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Attack Tree Analysis for ipfs/go-ipfs

Objective: Compromise application using go-ipfs by exploiting weaknesses or vulnerabilities within go-ipfs itself (Focus on High-Risk Paths).

Attack Tree Visualization

Root: Compromise Application via go-ipfs Exploitation (High-Risk Paths)
└── 2. Exploit Application Layer Vulnerabilities (go-ipfs APIs & Gateway) [HIGH RISK PATH]
    ├── 2.1. go-ipfs HTTP API Exploits [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   ├── 2.1.1. Unauthenticated API Access (if misconfigured) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   │   └── 2.1.1.1. Access Sensitive API Endpoints without Authentication [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
    ├── 2.1.2. API Input Validation Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   └── 2.1.2.1. Inject Malicious Payloads via API Parameters [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
    ├── 2.1.4. API Logic Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   └── 2.1.4.1. Exploit Flaws in API Logic to Achieve Unintended Actions [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
    └── 2.2. go-ipfs Gateway Exploits [HIGH RISK PATH]
        ├── 2.2.1. Gateway Traversal Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
        │   └── 2.2.1.1. Access Files Outside Intended Scope via Path Traversal [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
        ├── 2.2.2. Gateway SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
        │   └── 2.2.2.1. Manipulate Gateway to Make Requests to Internal/External Resources [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
└── 3. Exploit Data Layer Vulnerabilities (Data Integrity & Availability) [HIGH RISK PATH]
    └── 3.1. Data Poisoning/Content Injection [HIGH RISK PATH]
        └── 3.1.1. Inject Malicious Content into IPFS [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
            └── 3.1.1.1. Add Malicious Files to IPFS Network [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
  • Description: This path focuses on exploiting vulnerabilities in how the application interacts with go-ipfs through its HTTP API and Gateway. These interfaces are often exposed to the application's internal network or even the public internet, making them prime targets.

    • 2.1. go-ipfs HTTP API Exploits [HIGH RISK PATH]

      • Description: Attacks targeting the go-ipfs HTTP API, which provides programmatic access to node functionalities.

        • 2.1.1. Unauthenticated API Access (if misconfigured) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]

          • 2.1.1.1. Access Sensitive API Endpoints without Authentication [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
            • Impact: Critical (Data manipulation, node control, information disclosure, DoS)
            • Likelihood: Medium (If misconfigured), Low (If properly secured)
            • Effort: Minimal (Simple HTTP requests)
            • Skill Level: Novice (Basic understanding of HTTP)
            • Detection Difficulty: Easy (Monitor API access logs, check for unauthenticated requests)
            • Insight/Mitigation: Enforce API authentication (e.g., using API keys, JWT), restrict API access to trusted networks/users, follow least privilege principle.
            • Attack Vector: Attacker directly accesses unprotected API endpoints (e.g., /api/v0/) without providing valid credentials, leveraging misconfiguration where authentication is not enabled or bypassed.
        • 2.1.2. API Input Validation Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]

          • 2.1.2.1. Inject Malicious Payloads via API Parameters [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
            • Impact: Significant to Critical (Command injection, path traversal, SSRF, data manipulation)
            • Likelihood: Medium (Common web vulnerability, depends on API code quality)
            • Effort: Low to Medium (Web vulnerability scanning tools, manual testing)
            • Skill Level: Intermediate (Web application security knowledge)
            • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Web Application Firewalls, input validation checks, penetration testing)
            • Insight/Mitigation: Implement strict input validation and sanitization on all API endpoints, use parameterized queries/commands, avoid dynamic command execution.
            • Attack Vector: Attacker crafts malicious input within API request parameters (e.g., in POST data or URL query parameters) to exploit vulnerabilities like command injection (executing arbitrary commands on the server), path traversal (accessing unauthorized files), or SSRF (making the server make requests to attacker-controlled or internal resources).
        • 2.1.4. API Logic Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]

