Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
90 lines (79 loc) · 9.24 KB

attack-surface.md

File metadata and controls

90 lines (79 loc) · 9.24 KB

Attack Surface Analysis for hyperledger/fabric

Attack Surface: Certificate Authority (CA) Compromise

  • Description: An attacker gains control of the Certificate Authority (CA) responsible for issuing digital certificates within the Fabric network.
  • Fabric Contribution: Fabric relies heavily on PKI and the CA for identity management and trust. Compromising the CA undermines the entire Fabric security model.
  • Example: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in the Fabric CA software or gains unauthorized access to the CA server. They then issue fraudulent certificates for themselves, allowing them to impersonate network administrators, peers, or users.
  • Impact: Critical. Complete network compromise, unauthorized access to all data and functionalities, ability to manipulate transactions, and disrupt network operations.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers/Users:
      • Secure CA Infrastructure: Harden the CA server operating system, network, and physical access.
      • Regular Security Audits: Conduct regular security audits and penetration testing of the CA infrastructure and software.
      • Principle of Least Privilege: Restrict access to the CA system and its administrative functions.
      • Use HSM for CA Key: Store the CA's private key in a Hardware Security Module (HSM).
      • Monitor CA Logs: Actively monitor CA logs for suspicious activities.
      • Implement Strong Access Controls: Use strong authentication and authorization mechanisms to protect CA access.
      • Keep CA Software Updated: Regularly update the Fabric CA software to patch known vulnerabilities.

Attack Surface: Chaincode Logic Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Bugs, logic errors, or security flaws exist within the smart contract (chaincode) code deployed on the Fabric network.
  • Fabric Contribution: Chaincode executes business logic and directly interacts with the ledger on Fabric peers. Fabric provides isolation but cannot prevent vulnerabilities within the chaincode itself.
  • Example: A chaincode has a reentrancy vulnerability. An attacker exploits this vulnerability by making recursive calls to a function, manipulating the state of the ledger in an unintended way. Another example is an integer overflow vulnerability leading to incorrect calculations and unauthorized actions.
  • Impact: High. Data corruption, financial loss, manipulation of business logic, unauthorized access to data, potential denial of service if chaincode consumes excessive resources.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Secure Coding Practices: Follow secure coding guidelines for chaincode languages (Go, Java, Node.js).
      • Thorough Testing: Implement comprehensive unit, integration, and system testing of chaincode.
      • Code Reviews: Conduct peer code reviews and security audits of chaincode before deployment.
      • Static Analysis: Utilize static analysis tools to identify potential vulnerabilities in chaincode.
      • Input Validation: Implement robust input validation and sanitization within chaincode.
      • Principle of Least Privilege in Chaincode: Design chaincode with least privilege access controls.
      • Dependency Management: Carefully manage and audit chaincode dependencies.

Attack Surface: Peer Node API Exposure

  • Description: Vulnerabilities or misconfigurations in the APIs exposed by peer nodes (e.g., gRPC) are exploited to gain unauthorized access or control over the peer.
  • Fabric Contribution: Peer nodes are core Fabric components. Their APIs are essential for network operation and interaction with client applications and other peers.
  • Example: An attacker exploits an unpatched vulnerability in the gRPC implementation used by peer nodes or a misconfigured peer API that lacks proper authentication. They could then potentially query ledger data, inject malicious transactions, or disrupt peer operations.
  • Impact: High. Data breaches, unauthorized access to ledger data, potential manipulation of ledger data, denial of service of the peer node, and potentially wider network disruption.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers/Users (Operators):
      • Regular Security Patching: Keep peer node software and underlying operating systems updated.
      • API Access Control: Implement strong authentication and authorization for peer node APIs, using mutual TLS (mTLS).
      • Network Segmentation: Isolate peer nodes within a secure network segment.
      • Firewall Configuration: Configure firewalls to restrict access to peer node APIs.
      • Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS): Deploy IDS/IPS to monitor network traffic to peer nodes.
      • Regular Security Audits and Penetration Testing: Conduct regular security assessments of peer node infrastructure and APIs.
      • Disable Unnecessary APIs: Disable any peer node APIs not required for application functionality.
      • Rate Limiting and Throttling: Implement rate limiting and throttling on peer node APIs.

Attack Surface: Ordering Service Compromise

  • Description: An attacker gains control of the ordering service, which is responsible for ordering transactions and creating blocks in the Fabric network.
  • Fabric Contribution: The ordering service is critical for consensus and transaction ordering in Fabric. Compromising it has network-wide consequences within Fabric.
  • Example: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in the ordering service software (e.g., Raft or Kafka implementation) or compromises ordering service nodes. They could then manipulate the order of transactions, censor transactions, or cause a denial of service for the entire network.
  • Impact: Critical. Network-wide disruption, transaction manipulation, censorship of transactions, potential for double-spending, loss of data integrity.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers/Users (Operators):
      • Secure Ordering Service Infrastructure: Harden the ordering service nodes' infrastructure.
      • Regular Security Patching: Keep ordering service software and underlying systems updated.
      • Consensus Mechanism Security: Choose a robust and secure consensus mechanism (like Raft) and configure it securely.
      • Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT): Consider using a BFT-based ordering service for enhanced resilience (if applicable).
      • Limited Access to Ordering Service: Restrict access to ordering service nodes and administrative functions.
      • Redundancy and Fault Tolerance: Deploy the ordering service in a highly available and fault-tolerant configuration.
      • Monitoring and Alerting: Implement robust monitoring and alerting for ordering service nodes.
      • Regular Security Audits and Penetration Testing: Conduct regular security assessments of the ordering service infrastructure.

Attack Surface: Private Key Exposure

  • Description: Private keys used by users, peers, or orderers are compromised, allowing attackers to impersonate these Fabric entities.
  • Fabric Contribution: Fabric relies on private keys for digital signatures and authentication within its permissioned blockchain framework. Compromising private keys bypasses Fabric's identity and access management.
  • Example: A developer accidentally commits a private key to a public code repository. An attacker finds the key and uses it to impersonate the developer, gaining unauthorized access to the Fabric network and potentially submitting malicious transactions.
  • Impact: High. Unauthorized transactions, data breaches, impersonation of legitimate users or nodes, potential for network disruption, loss of trust and reputation within the Fabric network.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers/Users:
      • Secure Key Generation and Storage: Generate private keys securely and store them in encrypted form or in secure hardware like HSMs.
      • Avoid Storing Keys in Code: Never hardcode private keys in application code or configuration files.
      • Key Rotation: Implement regular key rotation for all Fabric entities.
      • Access Control for Key Storage: Restrict access to key storage locations.
      • Secure Key Management Practices: Implement robust key management policies and procedures.
      • Client-Side Key Management: For client applications, use secure key storage mechanisms. Consider hardware wallets for user keys.
      • Educate Users and Developers: Train users and developers on secure key management practices.
      • Regular Security Audits of Key Management: Conduct regular security audits of key management processes.