attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for helm/helm

Objective: Compromise Application Using Helm Exploitation [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Visualization

Attack Goal: Compromise Application Using Helm Exploitation [CRITICAL] ├───[OR]─ Compromise Application via Malicious Helm Chart [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL] │ ├───[OR]─ Supply Chain Attack - Malicious Chart Source [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL] │ │ ├───[AND]─ Compromise Private/Internal Helm Repository [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL] │ │ └───[AND]─ Typosquatting/Similar Name Attack on Chart Repository [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR]─ Malicious Chart Content [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL] │ │ ├───[AND]─ Template Injection Vulnerabilities in Chart Templates [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL] │ │ ├───[AND]─ Inclusion of Malicious Code/Scripts in Chart Hooks [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL] │ │ ├───[AND]─ Insecure Default Configurations in Chart Values [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL] │ │ ├───[AND]─ Inclusion of Vulnerable Dependencies (Images, Libraries) in Chart [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL] │ │ └───[AND]─ Secrets Exposure/Mismanagement in Chart [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL] │ │ ├───[AND]─ Hardcoded Secrets in Chart Templates or Values [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL] │ │ └───[AND]─ Insecure Storage of Secrets in Chart Repository [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL] ├───[OR]─ Compromise Application via Helm Client Exploitation │ ├───[OR]─ Exploiting Vulnerabilities in Helm Client Binary │ │ ├───[AND]─ Using Outdated or Vulnerable Helm Client Version [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR]─ Compromising Helm Client Configuration/Credentials [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[AND]─ Stealing Helm Client Configuration Files (kubeconfig, Helm settings) [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ └───[AND]─ Credential Harvesting from Helm Client Environment [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├───[OR]─ Compromise Application via Helm Release/Deployment Exploitation [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL] │ ├───[OR]─ Exploiting Misconfigurations Introduced by Helm Charts [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL] │ │ ├───[AND]─ Overly Permissive RBAC Roles Deployed by Chart [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL] │ │ ├───[AND]─ Exposed Services Due to Chart Defaults or Misconfiguration [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL] │ │ ├───[AND]─ Privilege Escalation via Container Security Context in Chart [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL] │ │ └───[AND]─ Resource Exhaustion/DoS due to Chart Misconfigurations [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[AND]─ Insufficient Resource Limits/Requests in Chart [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: Compromise Application Using Helm Exploitation [CRITICAL]

This is the ultimate goal and is marked critical because successful exploitation at any point in the tree leads to application compromise.

Attack Tree Path: Compromise Application via Malicious Helm Chart [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]

This is a major High-Risk Path because malicious charts can directly introduce vulnerabilities and malicious code into the application deployment process. It's critical due to the potential for widespread and deep compromise.

Attack Tree Path: Supply Chain Attack - Malicious Chart Source [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]

This path focuses on compromising the source of Helm charts. It's high-risk because if the source is compromised, all charts from that source become suspect. It's critical because it can affect multiple applications relying on charts from that source.

Attack Tree Path: Compromise Private/Internal Helm Repository [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]

Attack Vector: Attackers target private or internal Helm repositories, often with weaker security than public ones. If successful, they can inject malicious charts that are trusted within the organization. Impact: High, as internal applications relying on this repository can be compromised. Why High-Risk: Insider threats, weaker security controls, and implicit trust in internal resources make this path highly exploitable and impactful.

Attack Tree Path: Typosquatting/Similar Name Attack on Chart Repository [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Vector: Attackers create fake Helm repositories with names similar to legitimate ones, hoping users will mistakenly use the malicious repository. Impact: Medium, as it relies on user error, but can still lead to compromise if users are not careful. Why High-Risk: Relies on social engineering and user mistakes, which are common attack vectors.

Attack Tree Path: Malicious Chart Content [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]

This path focuses on the content of the Helm chart itself being malicious, regardless of the source. It's high-risk and critical because malicious content directly impacts the deployed application.

Attack Tree Path: Template Injection Vulnerabilities in Chart Templates [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]

Attack Vector: Attackers exploit vulnerabilities in Helm's templating engine by injecting malicious code into chart templates. This code can execute during chart rendering, potentially gaining control over the Kubernetes environment. Impact: High, potentially full application and even Kubernetes cluster compromise. Why High-Risk: Template injection is a powerful vulnerability, and Helm templates are complex, making them prone to injection flaws if not carefully handled.

Attack Tree Path: Inclusion of Malicious Code/Scripts in Chart Hooks [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]

Attack Vector: Attackers insert malicious scripts into Helm chart hooks (pre-install, post-upgrade, etc.). These scripts execute during the Helm release lifecycle, allowing attackers to perform actions within the Kubernetes cluster or the deployed application's context. Impact: High, potentially full application and Kubernetes cluster compromise. Why High-Risk: Hooks provide a mechanism to execute code within the deployment process, and malicious hooks can be easily added to charts.

Attack Tree Path: Insecure Default Configurations in Chart Values [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]

Attack Vector: Charts are configured with insecure default values in values.yaml (e.g., default passwords, exposed ports, disabled security features). Attackers exploit these weak defaults after deployment. Impact: Medium-High, depending on the severity of the misconfiguration, can lead to data breaches, unauthorized access, or service compromise. Why High-Risk: Default configurations are often overlooked, and insecure defaults are a common source of vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: Inclusion of Vulnerable Dependencies (Images, Libraries) in Chart [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]

Attack Vector: Charts pull in container images or libraries with known vulnerabilities. Attackers exploit these vulnerabilities in the deployed application. Impact: Medium-High, depending on the vulnerability, can lead to application compromise, data breaches, or denial of service. Why High-Risk: Vulnerable dependencies are common, especially in older or unmaintained images, and are easily exploitable if not scanned and updated.

