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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for hibiken/asynq

Attack Surface: Redis Server Compromise (Asynq Dependency)

  • Description: Compromise of the Redis server used by Asynq, which is critical due to Asynq's complete reliance on Redis for operation.
  • Asynq Contribution: Asynq's functionality is fundamentally tied to Redis. A compromised Redis server directly undermines the security and integrity of the entire Asynq system and the applications relying on it.
  • Example: An attacker gains access to the Redis server due to weak authentication or network exposure, allowing them to manipulate task queues and data.
  • Impact:
    • Data Breach: Exposure of task payloads stored in Redis, potentially containing sensitive data processed by Asynq.
    • Task Manipulation: Injection of malicious tasks, deletion of critical tasks, or modification of task data, disrupting application workflows managed by Asynq.
    • Denial of Service: Disruption of Asynq's task processing capabilities, leading to application downtime and failure of critical background jobs.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Mandatory Strong Redis Authentication: Enforce strong passwords or robust authentication mechanisms for all Redis connections used by Asynq clients and servers.
    • Strict Network Isolation for Redis: Deploy Redis on a private network segment, restricting access only to authorized Asynq components and necessary infrastructure.
    • Regular Security Patching of Redis: Maintain up-to-date Redis server versions with the latest security patches to mitigate known vulnerabilities.
    • Principle of Least Privilege for Redis Access: Configure Redis access controls to grant only the necessary permissions to Asynq components, minimizing the potential impact of compromised credentials.

Attack Surface: Task Payload Deserialization Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Security flaws arising from the deserialization of task payloads within Asynq worker processes, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution.
  • Asynq Contribution: Asynq's architecture necessitates the deserialization of task payloads before they can be processed by task handlers. If deserialization is not handled securely within the task handler code (which is part of the application using Asynq), it becomes a direct attack vector.
  • Example: A task payload is crafted to exploit a vulnerability in the JSON deserialization library used within a task handler. When the Asynq worker processes this task, the malicious payload triggers code execution on the worker server.
  • Impact:
    • Code Injection: Execution of arbitrary code on Asynq worker servers, potentially allowing attackers to gain control of worker processes and the underlying system.
    • Denial of Service: Worker crashes or resource exhaustion caused by malformed or malicious payloads during deserialization.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical (Critical if code execution is achievable, High if it leads to DoS or data corruption)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Employ Secure Deserialization Libraries and Practices: Utilize well-vetted and secure deserialization libraries. Avoid using deserialization methods that are known to be vulnerable to code injection.
    • Strict Input Validation Post-Deserialization: Implement robust input validation on the deserialized task payload before any processing logic is executed in the task handler. This helps to catch and reject malicious or malformed data.
    • Sandboxing or Isolation for Task Handlers: Execute task handlers in isolated environments (e.g., containers, virtual machines, sandboxed processes) to limit the potential impact of code execution vulnerabilities.
    • Regularly Update Deserialization Libraries: Keep deserialization libraries and all other dependencies updated to patch known security vulnerabilities.

Attack Surface: Task Handler Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Security vulnerabilities present within the application-specific code of task handlers, which are executed by Asynq workers to process tasks.
  • Asynq Contribution: Asynq serves as the execution platform for task handlers. While Asynq itself might be secure, vulnerabilities in the user-defined task handler logic are directly exposed and exploitable through Asynq's task processing mechanism. Asynq's reliability and security are directly dependent on the security of the task handlers it executes.
  • Example: A task handler processes user-provided data from the task payload without proper sanitization, leading to an SQL injection vulnerability when the handler interacts with a database. This vulnerability is exposed and triggered when Asynq processes a task with a malicious payload.
  • Impact:
    • Data Breach: Unauthorized access to sensitive data through vulnerabilities like injection flaws or logic errors in task handlers.
    • System Compromise: Potential for further exploitation of worker servers and backend systems depending on the nature of the vulnerability and the privileges of the worker process.
    • Application Instability: Errors, crashes, or unexpected behavior caused by vulnerabilities in task handler logic.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical (Critical if system compromise or significant data breach is possible, High for data access or application instability)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement Secure Coding Practices in Task Handlers: Adhere to secure coding principles when developing task handlers, including thorough input validation, output encoding, and protection against common web and application vulnerabilities (e.g., injection flaws, cross-site scripting, insecure deserialization).
    • Conduct Rigorous Code Reviews and Security Testing: Perform thorough code reviews and security testing (including static and dynamic analysis) of all task handler code to identify and remediate potential vulnerabilities before deployment.
    • Apply the Principle of Least Privilege to Worker Processes: Run Asynq worker processes with the minimum necessary privileges required for their operation to limit the potential damage if a task handler is compromised.
    • Implement Robust Error Handling and Logging in Handlers: Incorporate comprehensive error handling and logging within task handlers to detect and respond to unexpected behavior or potential security incidents during task processing.

Attack Surface: Web UI Authentication and Authorization Bypass (If Enabled)

  • Description: Weak or missing authentication and authorization controls for accessing Asynq's Web UI, allowing unauthorized users to gain access.
  • Asynq Contribution: Asynq provides an optional Web UI for monitoring and managing task queues. If enabled without proper security measures, it directly introduces a web-based attack surface.
  • Example: The Asynq Web UI is deployed with default or weak credentials, or without any authentication at all. An attacker can access the UI, view task queue information, and potentially perform administrative actions if authorization is also weak or missing.
  • Impact:
    • Unauthorized Access to Monitoring Data: Exposure of sensitive information about task queues, worker status, and application workload.
    • Task Queue Manipulation: Potential for unauthorized users to manage task queues, including pausing queues, retrying tasks, or deleting tasks, disrupting application operations.
    • Administrative Actions: If authorization is also bypassed, attackers might gain access to administrative functions within the Web UI, potentially leading to further system compromise.
  • Risk Severity: High (if administrative actions are exposed, otherwise Medium for information disclosure and task manipulation)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Mandatory Authentication and Strong Authorization for Web UI: Always enable and enforce strong authentication for accessing the Asynq Web UI. Implement a robust authorization model to control access to different features and data within the UI based on user roles.
    • Deploy Web UI Behind a Reverse Proxy with Authentication: Place the Web UI behind a reverse proxy that handles authentication and authorization, adding an extra layer of security and control.
    • Regular Security Audits of Web UI Configuration: Periodically review the Web UI's security configuration and access controls to ensure they remain effective and aligned with security best practices.
    • Consider Disabling Web UI in Production if Not Essential: If the Web UI is not strictly necessary for production monitoring and management, consider disabling it to eliminate this attack surface altogether.