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Mitigation Strategies Analysis for hashicorp/vault

Mitigation Strategy: Automated Unsealing with Cloud KMS

  • Mitigation Strategy: Automated Unsealing with Cloud KMS (AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault, Google Cloud KMS).

  • Description:

    1. Choose a Cloud KMS: Select a cloud provider's Key Management Service (KMS) that supports auto-unsealing.
    2. Create a KMS Key: Create a customer-managed key (CMK) within the chosen KMS. This key will be used to encrypt Vault's master key.
    3. Configure Vault: Configure Vault (using the seal stanza in the Vault configuration file) to use the chosen KMS for auto-unsealing. This involves providing the KMS key ID and necessary credentials (e.g., IAM role in AWS, service principal in Azure). This is a direct Vault configuration.
    4. Test Auto-Unseal: Thoroughly test the auto-unseal process to ensure it works reliably. Simulate restarts and failures.
    5. Monitor Seal Status: Implement monitoring and alerting within Vault (or via Vault's API) to track Vault's seal status. Alert immediately if Vault becomes sealed unexpectedly.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Unsealed Vault in Production (Severity: Critical): Eliminates the risk of manual unsealing errors and the exposure of unseal keys. An attacker gaining access to the server cannot directly access secrets without also compromising the cloud KMS.
    • Compromise of Vault Server (Severity: Critical): Reduces the impact of a server compromise. Even if the server is compromised, the attacker cannot decrypt the data without access to the cloud KMS key.

  • Impact:

    • Unsealed Vault in Production: Risk reduced from Critical to Low (assuming the Cloud KMS is properly secured).
    • Compromise of Vault Server: Risk reduced from Critical to Medium (attacker still has access to the server, but not the secrets).

  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. AWS KMS is configured in Vault's configuration, but monitoring and alerting for seal status are not yet fully integrated with our existing Prometheus/Grafana setup. Auto-unseal is working in the dev and staging environments.

  • Missing Implementation: Full monitoring and alerting integration in all environments (dev, staging, production) using Vault's API or built-in features. Formal documentation of the auto-unseal process and disaster recovery procedures.

Mitigation Strategy: Strict Token Management and Least Privilege Policies

  • Mitigation Strategy: Strict Token Management and Least Privilege Policies.

  • Description:

    1. Revoke Root Token: Immediately after initial Vault setup, revoke the initial root token using Vault's CLI or API. Never use the root token for day-to-day operations.
    2. Short-Lived Tokens: When creating tokens (via Vault's CLI, API, or auth methods), set short Time-To-Live (TTL) values. The TTL should be the minimum required for the task. This is a direct interaction with Vault.
    3. Least Privilege Policies: Create Vault policies (using Vault's policy language and stored within Vault) that grant only the necessary permissions to specific paths and operations. Avoid wildcard permissions. Use path-based restrictions and verb constraints (read, write, list, delete). This is a core Vault configuration.
    4. AppRole/Kubernetes Auth: Configure and use AppRole or Kubernetes authentication methods within Vault. These methods provide dynamic, short-lived credentials. This involves configuring these auth methods directly in Vault.
    5. Token Renewal/Revocation: Applications should use Vault's API to renew tokens before they expire and revoke them when no longer needed. This is an interaction with Vault's API.
    6. Regular Policy Audits: Regularly review and audit all Vault policies using Vault's CLI or API. Remove or refine any overly permissive policies.
    7. Use response wrapping (cubbyhole) for sensitive data delivery using Vault's API.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Weak/Default Root Token/Policies (Severity: Critical): Eliminates the risk of using the all-powerful root token and overly permissive default policies.
    • Compromised Client Token (Severity: High): Limits the damage from a compromised token. Short TTLs and least privilege policies reduce the attacker's access and the time window for exploitation.
    • Application Requesting Excessive Secrets (Severity: Medium): Enforces the principle of least privilege, preventing applications from accessing secrets they don't need.
    • Hardcoded Tokens (Severity: High): Mitigates the risk by encouraging the use of dynamic authentication methods.

  • Impact:

    • Weak/Default Root Token/Policies: Risk reduced from Critical to Low.
    • Compromised Client Token: Risk reduced from High to Low (with short TTLs and strict policies).
    • Application Requesting Excessive Secrets: Risk reduced from Medium to Low.
    • Hardcoded Tokens: Risk reduced from High to Medium (still a risk if developers don't follow best practices).

  • Currently Implemented: AppRole is configured and used for most application authentication within Vault. Basic policies are defined in Vault, but they need refinement. Token renewal is implemented in most applications via Vault's API, but revocation is not consistently handled.

