Objective: [G] Gain Unauthorized Control Over Fabric Network & Data
[G] Gain Unauthorized Control Over Fabric Network & Data
/ | \
/ | \
------------------------------------------ -------------------------- ------------------------------------------
| [A] Compromise Chaincode (Sub-tree) | | [B] Exploit Network | | [C] Compromise IAM (Sub-tree) |
------------------------------------------ | (Partial Sub-tree) | ------------------------------------------
/ | -------------------------- / |
/ | | / |
--------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- ---------------
| [A2] Exploit | | [A3] Deploy | | [B2] Leverage | | [C1] Steal | | [C2a] Use |
| Logic Flaws| | Malicious | | Default | | Private | | Crypto |
| in Existing| | Chaincode | | Credentials| | Keys [!] | | Algorith- |
| Chaincode | | (e.g., | | (e.g., weak | | | | m Weak- |
| [!] | | Upgrade) | | passwords) | | | | nesses |
--------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- | (e.g., |
| | | | | weak |
| | | | | keys) |
------|------ ------|------ ------|------ ------|------ -----------
| [A2a] Find | | [A3a] Gain| | [B2a] Use | | [C1a] Use |
| Static |---> | Admin | | Social |---> | Phishing|
| Analysis| | Access | | Engineer-| | Attacks |
| Tools | | (e.g., | | ing | | (e.g., |
| (e.g., | | comprom-| | to Gain | | email) |
| Mythril) | | ised | | Access | | [!] |
| [!] | | MSP)[!] | | [!] | | |
----------- ----------- ----------- -----------
If misconfigured:
--------------------------
| [B] Exploit Network |
| (Partial Sub-tree) |
--------------------------
|
---------------
| [B1] Exploit |
| Ordering |
| Service |
| Vulnerabil-|
| ities |
| (e.g., |
| DoS) |
---------------
|
------|------
| [B1a] Find|
| Publicly|
| Exposed |
| Ordering|
| Service |
| Endpoints|
-----------
--------------------------
| [B] Exploit Network |
| (Partial Sub-tree) |
--------------------------
|
---------------
| [B3] Attack |
| Endorsing |
| Peers |
| (e.g., |
| comprom- |
| ised |
| nodes) |
---------------
|
------|------
| [B3a] Find|
| Known |
| Exploits|
| (e.g., |
| CVEs) |
-----------
Attack Tree Path: 1. Chaincode Exploitation Path
-
[A2] Exploit Logic Flaws in Existing Chaincode [!]:
- Description: The attacker identifies and exploits vulnerabilities in already deployed chaincode. This is a direct attack on the running system and doesn't require deployment privileges.
- Examples: Exploiting phantom reads, double-spend vulnerabilities, incorrect access control, integer overflows, or other logic errors.
- Mitigation: Rigorous code review, static analysis (using tools like Mythril), dynamic analysis (fuzzing), formal verification, and security audits.
-
[A2a] Find Static Analysis Tools (e.g., Mythril) [!]:
- Description: The attacker uses static analysis tools to identify potential vulnerabilities in the chaincode source code without executing it. The effective use of these tools is the critical aspect.
- Examples: Using Mythril, Slither, or other security-focused static analyzers to find common chaincode vulnerabilities.
- Mitigation: Developers should also use these tools proactively to identify and fix vulnerabilities before deployment.
Attack Tree Path: 2. Chaincode Injection via Admin Compromise Path
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[A3] Deploy Malicious Chaincode (e.g., Upgrade):
- Description: The attacker leverages the chaincode upgrade process (or initial deployment) to replace legitimate chaincode with a malicious version.
- Examples: Replacing a payment processing chaincode with one that diverts funds to the attacker's account.
- Mitigation: Strict chaincode lifecycle management, multi-signature approvals for upgrades, code signing, and robust access controls.
-
[A3a] Gain Admin Access (e.g., compromised MSP) [!]:
- Description: The attacker obtains administrative privileges, often by compromising a Membership Service Provider (MSP). This is a critical step as it grants extensive control over the network.
- Examples: Compromising an MSP administrator's credentials, exploiting a vulnerability in the MSP software, or using social engineering.
- Mitigation: Strong authentication (multi-factor), principle of least privilege, secure key management (HSMs), regular security audits of MSP configurations, and intrusion detection.
Attack Tree Path: 3. Credential Theft via Social Engineering Path
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[B2] Leverage Default Credentials (e.g., weak passwords):
- Description: Attackers try default or weak credentials to gain access.
- Examples: Trying default passwords for peer or orderer nodes.
- Mitigation: Never use default credentials. Enforce strong password policies.
-
[B2a] Use Social Engineering to Gain Access [!]:
- Description: The attacker uses social engineering techniques to trick users or administrators into revealing credentials or granting access.
- Examples: Phishing emails, phone calls impersonating IT support, or other deceptive tactics.
- Mitigation: User education and awareness training, strong authentication (multi-factor), and a culture of security awareness.
Attack Tree Path: 4. Private Key Theft via Phishing Path
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[C1] Steal Private Keys [!]:
- Description: The attacker obtains private keys, which are essential for signing transactions and proving identity. This is a direct path to unauthorized control.
- Examples: Stealing private keys from compromised machines, intercepting key material during transmission, or tricking users into revealing their keys.
- Mitigation: Secure key management (HSMs), multi-factor authentication, secure key storage, and user education.
-
[C1a] Use Phishing Attacks (e.g., email) [!]:
- Description: The attacker uses phishing attacks to trick users into revealing their private keys or installing malware that steals keys.
- Examples: Sending emails that appear to be from a legitimate source, asking users to enter their private keys on a fake website.
- Mitigation: User education and awareness training, email security gateways, and strong authentication.
Attack Tree Path: 5. Cryptographic Weakness Exploitation (Low Likelihood, High Impact)
- [C2a] Use Crypto Algorithm Weaknesses (e.g., weak keys): * Description: The attacker exploits weaknesses in the cryptographic algorithms or key generation processes used by Fabric. * Examples: Using brute-force attacks against weak keys, exploiting known vulnerabilities in cryptographic libraries, or using quantum computing (in the future). * Mitigation: Use strong, up-to-date cryptographic algorithms and key sizes, regularly review cryptographic configurations, and stay informed about advancements in cryptanalysis.
Attack Tree Path: 6. Ordering Service Exploitation (Conditional - If Misconfigured)
-
[B1] Exploit Ordering Service Vulnerabilities:
- Description: Attacking the ordering service, which is crucial for transaction ordering and consensus.
- Examples: Denial-of-service attacks, exploiting vulnerabilities in the ordering service software.
- Mitigation: Keep ordering service software up-to-date, implement robust network security controls, and monitor for suspicious activity.
-
[B1a] Find Publicly Exposed Ordering Service Endpoints:
- Description: Identifying and exploiting vulnerabilities in an exposed ordering service.
- Examples: Scanning for open ports associated with the ordering service.
- Mitigation: Ensure the ordering service is not publicly exposed. Use firewalls and network segmentation.
Attack Tree Path: 7. Endorsing Peer Exploitation
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[B3] Attack Endorsing Peers (e.g., compromised nodes):
- Description: Compromising endorsing peers to influence transaction validation.
- Examples: Exploiting vulnerabilities in the peer software.
- Mitigation: Keep peer software up-to-date, implement robust network security controls, and monitor for suspicious activity.
-
[B3a] Find Known Exploits (e.g., CVEs):
- Description: Exploiting known vulnerabilities in the peer software or its dependencies.
- Examples: Using publicly available exploit code for unpatched vulnerabilities.
- Mitigation: Regularly apply security patches and updates.