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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for jaegertracing/jaeger

Attack Surface: Unauthenticated Span Ingestion Endpoints (Agent & Collector)

  • Description: Jaeger Agent and Collector expose endpoints (UDP, HTTP, gRPC, Thrift) for receiving span data. When these endpoints lack proper authentication, they become vulnerable to unauthorized access and malicious activities.
  • Jaeger Contribution to Attack Surface: Jaeger's core design necessitates span ingestion endpoints. The default configuration often leaves these endpoints unauthenticated for initial ease of use, directly introducing this attack surface.
  • Example: An attacker can flood the Jaeger Agent's default UDP port (6831) with packets, causing a Denial of Service (DoS). Alternatively, they can send crafted spans to the Collector's HTTP endpoint (14268) to pollute tracing data, potentially disrupting monitoring and analysis, or even attempt to exploit vulnerabilities in the Collector's span processing logic.
  • Impact:
    • Denial of Service (DoS) against Jaeger components, impacting tracing functionality.
    • Pollution and corruption of tracing data, leading to inaccurate monitoring and analysis.
    • Potential exploitation of vulnerabilities in span processing logic, possibly leading to further system compromise.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Mandatory Authentication and Authorization: Enforce authentication for all span ingestion endpoints. Utilize Jaeger's built-in authentication mechanisms or integrate with external authentication providers to verify the identity of span senders. Implement authorization to control which entities are permitted to submit spans.
    • Strict Network Access Control: Implement network firewalls or security groups to restrict access to span ingestion ports. Allow connections only from trusted sources, such as application instances within the same secure network segment.
    • Prioritize Secure Protocols: Favor secure protocols like gRPC with TLS or HTTPS for span ingestion over unencrypted protocols like UDP or HTTP to protect data in transit and potentially enable more robust authentication options.
    • Implement Rate Limiting and Traffic Shaping: Configure rate limiting on ingestion endpoints to mitigate DoS attacks by limiting the number of spans accepted within a given timeframe. Employ traffic shaping to manage and prioritize legitimate span traffic.

Attack Surface: Web UI Vulnerabilities (Jaeger Query)

  • Description: Jaeger Query's web UI, designed for visualizing and querying trace data, is susceptible to common web application vulnerabilities if not properly secured.
  • Jaeger Contribution to Attack Surface: The Jaeger Query UI is a core component for user interaction, directly introducing web application attack vectors inherent to web-based interfaces.
  • Example: The Jaeger UI could be vulnerable to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). An attacker might inject malicious JavaScript code into trace data displayed in the UI. When a user views this data, the script executes in their browser, potentially leading to session hijacking, data theft, or unauthorized actions within the Jaeger UI context.
  • Impact:
    • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks enabling session hijacking, sensitive data theft, or UI defacement, compromising user accounts and data confidentiality.
    • Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks allowing attackers to perform actions on behalf of authenticated users without their consent, potentially leading to unauthorized data manipulation or system changes within Jaeger.
    • Information disclosure through UI vulnerabilities, exposing sensitive trace data or system information to unauthorized users.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Rigorous Input Sanitization and Output Encoding: Implement comprehensive input sanitization and output encoding throughout the UI codebase to prevent XSS vulnerabilities. Sanitize all user inputs and encode outputs to neutralize potentially malicious scripts.
    • Robust CSRF Protection Implementation: Implement strong CSRF protection mechanisms, such as anti-CSRF tokens synchronized with user sessions, to prevent Cross-Site Request Forgery attacks.
    • Proactive Security Scanning and Penetration Testing: Conduct regular security scans and penetration testing specifically targeting the Jaeger Query UI to proactively identify and remediate web vulnerabilities before they can be exploited.
    • Secure Web Server Configuration and Hardening: Ensure the web server hosting the Jaeger UI is securely configured and hardened. Enforce HTTPS, implement security headers (e.g., Content Security Policy, HTTP Strict Transport Security), and configure strict access controls.
    • Maintain Up-to-Date Dependencies: Regularly update all UI dependencies, including frontend libraries and frameworks, to patch known vulnerabilities and benefit from the latest security improvements.

Attack Surface: Query API Security (Jaeger Query)

  • Description: Jaeger Query's API, intended for programmatic access to trace data, can become a significant attack surface if not adequately secured with authentication and authorization.
  • Jaeger Contribution to Attack Surface: The Query API is a necessary feature for programmatic interaction with tracing data, directly introducing API security concerns if not properly implemented and secured by Jaeger users.
  • Example: If the Query API lacks proper authentication and authorization, an attacker could bypass the UI and directly query the API to gain unauthorized access to sensitive trace data. Furthermore, poorly validated API endpoints could be vulnerable to injection attacks if they directly interact with the storage backend without proper input sanitization.
  • Impact:
    • Unauthorized access to sensitive trace data, potentially leading to data breaches and privacy violations.
    • Data exfiltration through API abuse, allowing attackers to extract valuable tracing information.
    • Injection attacks exploiting API endpoints, potentially leading to data manipulation, unauthorized data access in the storage backend, or even broader system compromise.
    • Denial of Service (DoS) attacks through API abuse, overloading the Query API and impacting its availability.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Mandatory API Authentication and Authorization: Implement robust authentication mechanisms (e.g., API keys, OAuth 2.0, JWT) for the Query API to verify the identity of clients. Enforce fine-grained authorization to control access to specific trace data based on user roles and permissions.
    • Strict Input Validation and Sanitization: Thoroughly validate and sanitize all inputs to the Query API to prevent injection attacks. Implement input validation at multiple layers to ensure data integrity and security.
    • Implement Rate Limiting and Throttling: Configure rate limiting and throttling on API endpoints to protect against DoS attacks and API abuse. Limit the number of requests from a single source within a given timeframe.
    • Adhere to Secure API Design Principles: Follow secure API design principles throughout the API development lifecycle. Implement least privilege access, secure error handling to avoid information leakage, and comprehensive data validation.
    • Enforce HTTPS for API Communication: Mandate HTTPS for all API communication to encrypt data in transit and protect sensitive information from eavesdropping and interception.

