attack-surface.md

Attack Surface Analysis for ipfs/go-ipfs

Attack Surface: Denial of Service (DoS) via Network Flooding

• Description: Attackers flood the go-ipfs node with excessive network traffic, overwhelming its resources and causing service disruption or unavailability.
• How go-ipfs contributes: go-ipfs's reliance on libp2p for peer-to-peer networking makes it inherently susceptible to network-level DoS attacks targeting connection requests, data requests (bitswap), or DHT queries. The decentralized nature can amplify the impact if many malicious peers participate.
• Example: A coordinated attack where numerous malicious peers flood a go-ipfs node with bitswap requests for non-existent content, rapidly consuming bandwidth, CPU, and memory, leading to node unresponsiveness and service outage.
• Impact: Service disruption, node unavailability, degraded performance for legitimate users, potential financial losses if the service is critical.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting on incoming connections and requests at the network level (firewall) and within go-ipfs configuration (if available for specific protocols).
  • Resource Limits: Configure resource limits within go-ipfs (e.g., connection limits, memory limits) to prevent resource exhaustion.
  • Firewall Configuration: Use firewalls to filter malicious traffic and limit exposure to untrusted networks.
  • Peer Blacklisting/Reputation: Implement mechanisms to blacklist or penalize peers exhibiting malicious behavior. Explore libp2p's peer management features.
  • Monitoring and Alerting: Monitor node resource usage and network traffic for anomalies indicative of a DoS attack.

Attack Surface: Unauthenticated HTTP API Access

• Description: The go-ipfs HTTP API is exposed without proper authentication, allowing unauthorized users to control the node remotely.
• How go-ipfs contributes: go-ipfs by default exposes an HTTP API for management and interaction. This API, if left unauthenticated, provides a direct control plane for the go-ipfs node.
• Example: An attacker gains network access to a go-ipfs node with an unauthenticated API. They use API endpoints to pin malicious content, retrieve potentially sensitive data stored on the node, modify node configuration, or shut down the go-ipfs service entirely.
• Impact: Full compromise of the go-ipfs node, unauthorized data access, data manipulation, service disruption, reputational damage, potential legal liabilities depending on the data accessed or manipulated.
• Risk Severity: Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • API Authentication: Mandatory: Enable and enforce API authentication mechanisms provided by go-ipfs (e.g., API access tokens, HTTP Basic Auth).
  • API Authorization: Implement authorization to control which users or applications can access specific API endpoints and actions, following the principle of least privilege.
  • Network Isolation: Run the go-ipfs API on a non-public interface (e.g., localhost) and use a reverse proxy or firewall to strictly control access from trusted networks only. Ideally, restrict API access to only necessary internal services.
  • Disable Unnecessary API Endpoints: If feasible, disable API endpoints that are not required for your application's functionality to minimize the attack surface.

Attack Surface: API Endpoint Vulnerabilities (Injection Attacks)

• Description: Vulnerabilities within the go-ipfs API endpoint implementations allow attackers to inject malicious code or commands through improperly sanitized input parameters.
• How go-ipfs contributes: go-ipfs's API, like any software API, is developed by humans and can contain coding errors. If input validation and output encoding are insufficient in API handlers, injection vulnerabilities can arise.
• Example: An attacker discovers a command injection vulnerability in an API endpoint that processes user-provided filenames or paths. By crafting a malicious input string, they can execute arbitrary system commands on the server hosting the go-ipfs node, potentially gaining full control.
• Impact: Remote code execution, complete server compromise, data breaches, privilege escalation to the level of the go-ipfs process user, DoS, and potentially lateral movement within the network.
• Risk Severity: Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Input Validation: Implement rigorous input validation for all API endpoints. Sanitize and validate all user-provided data to ensure it conforms to expected formats and ranges, rejecting invalid input.
  • Output Encoding: Properly encode output data to prevent injection attacks (e.g., HTML encoding, URL encoding) if API responses are rendered in web contexts.
  • Secure Coding Practices: Adhere to secure coding practices during development and maintenance of go-ipfs API handlers or any custom extensions. Conduct code reviews focusing on security.
  • Regular Security Audits & Penetration Testing: Conduct regular security audits and penetration testing specifically targeting the go-ipfs API to proactively identify and remediate vulnerabilities before they can be exploited.
  • Principle of Least Privilege: Run the go-ipfs process with the minimum necessary privileges to limit the impact of potential exploits.

Attack Surface: Insecure Configuration

• Description: Misconfigurations in go-ipfs settings create exploitable vulnerabilities and weaken the overall security posture of the node.
• How go-ipfs contributes: go-ipfs offers a wide range of configuration options to customize its behavior. Incorrect or insecure configuration choices directly expose the node to risks.
• Example: Exposing the API on a public network interface without authentication (as mentioned before), disabling essential security features, using weak or default passwords (if applicable for certain features), or misconfiguring network settings to allow unintended external access.
• Impact: Wide range of impacts depending on the specific misconfiguration, from unauthorized access and data breaches to DoS and complete node compromise. Can escalate other attack surfaces.
• Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the specific misconfiguration, some can be Critical)
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Security Hardening Guide: Strictly follow a comprehensive security hardening guide specifically for go-ipfs to ensure secure configuration settings are applied.
  • Principle of Least Privilege (Configuration): Only enable absolutely necessary features and services in the configuration. Disable or restrict access to features that are not essential for the intended use case.
  • Regular Configuration Review & Auditing: Periodically review the go-ipfs configuration to proactively identify and rectify any misconfigurations or deviations from established security best practices. Automate configuration audits if possible.
  • Configuration Management: Utilize configuration management tools (e.g., Ansible, Chef, Puppet) to automate and enforce secure configuration settings consistently across all go-ipfs deployments, preventing configuration drift.
  • Secure Defaults & Templates: Advocate for and utilize secure default configurations and secure configuration templates for go-ipfs to minimize the chance of accidental misconfigurations.

Attack Surface: Dependency Vulnerabilities Exploited Through go-ipfs

• Description: Vulnerabilities present in go-ipfs's dependencies (like libp2p, datastore libraries, or even the Go runtime itself) can be exploited through go-ipfs, impacting its security.
• How go-ipfs contributes: go-ipfs is built upon a complex software stack of dependencies. Vulnerabilities in these underlying components can directly affect the security of go-ipfs if attackers can trigger the vulnerable code paths through go-ipfs's functionalities.
• Example: A critical vulnerability is discovered in a specific version of the libp2p library used by go-ipfs. Attackers find a way to trigger the vulnerable code path in libp2p by sending specially crafted network packets to a go-ipfs node, leading to remote code execution on the node.
• Impact: Wide range of impacts depending on the nature of the dependency vulnerability, including remote code execution, DoS, data breaches, and node compromise. The impact is on go-ipfs because the vulnerability is exploited via interaction with go-ipfs.
• Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the severity of the dependency vulnerability)
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Proactive Dependency Updates: Establish a robust process for regularly updating go-ipfs and all its dependencies to the latest stable versions. Prioritize security updates to patch known vulnerabilities promptly.
  • Automated Dependency Scanning: Implement automated dependency scanning tools integrated into your development and deployment pipelines to continuously monitor for known vulnerabilities in go-ipfs dependencies.
  • Vulnerability Monitoring & Alerting: Subscribe to security advisories and vulnerability databases (e.g., CVE feeds, GitHub security advisories) to receive timely notifications about new vulnerabilities affecting go-ipfs dependencies.
  • Supply Chain Security Practices: Implement broader supply chain security practices to ensure the integrity and security of the software supply chain for go-ipfs and its dependencies, including verifying checksums and using trusted sources for dependencies.