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Mitigation Strategies Analysis for hashicorp/vault

Mitigation Strategy: Principle of Least Privilege for Vault Policies

  • Description:

    1. Identify Application Needs: For each application or service interacting with Vault, meticulously document the specific secrets and Vault paths it requires access to.
    2. Create Granular Policies: Develop Vault policies within Vault that precisely match the identified needs. Avoid wildcard permissions (*) and instead specify exact paths and capabilities (e.g., read, create, update, delete, list). This is configured using Vault's policy language and API.
    3. Assign Policies to Roles/Groups: Create Vault roles or groups within Vault. Assign the narrowly scoped policies to these roles/groups. This is managed through Vault's role and group management features.
    4. Authenticate Applications with Roles/Groups: Configure applications to authenticate with Vault and associate them with the appropriate roles or groups within Vault. This is achieved through Vault's authentication methods (AppRole, Kubernetes, etc.).
    5. Regularly Review and Refine Policies: Periodically audit Vault policies within Vault to ensure they remain aligned with application needs and security best practices. Remove any unnecessary permissions and adapt policies as applications evolve. This involves using Vault's policy listing and inspection features.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Unauthorized Secret Access (Severity: High): Malicious actors or compromised applications gaining access to sensitive secrets they shouldn't have due to overly permissive Vault policies.
    • Lateral Movement (Severity: Medium): Compromised application with overly broad permissions being used to access other sensitive resources within Vault.
    • Accidental Data Exposure (Severity: Medium): Misconfigured application or user with excessive permissions unintentionally exposing sensitive data due to policy misconfigurations in Vault.

  • Impact:

    • Unauthorized Secret Access: High Risk Reduction
    • Lateral Movement: Medium Risk Reduction
    • Accidental Data Exposure: Medium Risk Reduction

  • Currently Implemented:

    • Vault Policy Configuration: Yes, policies are defined in vault/policies/ repository using HCL and applied to Vault.
    • Application Role Assignment: Partially implemented. Web application uses dedicated AppRole, but background jobs use a more generic role.

  • Missing Implementation:

    • Background Jobs: Need to create specific AppRoles and policies in Vault for each type of background job to restrict access further.
    • Policy Review Automation: Lack of automated tools to regularly review and flag overly permissive policies within Vault.

Mitigation Strategy: Enable and Configure Audit Logging

  • Description:

    1. Enable Audit Logging Backends: Activate at least one audit logging backend in Vault. Recommended backends include file, socket, or cloud-based storage (e.g., AWS S3, Azure Blob Storage, GCP Cloud Storage). This is configured through Vault's configuration files or API.
    2. Configure Log Level: Set the audit log level in Vault to request or response+request to capture sufficient detail for security monitoring and incident investigation. This is a Vault configuration setting.
    3. Secure Audit Log Storage: Ensure audit logs are stored in a secure and tamper-proof location, separate from Vault servers. While secure storage is important, the Vault-direct aspect here is configuring Vault to send logs to a suitable backend.
    4. Implement Log Monitoring and Alerting: Integrate Vault audit logs with a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) system or log aggregation platform. Configure alerts for suspicious events, such as failed authentication attempts, unauthorized secret access, or policy changes based on Vault audit logs.
    5. Regularly Review Audit Logs: Establish a process for regularly reviewing Vault audit logs to proactively identify and investigate potential security incidents or misconfigurations within Vault.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Security Breach Detection (Severity: High): Delayed detection of security breaches or unauthorized activities within Vault.
    • Insider Threats (Severity: Medium): Unnoticed malicious actions by internal users with Vault access that are logged by Vault audit.
    • Compliance Violations (Severity: Medium): Failure to meet regulatory requirements for audit logging and security monitoring of Vault activity.

  • Impact:

    • Security Breach Detection: High Risk Reduction
    • Insider Threats: Medium Risk Reduction
    • Compliance Violations: Medium Risk Reduction

  • Currently Implemented:

    • File Audit Backend: Yes, audit logs are written to /var/log/vault/audit.log on Vault servers as configured in Vault.
    • Log Rotation: Yes, logrotate is configured for audit logs on the server, but Vault is configured to generate the logs.
    • SIEM Integration: No, audit logs are not currently integrated with a SIEM system.

  • Missing Implementation:

    • SIEM Integration: Need to implement integration with the company's SIEM solution for centralized monitoring and alerting of Vault audit logs.
    • Alerting Rules: Define and configure specific alerting rules within the SIEM for Vault audit events.
    • Secure Log Storage: Current file-based storage on Vault servers is not ideal for long-term secure storage and needs to be moved to a dedicated secure storage solution as a backend for Vault audit logging.