  • Missing Implementation: Comprehensive policy review and refinement within Vault. Consistent implementation of token revocation across all applications using Vault's API. Formalized process for regular policy audits using Vault's CLI or API. Implementation of cubbyhole response wrapping.

Mitigation Strategy: Comprehensive Audit Logging (Vault Configuration)

  • Mitigation Strategy: Comprehensive Audit Logging (Vault Configuration).

  • Description:

    1. Enable Audit Logging: Enable Vault's audit logging within Vault's configuration file.
    2. Configure Audit Devices: Configure audit devices (e.g., file, syslog, socket) within Vault's configuration to capture all relevant events: authentication attempts (successes and failures), policy changes, secret access (reads, writes, creations, deletions), unsealing operations, and token lifecycle events. This is a direct Vault configuration.
    3. Secure Log Storage: While securing the log storage itself is not a direct Vault action, the destination of the logs is configured within Vault.
    4. Regular Log Review: Regularly review audit logs (which are generated by Vault) for suspicious activity.
    5. Automated Alerting: Implement automated alerting based on events logged by Vault.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Inadequate Audit Logging (Severity: High): Provides the ability to detect and investigate security incidents. Without auditing, it's difficult to determine what happened after a compromise.
    • Compromised Client Token (Severity: High): Audit logs can help identify the source and scope of a token compromise.
    • Insider Threats (Severity: Medium): Audit logs can help detect malicious or accidental actions by authorized users.

  • Impact:

    • Inadequate Audit Logging: Risk reduced from High to Low (with comprehensive logging and analysis).
    • Compromised Client Token: Provides evidence for investigation and response, but doesn't directly reduce the risk.
    • Insider Threats: Provides evidence for investigation and response, but doesn't directly reduce the risk.

  • Currently Implemented: Vault audit logging is enabled in Vault's configuration and sent to a central logging server (Graylog). Basic log review is performed, but automated alerting is limited.

  • Missing Implementation: Comprehensive configuration of audit devices within Vault to capture all relevant events. Implementation of automated alerting for a wider range of suspicious activities, triggered by Vault's logs. Formalized procedures for regular log review and analysis.

Mitigation Strategy: HSM Integration (Vault Configuration)

  • Mitigation Strategy: Hardware Security Module (HSM) Integration (Vault Configuration).

  • Description:

    1. Choose an HSM: Select a FIPS 140-2 Level 2 (or higher) certified HSM that is compatible with Vault.
    2. Configure Vault: Configure Vault (using the seal stanza in the Vault configuration file) to use the HSM for key management. This involves installing the HSM's PKCS#11 library and configuring Vault's seal stanza with the appropriate parameters (library path, PIN, key label, etc.). This is a direct Vault configuration.
    3. Key Generation: Generate the Vault master key within the HSM using Vault's initialization process. The master key will never leave the HSM in plaintext.
    4. Test Integration: Thoroughly test the HSM integration with Vault to ensure it works correctly.
    5. Secure HSM: While physically securing the HSM is not a direct Vault action, the integration with Vault is.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Compromise of Vault Server (Severity: Critical): Provides the highest level of protection for the Vault master key. Even if the server is compromised, the attacker cannot extract the master key from the HSM.
    • Software-Based Attacks (Severity: High): Protects against attacks that target software vulnerabilities in Vault or the operating system.

  • Impact:

    • Compromise of Vault Server: Risk reduced from Critical to Low (attacker cannot decrypt data without physical access to the HSM).
    • Software-Based Attacks: Risk significantly reduced.

  • Currently Implemented: Not implemented. This is considered a future enhancement for our most critical production deployments.

  • Missing Implementation: This mitigation is entirely missing and requires a significant investment in hardware and configuration within Vault. A cost-benefit analysis needs to be performed before implementation.

Mitigation Strategy: Disable Unused Secret Engines and Auth Methods (Vault Configuration)

  • Mitigation Strategy: Disable Unused Secret Engines and Auth Methods (Vault Configuration)

  • Description:

    1. Identify Unused Components: Regularly review the enabled secret engines and auth methods in Vault using Vault's CLI or API.
    2. Disable Unnecessary Components: Disable any secret engines or auth methods that are not actively being used using Vault's CLI or API. This is a direct interaction with Vault.
    3. Document Disabled Components: Document the reason for disabling each component.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Vulnerable Secret Engines/Auth Methods (Severity: Variable, potentially High): Reduces the attack surface by removing potential entry points for attackers.

  • Impact:

    • Vulnerable Secret Engines/Auth Methods: Risk reduced (the amount depends on the specific vulnerability).

  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. We have disabled some unused components using Vault's CLI, but a comprehensive review is needed.

  • Missing Implementation: A complete review of all enabled secret engines and auth methods within Vault. A documented process for regularly reviewing and disabling unused components using Vault's CLI or API.