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Threat Model Analysis for hibiken/asynq

  • Description: An attacker with network access or access to the Redis server could eavesdrop on network traffic or directly access Redis data to read task payloads stored in plain text. This could be achieved by network sniffing, accessing Redis backups, or exploiting Redis vulnerabilities if present.
  • Impact: Confidentiality breach. Sensitive data within task payloads could be exposed to unauthorized parties, leading to potential data leaks, identity theft, or other privacy violations.
  • Affected Asynq Component: Redis Data Storage, Network Communication between Asynq components and Redis.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enable TLS/SSL encryption for Redis connections.
    • Encrypt sensitive data within task payloads before enqueuing and decrypt in task handlers.
    • Implement strong access controls and authentication for Redis.
  • Description: An attacker, potentially through exploiting Redis vulnerabilities or gaining unauthorized access to the Redis server, could intentionally corrupt data within Redis. This could involve modifying task payloads, deleting tasks, or altering queue metadata, leading to incorrect or failed task processing.
  • Impact: Integrity and Availability impact. Task processing could be disrupted, leading to incorrect application behavior, data inconsistencies, or service unavailability.
  • Affected Asynq Component: Redis Data Storage, Task Queues.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement Redis persistence (RDB/AOF).
    • Regularly backup Redis data.
    • Use Redis replication and clustering for redundancy.
    • Monitor Redis health and performance.
    • Implement input validation and integrity checks on task payloads in handlers.
  • Description: An attacker could launch a Denial of Service (DoS) attack against the Redis server, making it unavailable. This could be achieved through network flooding, resource exhaustion, or exploiting Redis vulnerabilities. Alternatively, legitimate infrastructure issues could also cause downtime. Asynq relies on Redis, so downtime directly impacts task processing.
  • Impact: Availability impact. Asynq clients cannot enqueue tasks, and servers cannot process them, leading to application downtime or service degradation.
  • Affected Asynq Component: Redis Server, Asynq Client, Asynq Server.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement Redis high availability solutions (Sentinel/Cluster).
    • Design application to handle temporary Redis outages with retry mechanisms.
    • Monitor Redis availability and performance.
    • Implement rate limiting and traffic shaping to mitigate DoS attempts.
  • Description: An attacker could exploit misconfigurations in Redis, such as default passwords, exposed ports, or disabled authentication, to gain unauthorized access to the Redis instance. This allows them to read, modify, or delete task data, or potentially use Redis as a stepping stone to further compromise the application or infrastructure.
  • Impact: Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability impact. Could lead to data breaches, data manipulation, disruption of task processing, or broader system compromise.
  • Affected Asynq Component: Redis Server, Redis Configuration.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Configure strong passwords for Redis authentication.
    • Restrict network access to Redis.
    • Disable unnecessary Redis commands and features.
    • Regularly audit Redis configuration for security best practices.
    • Use configuration management tools to enforce secure Redis settings.
  • Description: An attacker could enqueue tasks with crafted payloads designed to exploit vulnerabilities in task handlers or the application logic. This could involve injecting malicious code, commands, or data into the payload, leading to unauthorized actions when the task handler processes it.
  • Impact: Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability impact. Could lead to data breaches, data manipulation, unauthorized access, or denial of service depending on the vulnerability exploited in the task handler.
  • Affected Asynq Component: Task Handlers, Task Payloads, Asynq Client.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement robust input validation and sanitization for task payloads.
    • Apply principle of least privilege to task handlers.
    • Regularly review and audit task handler code for vulnerabilities.
    • Use secure serialization/deserialization methods for task payloads.
  • Description: Vulnerabilities in the task handler code itself (e.g., injection flaws, insecure dependencies) could be exploited. An attacker might leverage crafted task payloads or directly interact with the application if task handlers expose external interfaces to trigger these vulnerabilities.
  • Impact: Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability impact. Could lead to code execution, data breaches, data manipulation, or denial of service depending on the vulnerability.
  • Affected Asynq Component: Task Handlers, Application Code.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Apply secure coding practices in task handlers.
    • Perform regular security code reviews and vulnerability scanning.
    • Keep task handler dependencies up-to-date.
    • Implement proper error handling and logging in task handlers.
    • Use static analysis tools to detect potential vulnerabilities.