Mitigation Strategy: Regularly Review Vault Configuration

  • Description:

    1. Document Vault Configuration: Maintain comprehensive documentation of the current Vault configuration, including enabled auth methods, secret engines, policies, roles, groups, audit backends, and other relevant settings.
    2. Periodic Configuration Audits: Schedule regular audits of the Vault configuration (e.g., quarterly or semi-annually).
    3. Configuration Review Checklist: Develop a checklist of security best practices and configuration recommendations for Vault. Use this checklist during audits to identify deviations or potential misconfigurations.
    4. Automated Configuration Checks (IaC): Ideally, manage Vault configuration using Infrastructure as Code (IaC) tools. Implement automated checks within the IaC pipeline to validate configuration against security policies and best practices.
    5. Address Identified Issues: Promptly address any misconfigurations or security weaknesses identified during configuration audits. Track remediation efforts and re-audit to ensure issues are resolved.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Misconfiguration Vulnerabilities (Severity: Medium): Vault being vulnerable due to insecure or suboptimal configuration settings.
    • Policy Drift (Severity: Medium): Vault configuration drifting away from security best practices over time, leading to increased risk.
    • Operational Errors (Severity: Low): Accidental misconfigurations introduced during manual changes to Vault.

  • Impact:

    • Misconfiguration Vulnerabilities: Medium Risk Reduction
    • Policy Drift: Medium Risk Reduction
    • Operational Errors: Low Risk Reduction

  • Currently Implemented:

    • Vault Configuration Documentation: Partially implemented. Basic configuration is documented, but not comprehensively.
    • Manual Configuration Reviews: Ad-hoc manual reviews are performed, but no regular schedule or checklist exists.
    • IaC for Configuration: Yes, Vault configuration is managed using Terraform.

  • Missing Implementation:

    • Regularly Scheduled Audits: Establish a formal schedule for Vault configuration audits.
    • Configuration Review Checklist: Develop and implement a detailed checklist for Vault configuration audits.
    • Automated Configuration Checks in IaC: Implement automated checks within the Terraform pipeline to validate Vault configuration against security best practices.

Mitigation Strategy: Use Short-Lived Tokens

  • Description:

    1. Configure Default Token TTLs: Set appropriate default Time-To-Live (TTL) values for Vault tokens within Vault's configuration. Shorter TTLs (e.g., minutes or hours) are generally more secure than long-lived tokens. This is a core Vault setting.
    2. Application-Specific Token TTLs: Where possible, configure even shorter TTLs for application-specific tokens using Vault's token creation parameters or role configurations.
    3. Implement Token Renewal: For applications requiring longer-term access, implement token renewal mechanisms using Vault's token renewal API. This is a feature provided by Vault.
    4. Avoid Storing Tokens Long-Term: Applications should avoid storing Vault tokens persistently. Tokens should be held in memory only and discarded when no longer needed. While application behavior, this is directly related to the security benefit of short-lived Vault tokens.
    5. Token Revocation Mechanisms: Understand and utilize Vault's token revocation mechanisms provided by Vault to invalidate tokens immediately in case of compromise or application termination.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Token Compromise (Severity: High): Stolen or leaked long-lived tokens being used by attackers for unauthorized access to Vault.
    • Reduced Blast Radius (Severity: Medium): Shorter token lifespan limiting the duration of unauthorized access if a token is compromised.
    • Credential Stuffing/Replay Attacks (Severity: Medium): Stolen tokens becoming less useful over time due to expiration.

  • Impact:

    • Token Compromise: High Risk Reduction
    • Reduced Blast Radius: Medium Risk Reduction
    • Credential Stuffing/Replay Attacks: Medium Risk Reduction

  • Currently Implemented:

    • Default Token TTL: Yes, default token TTL is set to 2 hours in Vault configuration.
    • Token Renewal in Web Application: Yes, the web application implements token renewal using the Vault client library.

  • Missing Implementation:

    • Shorter TTLs for Background Jobs: Background jobs still use the default 2-hour TTL, which could be reduced further by configuring specific roles or token creation parameters in Vault.
    • Token Revocation Automation: No automated mechanisms are in place to revoke tokens upon application termination or security events using Vault's revocation API.

