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Attack Tree Analysis for ipfs/go-ipfs

Objective: Disrupt Availability, Integrity, or Confidentiality of Data, or Use Node for Further Attacks

Attack Tree Visualization

                                      [Attacker's Goal: Disrupt Availability, Integrity, or Confidentiality of Data, or Use Node for Further Attacks]
                                                                    /                               |                               \
                                                -------------------------------------       -------------------------------------       -------------------------------------
                                                | Data Availability Disruption |       | Data Integrity Manipulation  |       |  Confidentiality Breach/Node Abuse |
                                                -------------------------------------       -------------------------------------       -------------------------------------
                                                       /               |                                      |                                      |
                                          -------------    -------------                                -------------                      -------------
                                          | Pinning   |    | Resource  |                                | Mutable   |                      |  Private  |
                                          | Attacks   |    | Exhaustion |                                | File      |                      |  Key Leak  |
                                          -------------    -------------                                |  System   |                      [***-------***]
                                             /     \           /     \                                 | (MFS)     |
                                  ---***---> -------- --------  -------- --------                       | Attacks   |
                                  |  Unpin | | Pin  |  | CPU   | | Mem  |                       -------------
                                  |  Data  | | Flood|  | Exh.  | | Exh. |                       |  Replace|
                                  -------- --------  ---***--->-------- --------                       |  Legit  |
                                                                                                                   |  Content|
                                                                                                                   [***-------***]

   (Implicit High-Risk Path: Any path leading to [*** Private Key Leak ***])
   (Implicit High-Risk Path: Any path leading to [*** MFS Attacks ***] / [*** Replace Legitimate Content ***])

Attack Tree Path: 1. Data Availability Disruption

  • 1.1 Pinning Attacks

    • 1.1.1 Unpin Data (High-Risk Path)
      • Description: The attacker gains unauthorized access to the IPFS node or a connected pinning service and issues commands to unpin data, making it unavailable.
      • Likelihood: Low (Requires compromised node or pinning service access)
      • Impact: High (Loss of data availability)
      • Effort: Medium (Depends on access method)
      • Skill Level: Intermediate (Requires understanding of IPFS pinning and access controls)
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Unpinning events might be logged, but correlation to an attack might be difficult)
      • Mitigation:
        • Strong authentication and authorization for the IPFS node and any pinning services.
        • Regularly audit access logs.
        • Implement multi-factor authentication where possible.
        • Use multiple pinning services for redundancy.

  • 1.2 Resource Exhaustion

    • 1.2.1 CPU Exhaustion (High-Risk Path)

      • Description: The attacker sends computationally expensive requests to the IPFS node, overwhelming the CPU and making the node unresponsive.
      • Likelihood: Medium (If API is exposed without rate limiting or complex operations are available)
      • Impact: Medium to High (Node slowdown or unresponsiveness)
      • Effort: Low to Medium (Depends on the vulnerability exploited)
      • Skill Level: Intermediate (Understanding of IPFS operations and potential bottlenecks)
      • Detection Difficulty: Easy (High CPU usage, slow response times)
      • Mitigation:
        • Implement strict rate limiting on all API endpoints.
        • Set resource quotas (CPU limits) for the IPFS process.
        • Monitor CPU usage and alert on anomalies.

    • 1.2.2 Memory Exhaustion (High-Risk Path)

      • Description: The attacker sends requests or exploits vulnerabilities that cause the IPFS node to consume excessive memory, leading to crashes or slowdowns.
      • Likelihood: Medium (Similar to CPU exhaustion, depends on vulnerabilities)
      • Impact: High (Node crashes, data loss if not persisted)
      • Effort: Low to Medium (Depends on the vulnerability exploited)
      • Skill Level: Intermediate (Understanding of IPFS memory management)
      • Detection Difficulty: Easy (High memory usage, crashes)
      • Mitigation:
        • Implement strict rate limiting on all API endpoints.
        • Set resource quotas (memory limits) for the IPFS process.
        • Monitor memory usage and alert on anomalies.
        • Regularly update go-ipfs to address memory-related vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Data Integrity Manipulation

  • 2.1 Mutable File System (MFS) Attacks (Critical Node / High-Risk Path)
    • 2.1.1 Replace Legitimate Content (Critical Node / High-Risk Path)
      • Description: The attacker gains write access to the MFS root and replaces legitimate files with malicious ones, maintaining the same MFS path.
      • Likelihood: Low (Requires compromised MFS root access)
      • Impact: Very High (Data corruption, potential for malware distribution)
      • Effort: Medium (Depends on access method)
      • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced (Understanding of MFS and access controls)
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard (Requires monitoring MFS changes and comparing with expected state)
      • Mitigation:
        • Implement strict access control to the MFS root key. Use the principle of least privilege.
        • Regularly back up the MFS root.
        • Implement file integrity monitoring for MFS content.
        • Consider using a separate, less privileged key for routine MFS operations.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Confidentiality Breach / Node Abuse

  • 3.1 Private Key Leak (Critical Node / High-Risk Path)
    • Description: The attacker gains access to the node's private key, allowing them to impersonate the node, sign malicious data, and potentially decrypt encrypted content.
    • Likelihood: Low (Requires access to the node's private key file)
    • Impact: Very High (Complete node compromise, potential for data decryption)
    • Effort: Medium (Depends on access method – could be low if poor file permissions, high if exploiting a complex vulnerability)
    • Skill Level: Intermediate (Understanding of file system security and key management)
    • Detection Difficulty: Hard (Requires monitoring file access and key usage)
    • Mitigation:
      • Store the private key using a Hardware Security Module (HSM) if possible.
      • If HSM is not available, encrypt the private key file at rest.
      • Implement strict file permissions to prevent unauthorized access to the key file.
      • Regularly rotate the node's private key.
      • Monitor for unauthorized access to the key file and any unusual signing activity.
      • Implement strong authentication and authorization for any access to the node's file system.

Attack Tree Path: Implicit High-Risk Paths:

These paths are not explicitly drawn in the simplified tree but are crucial to understand:

  • Any path leading to Private Key Leak: This includes vulnerabilities in the application itself (e.g., file inclusion vulnerabilities, remote code execution), social engineering attacks targeting administrators, or physical access to the server. All of these must be considered and mitigated.
  • Any path leading to MFS Attacks / Replace Legitimate Content: Similar to the private key, any vulnerability that grants write access to the MFS root is a high-risk path. This could involve exploiting vulnerabilities in the application, compromising credentials, or gaining unauthorized access to the node's file system.