attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for iawia002/lux

Objective: To execute arbitrary code on the server hosting the application that uses lux, or to exfiltrate sensitive data downloaded by lux (e.g., user credentials, private videos, API keys embedded in URLs).

Attack Tree Visualization

[Root] Compromise Application Using Lux (Execute Code OR Exfiltrate Data)

├── [1] Execute Arbitrary Code [HR] │ ├── [1.1] Command Injection via URL/Filename Manipulation [HR] │ │ ├── [1.1.1] Exploit lux's URL parsing logic [HR] │ │ │ └── [1.1.1.1] Pass malicious URL to lux that triggers OS command execution [CN] │ │ ├── [1.1.2] Exploit lux's filename handling [HR] │ │ │ └── [1.1.2.1] Trigger command execution during file saving or processing [CN] │ └── [1.3] Dependency Vulnerabilities [HR] │ └── [1.3.1] Exploit a known vulnerability in a Go library used by lux │ └── [1.3.1.2] Craft input or network conditions to trigger the vulnerability. [CN]

├── [2] Exfiltrate Sensitive Data [HR] │ ├── [2.1] Access Downloaded Content [HR] │ │ └── [2.1.1.1] If the application doesn't properly isolate lux's output, an attacker might access downloaded files directly. [CN] │ ├── [2.2] Extract Credentials/API Keys from URLs [HR] │ │ ├── [2.2.1.1] Exploit a separate vulnerability to access log files. [CN] │ │ └── [2.2.2.1] Attacker provides a URL containing sensitive data, hoping the application will pass it to lux and expose it somehow. [CN]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Execute Arbitrary Code [HR]

• 1.1 Command Injection via URL/Filename Manipulation [HR]

  • Description: The attacker exploits insufficient input sanitization to inject operating system commands into either the URL or the filename processed by lux.
  • 1.1.1 Exploit lux's URL parsing logic [HR]
    • 1.1.1.1 Pass malicious URL to lux that triggers OS command execution [CN]
      • Description: The attacker crafts a URL containing shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, |, `, $()) that, when processed by lux, are interpreted by the underlying operating system as commands. For example, a URL like http://example.com/video; rm -rf / could be used.
      • Likelihood: Medium (Heavily dependent on the application's input sanitization)
      • Impact: Very High (Full system compromise)
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Might be caught by intrusion detection systems or logs)
  • 1.1.2 Exploit lux's filename handling [HR]
    • 1.1.2.1 Trigger command execution during file saving or processing [CN]
      • Description: The attacker crafts a filename containing shell metacharacters. When lux saves the downloaded file or interacts with it (e.g., passing it to another program), the injected command is executed. An example filename could be video; whoami > /tmp/output.txt .mp4.
      • Likelihood: Medium (Dependent on input sanitization and how filenames are used internally)
      • Impact: Very High (Full system compromise)
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium

• 1.3 Dependency Vulnerabilities [HR]

  • Description: The attacker exploits a known vulnerability in one of lux's Go library dependencies.
  • 1.3.1 Exploit a known vulnerability in a Go library used by lux
    • 1.3.1.2 Craft input or network conditions to trigger the vulnerability. [CN]
      • Description: After identifying a vulnerable dependency (e.g., using a dependency scanner), the attacker crafts specific input or manipulates network conditions to trigger the vulnerability. The exact nature of the input/conditions depends on the specific vulnerability.
      • Likelihood: Low/Medium (Depends on the exploitability of the specific vulnerability and whether it's been patched)
      • Impact: Variable (Depends on the vulnerability; could range from DoS to full code execution)
      • Effort: Medium/High
      • Skill Level: Advanced
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium/Hard

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exfiltrate Sensitive Data [HR]

• 2.1 Access Downloaded Content [HR]

  • Description: The attacker gains unauthorized access to files downloaded by lux.
  • 2.1.1.1 If the application doesn't properly isolate lux's output, an attacker might access downloaded files directly. [CN]
    • Description: If the application using lux doesn't properly configure the download directory (e.g., sets weak permissions, uses a predictable path, or allows directory listing), an attacker can directly access the downloaded files. This could include private videos, documents, or other sensitive data.
    • Likelihood: Medium (Depends on directory permissions and web server configuration)
    • Impact: Medium/High (Depends on the sensitivity of the downloaded content)
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Novice/Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy (If directory listing is enabled or permissions are too permissive)

• 2.2 Extract Credentials/API Keys from URLs [HR]

  • Description: The attacker obtains sensitive information (credentials, API keys) that are embedded in URLs passed to lux.
  • 2.2.1.1 Exploit a separate vulnerability to access log files. [CN]
    • Description: If lux or the application logs the full URLs (including any embedded credentials), and an attacker gains access to these log files (through a separate vulnerability like directory traversal or misconfigured log access), they can extract the credentials.
    • Likelihood: Medium (Depends on log file permissions and the presence of other vulnerabilities)
    • Impact: Medium/High (Depends on the sensitivity of the logged credentials)
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Depends on log monitoring and intrusion detection)
  • 2.2.2.1 Attacker provides a URL containing sensitive data, hoping the application will pass it to lux and expose it somehow. [CN]
    • Description: The attacker provides a URL containing sensitive data (e.g., a URL with an embedded API key) to the application. If the application blindly passes this URL to lux, and lux logs it, exposes it in an error message, or otherwise makes it accessible, the attacker can retrieve the sensitive data.
    • Likelihood: Medium (Depends on the application's handling of URLs and lux's logging/error handling)
    • Impact: High (Exposure of credentials or API keys)
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Depends on logging and monitoring practices)