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Key Storage for Vault's Encryption Keys

  • Description:

    1. Identify KMS/HSM Solution: Choose a robust Key Management System (KMS) or Hardware Security Module (HSM) that is compatible with Vault and meets your organization's security requirements.
    2. Integrate KMS/HSM with Vault: Configure Vault to use the selected KMS/HSM for storing and managing its encryption keys (master keys and unseal keys). Vault supports various KMS/HSM integrations.
    3. Configure KMS/HSM Access Control: Implement strict access controls within the KMS/HSM to restrict access to Vault's encryption keys to only authorized Vault servers and administrators.
    4. Monitor KMS/HSM Activity: Monitor the KMS/HSM for any unauthorized access attempts or suspicious activity related to Vault's encryption keys.
    5. Regularly Review KMS/HSM Integration: Periodically review the integration between Vault and the KMS/HSM to ensure it remains secure and properly configured.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Master Key Compromise (Severity: Critical): Attackers gaining access to Vault's master keys, allowing them to decrypt all secrets stored in Vault.
    • Data Breach (Severity: Critical): Compromise of master keys leading to complete exposure of all secrets managed by Vault.
    • Loss of Control over Secrets (Severity: Critical): If master keys are compromised, the organization loses control over the confidentiality of its secrets.

  • Impact:

    • Master Key Compromise: Critical Risk Reduction
    • Data Breach: Critical Risk Reduction
    • Loss of Control over Secrets: Critical Risk Reduction

  • Currently Implemented:

    • KMS/HSM Integration: No, Vault currently uses local storage for unseal keys (auto-unseal is enabled with cloud provider KMS, but not a dedicated HSM).

  • Missing Implementation:

    • Dedicated HSM Integration: Need to implement integration with a dedicated HSM for storing Vault's master keys to enhance security.
    • KMS/HSM Access Control Configuration: Once HSM integration is implemented, configure granular access controls within the HSM.
    • KMS/HSM Monitoring: Set up monitoring for the chosen KMS/HSM solution.

Mitigation Strategy: Implement Key Rotation for Vault's Encryption Keys

  • Description:

    1. Establish Key Rotation Policy: Define a clear policy for regularly rotating Vault's encryption keys (master keys and unseal keys). Determine the rotation frequency (e.g., annually, bi-annually) based on risk assessment and compliance requirements.
    2. Automate Key Rotation Process: Automate the key rotation process as much as possible to reduce manual effort and potential errors. Vault provides mechanisms for key rotation.
    3. Test Key Rotation Procedure: Thoroughly test the key rotation procedure in a non-production environment to ensure it works correctly and does not disrupt Vault service availability.
    4. Document Key Rotation Process: Document the key rotation process in detail, including steps, roles and responsibilities, and rollback procedures.
    5. Monitor Key Rotation Success: Monitor the key rotation process to ensure it completes successfully and that Vault remains operational after rotation.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Long-Term Key Compromise (Severity: High): If encryption keys are compromised but not rotated, attackers have a prolonged window of opportunity to exploit them.
    • Reduced Impact of Key Leakage (Severity: Medium): Regular key rotation limits the amount of data compromised if a key is leaked, as older data will be encrypted with different keys.
    • Compliance Requirements (Severity: Medium): Meeting compliance requirements that mandate regular key rotation for sensitive data.

  • Impact:

    • Long-Term Key Compromise: High Risk Reduction
    • Reduced Impact of Key Leakage: Medium Risk Reduction
    • Compliance Requirements: Medium Risk Reduction

  • Currently Implemented:

    • Key Rotation Policy: No formal key rotation policy is currently defined.
    • Automated Key Rotation: No automated key rotation process is implemented.

  • Missing Implementation:

    • Key Rotation Policy Definition: Develop and document a formal key rotation policy for Vault.
    • Automated Key Rotation Implementation: Implement automated key rotation using Vault's built-in mechanisms or scripting.
    • Key Rotation Testing: Thoroughly test the key rotation process in a staging environment.

Mitigation Strategy: Establish Vault Backup and Recovery Procedures

  • Description:

    1. Define Backup Strategy: Determine the appropriate backup strategy for Vault data, including full backups, incremental backups, and backup frequency. Consider factors like Recovery Point Objective (RPO) and Recovery Time Objective (RTO).
    2. Implement Automated Backups: Automate the Vault backup process to ensure regular and consistent backups. Vault provides commands for taking backups.
    3. Secure Backup Storage: Store Vault backups in a secure and offsite location, separate from the primary Vault infrastructure. Encrypt backups at rest and in transit.
    4. Regularly Test Recovery Procedures: Periodically test the Vault recovery procedures in a non-production environment to ensure backups are valid and recovery can be performed within the defined RTO.
    5. Document Backup and Recovery Procedures: Document the backup and recovery procedures in detail, including steps, roles and responsibilities, and contact information.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Data Loss (Severity: High): Loss of Vault data due to hardware failure, software errors, or disaster events.
    • Service Disruption (Severity: High): Prolonged Vault downtime due to inability to recover from data loss.
    • Business Continuity Risk (Severity: High): Impact on business operations if Vault is unavailable and secrets cannot be accessed.

