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Threat Model Analysis for hibiken/asynq

Threat: Malicious Task Injection

  • Description: An attacker crafts a malicious task payload and injects it into the queue via the asynq client. This bypasses application-level input validation (if any exists at the point of task creation) and relies on exploiting vulnerabilities in how asynq handles task deserialization or how the user has configured asynq to handle serialization. The malicious payload contains code to be executed by the worker upon deserialization.
  • Impact: Arbitrary code execution on the worker server, leading to potential data breaches, system compromise, or denial of service.
  • Affected Component: asynq.Client (specifically, the Enqueue and related methods), asynq.Worker (the task processing and deserialization logic), any custom asynq.PayloadConverter implementations.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strict Input Validation (Pre-Enqueue): Even though this is an asynq-focused threat model, always validate and sanitize data before it's passed to asynq.Client.Enqueue. This is the first line of defense. Don't rely solely on asynq for security.
    • Safe Serialization (Asynq Config): Use the default encoding/json serializer provided by asynq. Avoid custom serializers unless absolutely necessary and you are extremely confident in their security. If a custom serializer must be used, it must be rigorously audited and hardened against deserialization attacks.
    • Principle of Least Privilege (Worker): Run worker processes with the absolute minimum necessary privileges. This limits the damage an attacker can do if they achieve code execution.
    • Content Security Policy (CSP) (If Applicable): If tasks involve rendering any content (highly unusual, but possible), use CSP to restrict the sources of executable code. This is a defense-in-depth measure.

Threat: Task Starvation (via Asynq Client)

  • Description: An attacker, using the asynq.Client, floods the queue with a large number of tasks. This is distinct from a general DoS attack on the application; it's specifically targeting the asynq queueing mechanism. The attacker might use a large number of low-priority tasks or a smaller number of tasks designed to consume excessive resources on the worker.
  • Impact: Denial of service for legitimate users; application becomes unresponsive or significantly degraded because legitimate tasks are delayed or never processed.
  • Affected Component: asynq.Client (the Enqueue and related methods), asynq.Server (the queue multiplexer), asynq.Worker (task processing).
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Rate Limiting (Pre-Enqueue): Implement rate limiting before calls to asynq.Client.Enqueue. This is the most effective mitigation. Limit the number of tasks a user or IP address can enqueue within a given time period.
    • Priority Queues (Asynq Config): Utilize asynq's priority queue feature (asynq.QueuePriority) to ensure that critical tasks are processed before less important ones. This helps mitigate the impact of a flood of low-priority tasks.
    • Resource Limits (Asynq Config): Set reasonable timeouts and retry limits for tasks using asynq.Config options like Timeout and Retry. This prevents individual malicious tasks from consuming excessive resources.
    • Queue Monitoring (Asynq & External): Continuously monitor queue length and worker activity using asynq's built-in metrics and external monitoring tools. Set up alerts for high queue lengths and worker resource exhaustion.

Threat: Unpatched Asynq Vulnerability

  • Description: A vulnerability is discovered and publicly disclosed in the asynq library itself. This is distinct from vulnerabilities in Redis or in user-provided worker code. An attacker exploits this asynq-specific vulnerability.
  • Impact: Varies depending on the specific vulnerability within asynq, but could range from denial of service to arbitrary code execution if the vulnerability is in a critical component like the client or server.
  • Affected Component: Potentially any component of the asynq library.
  • Risk Severity: Variable (but could be Critical or High depending on the vulnerability)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Regular Updates: Keep the asynq library updated to the latest stable version. This is the primary mitigation.
    • Vulnerability Monitoring: Actively monitor security advisories and vulnerability databases specifically for announcements related to asynq.
    • Rapid Patching: Have a process in place to quickly apply security patches to asynq when they are released.