resources are allocated to Consul servers.
      • Regularly update Consul to address any known DoS vulnerabilities.
      • Have a robust disaster recovery plan.

Threat: Outdated Consul Version Exploitation

  • Threat: Outdated Consul Version Exploitation
    • Description: An attacker exploits a known vulnerability in an outdated version of Consul.
    • Impact: Varies depending on the specific vulnerability. Could range from information disclosure to complete cluster compromise.
    • Affected Consul Component: Any component affected by the specific vulnerability.
    • Risk Severity: Medium to Critical (depends on the vulnerability, but we're only including High/Critical here, so assume High if a known CVE exists)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Regularly update Consul to the latest stable version.
      • Monitor security advisories from HashiCorp.
      • Implement a robust patching process.