  • Impact:

    • Data Loss: High Risk Reduction
    • Service Disruption: High Risk Reduction
    • Business Continuity Risk: High Risk Reduction

  • Currently Implemented:

    • Backup Strategy: Basic backup strategy is defined (full backups).
    • Automated Backups: Yes, automated backups are configured using cron jobs and Vault CLI.
    • Secure Backup Storage: Backups are stored in cloud storage with encryption.

  • Missing Implementation:

    • Incremental Backups: Implement incremental backups to reduce backup size and time.
    • Regular Recovery Testing: Recovery procedures are not regularly tested. Need to establish a schedule for regular DR drills.
    • Detailed Documentation: Backup and recovery procedures documentation needs to be more comprehensive and readily accessible.

Mitigation Strategy: Implement Vault Disaster Recovery

  • Description:

    1. Design DR Architecture: Design a disaster recovery (DR) architecture for Vault, typically involving a secondary Vault cluster in a geographically separate location.
    2. Replication Configuration: Configure Vault replication (performance or disaster recovery replication) between the primary and secondary clusters.
    3. Failover Procedures: Develop and document clear failover procedures for switching from the primary to the secondary Vault cluster in case of a disaster.
    4. Regular DR Drills: Conduct regular disaster recovery drills to test the failover procedures and ensure the secondary cluster can take over seamlessly.
    5. Monitoring and Alerting for DR: Implement monitoring and alerting for both primary and secondary Vault clusters to detect issues and ensure DR readiness.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Regional Outages (Severity: Critical): Vault service disruption due to regional infrastructure outages or disasters affecting the primary Vault cluster.
    • Business Continuity Risk (Severity: Critical): Inability to access secrets and critical application dependencies during a regional outage.
    • Data Loss (Severity: High): Potential data loss if replication is not properly configured or fails during a disaster.

  • Impact:

    • Regional Outages: Critical Risk Reduction
    • Business Continuity Risk: Critical Risk Reduction
    • Data Loss: High Risk Reduction

  • Currently Implemented:

    • DR Architecture: No dedicated DR cluster is currently implemented.
    • Replication: No replication is configured.

  • Missing Implementation:

    • Secondary DR Cluster Deployment: Deploy a secondary Vault cluster in a separate geographic location.
    • Replication Configuration: Configure disaster recovery replication between primary and secondary clusters.
    • Failover Procedure Documentation: Document detailed failover procedures.
    • DR Drills: Establish a schedule for regular DR drills to test failover.

Mitigation Strategy: Use Official Vault Client Libraries

  • Description:

    1. Select Official Libraries: For each programming language used in applications interacting with Vault, use the official HashiCorp-maintained Vault client library.
    2. Avoid Custom Clients: Refrain from developing custom Vault client libraries or using unofficial, community-maintained libraries, as these may have security vulnerabilities or lack proper maintenance.
    3. Dependency Management: Manage Vault client library dependencies using standard package managers (e.g., pip for Python, npm for Node.js, maven for Java).
    4. Regular Updates: Keep Vault client libraries updated to the latest versions to benefit from bug fixes, security patches, and new features.
    5. Security Vulnerability Monitoring: Monitor security advisories and vulnerability databases for any reported vulnerabilities in Vault client libraries and promptly update to patched versions.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Client-Side Vulnerabilities (Severity: Medium): Security vulnerabilities in custom or unofficial Vault client libraries that could be exploited to compromise applications or Vault interactions.
    • Data Exposure (Severity: Medium): Vulnerabilities in client libraries potentially leading to unintended exposure of secrets or sensitive data.
    • Integration Issues (Severity: Low): Unofficial libraries potentially having compatibility issues with Vault or lacking support for latest Vault features.

  • Impact:

    • Client-Side Vulnerabilities: Medium Risk Reduction
    • Data Exposure: Medium Risk Reduction
    • Integration Issues: Low Risk Reduction

  • Currently Implemented:

    • Official Libraries Used: Yes, official Vault client libraries are used in all applications (Python hvac, Go hashicorp/vault/api).

  • Missing Implementation:

    • Automated Dependency Updates: No fully automated process for regularly updating Vault client library dependencies.
    • Vulnerability Monitoring for Client Libraries: No automated monitoring specifically for vulnerabilities in Vault client libraries beyond general dependency scanning.