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Attack Tree Analysis for hibiken/asynq

Objective: Disrupt or Control Task Processing (Specifically: Execute arbitrary code on worker nodes)

Attack Tree Visualization

                                      Disrupt or Control Task Processing
                                                    |
        -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        |													   |
  1.  Denial of Service (DoS)                     2.  Unauthorized Task Execution/Modification [CN]
        |													   |
  -------------											  -----------------
  |           |											  |               |
1a. Queue   1b. Worker										 2a. Inject     2b. Modify
  Overflow   Exhaustion										  Malicious     Existing
  [HR]        [HR]											  Tasks [CN]    Tasks
															 |				   |
														---------------		  ---------------
														|             |						|
												  2a1. Forge    2a2. Exploit			   2b2. Tamper
													   Task      Vulnerable				   with Task
													   Payloads  Task Handler				   Payload
													   [HR]      [CN] [HR]					[HR]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Denial of Service (DoS)

  • Goal: Prevent the application from processing legitimate tasks.

    • 1a. Queue Overflow [HR]

      • Description: The attacker floods the Redis queue with an overwhelming number of tasks, exceeding capacity or configured limits. This blocks legitimate tasks.
      • Likelihood: Medium to High (Depends on rate limiting and queue size configuration.)
      • Impact: High (Application unavailability, potential data loss.)
      • Effort: Low (Simple scripts can generate many requests.)
      • Skill Level: Novice
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Unusual queue growth is detectable, but distinguishing malicious traffic can be hard.)

    • 1b. Worker Exhaustion [HR]

      • Description: The attacker submits tasks that consume excessive resources (CPU, memory, I/O) on worker nodes, preventing them from processing other tasks.
      • Likelihood: Medium (Depends on task complexity and resource limits.)
      • Impact: High (Application unresponsive/slow, potential data loss.)
      • Effort: Medium (Requires crafting resource-intensive tasks.)
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium (High resource usage detectable, but identifying malicious tasks can be difficult.)

Attack Tree Path: 2. Unauthorized Task Execution/Modification [CN]

  • Goal: Execute arbitrary code or modify the behavior of existing tasks. This is the most critical threat.

    • 2a. Inject Malicious Tasks [CN]

      • Goal: Enqueue tasks with malicious payloads to achieve code execution.

      • 2a1. Forge Task Payloads [HR]

        • Description: The attacker crafts a task payload that, when processed, executes arbitrary code or performs unintended actions. This exploits weaknesses in input validation or deserialization.
        • Likelihood: Low to Medium (Highly dependent on input validation quality.)
        • Impact: Very High (Complete system compromise.)
        • Effort: Medium to High (Requires understanding task handler logic and bypassing validation.)
        • Skill Level: Advanced to Expert
        • Detection Difficulty: Hard to Very Hard (Well-crafted payloads may be indistinguishable from legitimate data.)

      • 2a2. Exploit Vulnerable Task Handler [CN] [HR]

        • Description: The attacker identifies and exploits a vulnerability (e.g., SQL injection, command injection) in an existing task handler.
        • Likelihood: Low to Medium (Depends on the presence of vulnerabilities.)
        • Impact: Very High (Complete system compromise.)
        • Effort: High to Very High (Requires vulnerability research and exploitation.)
        • Skill Level: Expert
        • Detection Difficulty: Hard to Very Hard (Requires advanced intrusion detection.)
    • 2b. Modify Existing Tasks
      • Goal: Alter task in queue to change application behavior.
      • 2b2. Tamper with Task Payload [HR]
        • Description: The attacker modifies the data within a task payload in the queue, causing the task handler to perform an unintended action, potentially leading to code execution.
        • Likelihood: Low (Requires bypassing Redis security.)
        • Impact: Very High (Potential for code execution or data corruption.)
        • Effort: High (Requires bypassing Redis security and crafting a modified payload.)
        • Skill Level: Advanced
        • Detection Difficulty: Hard (Requires monitoring for unauthorized Redis access and data anomalies.)