Objective: Compromise Fabric Application
Compromise Fabric Application [CRITICAL NODE] ├───(OR)─ Exploit Fabric Network Infrastructure [HIGH RISK PATH] │ ├───(OR)─ Compromise Orderer Node [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ ├───(OR)─ Consensus Disruption (Raft/Kafka specific) [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ ├─── Byzantine Fault Injection (Raft leader election manipulation) [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ └─── Kafka Broker Compromise (Kafka based ordering) [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ ├───(OR)─ Manipulate Transaction Ordering (Integrity) [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ ├─── Orderer Compromise (Direct Access) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ └───(OR)─ Information Disclosure (Confidentiality) [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ └─── Logging/Monitoring Data Leakage [HIGH RISK PATH] │ ├───(OR)─ Compromise Peer Node [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ ├───(OR)─ Data Theft from Ledger (Confidentiality) [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ ├─── Exploit Peer Software Vulnerability (e.g., Fabric code, OS) [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ ├───(OR)─ Data Tampering in Ledger (Integrity) [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ ├─── Peer Compromise & Ledger Manipulation [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ └───(OR)─ Channel Hijacking/Data Leakage (Confidentiality/Integrity) │ │ └─── Compromise Channel MSP (Membership Service Provider) [HIGH RISK PATH] │ ├───(OR)─ Compromise Certificate Authority (CA) / Membership Service Provider (MSP) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ ├───(OR)─ CA Key Compromise (Identity Theft, Impersonation) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ ├─── Weak Key Generation/Storage [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ ├─── CA Software Vulnerability [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ │ └─── Insider Threat/Malicious Administrator [HIGH RISK PATH] ├───(OR)─ Exploit Chaincode (Smart Contract) Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] │ ├───(OR)─ Logic Bugs in Chaincode (Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability) [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ ├───(OR)─ Access Control Bypass in Chaincode Logic [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ ├───(OR)─ Data Validation Failures [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ └───(OR)─ Business Logic Flaws (e.g., incorrect state transitions) [HIGH RISK PATH] │ ├───(OR)─ Chaincode Backdoors/Malware (Integrity, Confidentiality) [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ ├─── Malicious Code Injection during Development [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ ├─── Supply Chain Attacks (Compromised Dependencies) [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ └─── Insider Threat - Malicious Chaincode Deployment [HIGH RISK PATH] ├───(OR)─ Exploit Application-Fabric Integration (Client SDK) [HIGH RISK PATH] │ ├───(OR)─ Insecure Key Management in Application [HIGH RISK PATH] │ ├───(OR)─ Application Logic Vulnerabilities Exploiting Fabric Features [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ ├───(OR)─ Information Leakage through Application APIs exposing Fabric Data [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ └───(OR)─ Business Logic Flaws in Application leveraging Fabric Functionality [HIGH RISK PATH] └───(OR)─ Social Engineering / Insider Threat [HIGH RISK PATH] ├─── Phishing Attacks against Network Participants [HIGH RISK PATH] └─── Insider Malicious Actions (Data Theft, Sabotage) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] └─── Compromised Administrator Accounts [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
Attack Tree Path: 1. Compromise Fabric Application [CRITICAL NODE]
This is the ultimate goal. Achieving this means successfully exploiting one or more of the underlying attack paths to compromise the application's security posture.
Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Fabric Network Infrastructure [HIGH RISK PATH]
This path focuses on attacking the core components of the Hyperledger Fabric network itself. Success here can have widespread and severe consequences.
* **2.1. Compromise Orderer Node [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]:**
* Orderers are critical for transaction ordering and consensus. Compromising them can lead to:
* **2.1.1. Consensus Disruption (Raft/Kafka specific) [HIGH RISK PATH]:**
* **Byzantine Fault Injection (Raft leader election manipulation) [HIGH RISK PATH]:** Attackers can attempt to manipulate the Raft leader election process to gain control or disrupt consensus.
* **Kafka Broker Compromise (Kafka based ordering) [HIGH RISK PATH]:** If Kafka is used for ordering, compromising Kafka brokers can allow attackers to manipulate transaction order or disrupt the ordering service.
* **2.1.2. Manipulate Transaction Ordering (Integrity) [HIGH RISK PATH]:**
* **Orderer Compromise (Direct Access) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]:** Gaining direct access to the orderer node allows attackers to directly manipulate the order of transactions, leading to critical integrity breaches.
* **2.1.3. Information Disclosure (Confidentiality) [HIGH RISK PATH]:**
* **Logging/Monitoring Data Leakage [HIGH RISK PATH]:** Orderer logs and monitoring data might contain sensitive information. If not secured properly, attackers can access this data for reconnaissance or direct data breaches.