          • 2.1.4.1. Exploit Flaws in API Logic to Achieve Unintended Actions [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
            • Impact: Significant (Data manipulation, access control bypass, privilege escalation)
            • Likelihood: Low to Medium (Depends on API design and testing)
            • Effort: Medium to High (Requires understanding of API logic, manual testing)
            • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced (API security knowledge, logic analysis)
            • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard (Requires thorough testing, code review)
            • Insight/Mitigation: Thoroughly test API logic, perform security code reviews, use principle of least privilege in API design.
            • Attack Vector: Attacker exploits flaws in the intended workflow or business logic of the API endpoints. This could involve manipulating API calls in a specific sequence or providing unexpected input to bypass access controls, manipulate data in unintended ways, or escalate privileges.
    • 2.2. go-ipfs Gateway Exploits [HIGH RISK PATH]

      • Description: Attacks targeting the go-ipfs Gateway, which allows accessing IPFS content through standard HTTP requests, often used to serve content to web browsers.

        • 2.2.1. Gateway Traversal Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]

          • 2.2.1.1. Access Files Outside Intended Scope via Path Traversal [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
            • Impact: Significant (Access to sensitive data, information disclosure, potential code execution)
            • Likelihood: Medium (Common web vulnerability, depends on gateway implementation)
            • Effort: Low to Medium (Web vulnerability scanning tools, manual testing)
            • Skill Level: Intermediate (Web application security knowledge)
            • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Web Application Firewalls, path validation checks, penetration testing)
            • Insight/Mitigation: Implement strict path validation and sanitization in gateway, restrict access to allowed paths, use chroot/sandboxing if possible.
            • Attack Vector: Attacker crafts URLs with path traversal sequences (e.g., ../, ..%2F) to bypass intended directory restrictions in the gateway and access files or directories outside the intended scope of served IPFS content.
        • 2.2.2. Gateway SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]

          • 2.2.2.1. Manipulate Gateway to Make Requests to Internal/External Resources [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
            • Impact: Significant (Access to internal network resources, information disclosure, potential exploitation of other services)
            • Likelihood: Low to Medium (Depends on gateway functionality and input validation)
            • Effort: Medium (Requires understanding of SSRF, network reconnaissance)
            • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced (Web application and network security knowledge)
            • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard (Network monitoring, egress filtering, penetration testing)
            • Insight/Mitigation: Sanitize and validate URLs provided to gateway, restrict gateway access to external resources, implement network segmentation.
            • Attack Vector: Attacker manipulates the gateway to make HTTP requests to arbitrary URLs. This can be used to scan internal network ports, access internal services not exposed to the public internet, or potentially exploit vulnerabilities in other systems accessible from the go-ipfs node's network.
  • Description: This path focuses on attacks related to the data stored and served through IPFS, specifically concerning data integrity and the potential for serving malicious content.

    • 3.1. Data Poisoning/Content Injection [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • 3.1.1. Inject Malicious Content into IPFS [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • 3.1.1.1. Add Malicious Files to IPFS Network [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
          • Impact: Moderate to Significant (Serve malicious content to users, application compromise if application processes or displays this content without proper sanitization)
          • Likelihood: High (IPFS is designed for open content sharing)
          • Effort: Minimal (Simple IPFS commands)
          • Skill Level: Novice (Basic IPFS usage)
          • Detection Difficulty: Very Hard (on IPFS network level), Medium (on application level if not sanitized)
          • Insight/Mitigation: Implement content validation and sanitization on application side before using data from IPFS, use content verification mechanisms (CID verification).
          • Attack Vector: Attacker adds malicious files (e.g., malware, phishing pages, exploit code) to the IPFS network. If the application retrieves and serves this content without proper validation and sanitization, users accessing the application might be exposed to the malicious content, leading to application compromise or harm to users. Even if the CID is known and trusted initially, the content behind that CID could be malicious if not properly handled by the application.