Attack Surface: Storage Backend Interaction Vulnerabilities (Collector & Query)

  • Description: Jaeger Collector and Query components interact with a storage backend (e.g., Elasticsearch, Cassandra) to store and retrieve trace data. Improperly secured interactions can introduce vulnerabilities, especially concerning injection attacks.
  • Jaeger Contribution to Attack Surface: Jaeger's architecture relies on interaction with a storage backend. If Jaeger's code responsible for querying and writing to the storage backend is not carefully implemented, it can introduce injection vulnerabilities, even if the storage backend itself is considered secure. Specifically, if Jaeger constructs queries without proper parameterization, it becomes the point of vulnerability introduction.
  • Example: If Jaeger Collector or Query components construct database queries by directly concatenating user-provided data (e.g., span attributes, trace IDs) without proper sanitization or parameterization, they become vulnerable to storage injection attacks (e.g., Elasticsearch injection, Cassandra Query Language Injection). An attacker could craft malicious spans or API requests that exploit these vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary commands or queries on the storage backend, potentially bypassing access controls or exfiltrating data.
  • Impact:
    • Storage injection attacks enabling unauthorized data manipulation, deletion, or access within the storage backend, potentially compromising data integrity and confidentiality.
    • Data exfiltration from the storage backend, allowing attackers to extract sensitive trace data or even other data stored in the same backend.
    • Potential compromise of the storage backend infrastructure itself, depending on the severity of the injection vulnerability and the permissions granted to Jaeger components.
    • Denial of Service (DoS) against the storage backend by executing resource-intensive or malicious queries through injection vulnerabilities.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Mandatory Use of Parameterized Queries/Prepared Statements: Force the use of parameterized queries or prepared statements for all interactions with the storage backend from Jaeger Collector and Query components. This is the primary defense against injection attacks by separating SQL/CQL code from user-provided data.
    • Strict Input Validation and Sanitization (Collector & Query): Implement rigorous input validation and sanitization for all data received by Jaeger components that will be used in storage backend queries. Sanitize data before it is incorporated into queries, even when using parameterized queries as a defense-in-depth measure.
    • Principle of Least Privilege for Storage Access: Grant Jaeger Collector and Query components only the minimum necessary permissions to access the storage backend. Avoid using overly permissive database users or roles. Restrict write access to only the Collector and read access primarily to the Query component.
    • Regular Security Code Reviews and Static Analysis: Conduct regular security code reviews and utilize static analysis tools to identify potential injection vulnerabilities in Jaeger's codebase related to storage backend interactions.
    • Secure Storage Backend Configuration and Hardening: Ensure the chosen storage backend is itself securely configured and hardened according to its security best practices. Implement strong access controls, network security measures, and keep the storage backend software up-to-date with security patches.

Attack Surface: Configuration Exposure (Agent, Collector, Query)

  • Description: Jaeger components rely on configuration files and environment variables. If these configurations are not properly secured, they can expose sensitive information or allow for malicious modification of Jaeger's behavior.
  • Jaeger Contribution to Attack Surface: Jaeger's functionality is heavily dependent on configuration. Insecure configuration management practices directly contribute to this attack surface by potentially exposing sensitive data or allowing for unauthorized modifications that can compromise Jaeger's security and operation.
  • Example: Configuration files or environment variables might contain sensitive information such as storage backend credentials, API keys for authentication, or internal network details. If an attacker gains access to these configurations (e.g., through compromised servers, insecure storage, or misconfigured access controls), they could exfiltrate sensitive credentials, modify Jaeger's behavior to redirect spans to a malicious collector, disable security features, or disrupt tracing operations.
  • Impact:
    • Exposure of sensitive credentials (e.g., database passwords, API keys) and internal network information, potentially leading to broader system compromise beyond Jaeger.
    • Malicious modification of Jaeger component behavior, enabling attackers to redirect tracing data, bypass security controls, or disrupt tracing services, undermining monitoring and security visibility.
    • Potential for further system compromise based on exposed information, allowing attackers to pivot to other systems or escalate their privileges.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strict File System Permissions and Access Control: Implement strict file system permissions and access control lists (ACLs) to restrict access to configuration files to only authorized users and processes on the systems where Jaeger components are running.
    • Secure Configuration Management Practices: Adopt secure configuration management practices for deploying and managing Jaeger configurations. Utilize infrastructure-as-code and automated configuration management tools to ensure consistent and secure configurations.
    • External Secrets Management Solutions: Avoid storing sensitive information directly in configuration files or environment variables. Integrate with dedicated secrets management solutions (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, Kubernetes Secrets, cloud provider secrets managers) to securely store, manage, and access sensitive credentials.
    • Regular Configuration Audits and Security Reviews: Conduct regular audits of Jaeger configurations to ensure they adhere to security best practices and do not inadvertently expose sensitive information or create security misconfigurations. Perform security reviews of configuration deployment processes.
    • Principle of Least Privilege for Configuration Access: Apply the principle of least privilege when granting access to Jaeger configurations. Limit access to only those users and processes that absolutely require it for their operational roles.