Attack Tree Path: Secrets Exposure/Mismanagement in Chart [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]

This path focuses on the mishandling of secrets within Helm charts. It's high-risk and critical because secrets are essential for application security, and their exposure can lead to severe compromise.

Attack Tree Path: Hardcoded Secrets in Chart Templates or Values [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]

Attack Vector: Developers hardcode secrets directly into Helm chart templates or values.yaml files. These secrets can be exposed in repositories, logs, or configuration files. Impact: High, full application compromise, data breach, credential compromise. Why High-Risk: Hardcoding secrets is a common mistake, and exposed secrets are easily exploited.

Attack Tree Path: Insecure Storage of Secrets in Chart Repository [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]

Attack Vector: Secrets are stored directly in the chart repository, even if not hardcoded in templates. This can happen if developers commit secret files or store secrets in plain text in configuration files within the repository. Impact: High, full application compromise, data breach, credential compromise. Why High-Risk: Storing secrets in repositories is a major security flaw, and repository history can retain secrets even if removed later.

Attack Tree Path: Compromise Application via Helm Client Exploitation

While less broadly impactful than malicious charts, exploiting the Helm client is still a High-Risk Path because it can grant direct access to Kubernetes.

Attack Tree Path: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in Helm Client Binary

Attack Tree Path: Using Outdated or Vulnerable Helm Client Version [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Vector: Attackers exploit known vulnerabilities in outdated Helm client versions running on user machines. Impact: Medium-High, depending on the vulnerability, can lead to local machine compromise or Kubernetes access if the client's credentials are compromised. Why High-Risk: Outdated software is a common vulnerability, and client-side exploits can be used to gain initial access.

Attack Tree Path: Compromising Helm Client Configuration/Credentials [HIGH-RISK PATH]

This path focuses on stealing or compromising the Helm client's configuration and credentials, which grant access to Kubernetes.

Attack Tree Path: Stealing Helm Client Configuration Files (kubeconfig, Helm settings) [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Vector: Attackers steal kubeconfig files or Helm settings from developer machines or CI/CD systems where Helm is used. These files contain credentials to access Kubernetes. Impact: High, full Kubernetes cluster access, application compromise. Why High-Risk: kubeconfig files are powerful credentials, and if stolen, grant broad access to the Kubernetes environment.

Attack Tree Path: Credential Harvesting from Helm Client Environment [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Vector: Attackers harvest credentials used by the Helm client from the environment where it runs (e.g., memory, environment variables, temporary files). Impact: High, full Kubernetes cluster access, application compromise. Why High-Risk: Credential harvesting is a common technique, and if Helm client credentials are not properly protected, they can be easily stolen.

Attack Tree Path: Compromise Application via Helm Release/Deployment Exploitation [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]

This is a High-Risk Path and Critical Node because misconfigurations introduced during Helm deployment can directly lead to application vulnerabilities and broader Kubernetes security issues.

Attack Tree Path: Exploiting Misconfigurations Introduced by Helm Charts [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]

This path focuses on vulnerabilities arising from misconfigurations deployed by Helm charts. It's high-risk and critical because these misconfigurations can directly expose applications and Kubernetes clusters.

Attack Tree Path: Overly Permissive RBAC Roles Deployed by Chart [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]

Attack Vector: Charts deploy applications with overly permissive RBAC roles, granting excessive privileges to deployed pods or services. Attackers exploit these roles to escalate privileges within the Kubernetes cluster. Impact: Medium-High, privilege escalation within Kubernetes, potential access to other namespaces and resources. Why High-Risk: RBAC misconfigurations are common, and overly permissive roles can be easily exploited for lateral movement and privilege escalation.

Attack Tree Path: Exposed Services Due to Chart Defaults or Misconfiguration [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]

Attack Vector: Charts unintentionally expose services to the internet or internal networks due to default configurations or misconfigurations in service definitions (e.g., using LoadBalancer when ClusterIP is sufficient, exposing unnecessary ports). Attackers directly target these exposed services. Impact: Medium-High, exposure of application to direct internet attacks, potential for exploitation of application vulnerabilities. Why High-Risk: Service exposure is a common misconfiguration, and exposed services increase the attack surface significantly.

Attack Tree Path: Privilege Escalation via Container Security Context in Chart [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL]

Attack Vector: Charts configure containers with overly permissive security contexts (e.g., privileged: true, allowPrivilegeEscalation: true). Attackers exploit these settings to escape containers and gain node-level or Kubernetes cluster-level privileges. Impact: High, container escape, node compromise, Kubernetes cluster compromise. Why High-Risk: Permissive security contexts are dangerous, and container escape vulnerabilities can lead to full system compromise.

Attack Tree Path: Resource Exhaustion/DoS due to Chart Misconfigurations

Attack Tree Path: Insufficient Resource Limits/Requests in Chart [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Vector: Charts do not define or insufficiently define resource limits and requests for deployed pods. Attackers can exploit this to cause resource exhaustion, denial of service, or noisy neighbor issues within the Kubernetes cluster. Impact: Medium, application instability, denial of service, noisy neighbor effects. Why High-Risk: Resource misconfigurations are common, and lack of resource limits can lead to easy denial of service attacks.