* **2.2. Compromise Peer Node [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]:**
* Peers store the ledger and execute chaincode. Compromising them can lead to:
* **2.2.1. Data Theft from Ledger (Confidentiality) [HIGH RISK PATH]:**
* **Exploit Peer Software Vulnerability (e.g., Fabric code, OS) [HIGH RISK PATH]:** Exploiting vulnerabilities in the peer software or underlying OS can grant attackers access to the peer's file system and ledger data.
* **2.2.2. Data Tampering in Ledger (Integrity) [HIGH RISK PATH]:**
* **Peer Compromise & Ledger Manipulation [HIGH RISK PATH]:** Once a peer is compromised, attackers can directly manipulate the ledger data stored on that peer, leading to integrity violations.
* **2.2.3. Channel Hijacking/Data Leakage (Confidentiality/Integrity):**
* **Compromise Channel MSP (Membership Service Provider) [HIGH RISK PATH]:** If the MSP for a channel is compromised on a peer, attackers can potentially impersonate members of that channel or gain unauthorized access to channel data.
* **2.3. Compromise Certificate Authority (CA) / Membership Service Provider (MSP) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]:**
* CA/MSPs manage identities and trust within the Fabric network. Compromising them is extremely critical.
* **2.3.1. CA Key Compromise (Identity Theft, Impersonation) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]:**
* **Weak Key Generation/Storage [HIGH RISK PATH]:** If CA private keys are generated weakly or stored insecurely, attackers can steal them.
* **CA Software Vulnerability [HIGH RISK PATH]:** Vulnerabilities in the CA software itself can be exploited to extract private keys or gain control of the CA.
* **Insider Threat/Malicious Administrator [HIGH RISK PATH]:** Malicious insiders with administrative access to the CA can directly steal or misuse CA keys.
Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Chaincode (Smart Contract) Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
Chaincode contains the core application logic and data access rules. Vulnerabilities here can directly impact the application's functionality and data.
* **3.1. Logic Bugs in Chaincode (Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability) [HIGH RISK PATH]:**
* **Access Control Bypass in Chaincode Logic [HIGH RISK PATH]:** Flaws in chaincode's access control logic can allow unauthorized users to perform actions or access data they shouldn't.
* **Data Validation Failures [HIGH RISK PATH]:** Insufficient input validation in chaincode can lead to unexpected behavior, data corruption, or vulnerabilities.
* **Business Logic Flaws (e.g., incorrect state transitions) [HIGH RISK PATH]:** Errors in the chaincode's business logic can lead to incorrect state updates, financial losses, or other application-specific issues.
* **3.2. Chaincode Backdoors/Malware (Integrity, Confidentiality) [HIGH RISK PATH]:**
* **Malicious Code Injection during Development [HIGH RISK PATH]:** Attackers can inject malicious code into chaincode during the development process.
* **Supply Chain Attacks (Compromised Dependencies) [HIGH RISK PATH]:** Compromised dependencies used by the chaincode can introduce vulnerabilities or malicious functionality.
* **Insider Threat - Malicious Chaincode Deployment [HIGH RISK PATH]:** Malicious insiders with deployment privileges can deploy backdoored or malicious chaincode.
Attack Tree Path: 4. Exploit Application-Fabric Integration (Client SDK) [HIGH RISK PATH]
Vulnerabilities in how the application integrates with Fabric through the Client SDK can be exploited.
* **4.1. Insecure Key Management in Application [HIGH RISK PATH]:**
* If the application doesn't securely manage cryptographic keys used for interacting with Fabric (e.g., storing keys in plaintext, hardcoding keys), attackers can steal these keys and impersonate the application.
* **4.2. Application Logic Vulnerabilities Exploiting Fabric Features [HIGH RISK PATH]:**
* **Information Leakage through Application APIs exposing Fabric Data [HIGH RISK PATH]:** Application APIs that expose Fabric data without proper access control or sanitization can leak sensitive information.
* **Business Logic Flaws in Application leveraging Fabric Functionality [HIGH RISK PATH]:** Flaws in the application's business logic that interacts with Fabric can be exploited to manipulate data or processes on the blockchain.
Attack Tree Path: 5. Social Engineering / Insider Threat [HIGH RISK PATH]
Human factors are always a significant risk.
* **5.1. Phishing Attacks against Network Participants [HIGH RISK PATH]:**
* Phishing attacks can target users or administrators to steal credentials, which can then be used to gain access to Fabric components or application systems.
* **5.2. Insider Malicious Actions (Data Theft, Sabotage) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]:**
* Malicious insiders with legitimate access can intentionally steal data, disrupt services, or sabotage the Fabric application.
* **5.3. Compromised Administrator Accounts [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]:**
* If administrator accounts are compromised (e.g., through weak passwords, lack of MFA), attackers can gain full control over Fabric components and the application.