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Attack Tree Analysis for jaegertracing/jaeger

Objective: Compromise Application via Jaeger Exploitation (Focused on High-Risk Paths)

Attack Tree Visualization

Root: Compromise Application via Jaeger Exploitation [CRITICAL NODE]
├── OR
│   ├── 1. Exploit Jaeger Client Vulnerabilities
│   │   ├── OR
│   │   │   ├── 1.1. Exploit Client Library Vulnerabilities (Code Injection, DoS) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   ├── 2. Exploit Jaeger Agent Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   ├── OR
│   │   │   ├── 2.1. Exploit Agent Service Vulnerabilities (RCE, DoS) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   ├── 2.2. Malicious Span Injection via Agent's UDP/gRPC Endpoint [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   ├── 3. Exploit Jaeger Collector Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   ├── OR
│   │   │   ├── 3.1. Exploit Collector Service Vulnerabilities (RCE, DoS) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   ├── 3.2. Storage Backend Exploitation via Collector [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   ├── 3.3. Collector Configuration Exploitation [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   ├── 4. Exploit Jaeger Query/UI Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├── OR
│   │   │   ├── 4.1. Exploit Query Service Vulnerabilities (RCE, DoS, SSRF) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   ├── 4.2. Exploit UI Vulnerabilities (XSS, CSRF) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   ├── 4.3. Information Disclosure via Query API [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   ├── 5. Exploit Insecure Jaeger Deployment & Configuration Practices [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   ├── OR
│   │   │   ├── 5.1. Insecure Network Configuration (Exposed Ports, Lack of Network Segmentation) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   ├── 5.2. Weak or Default Credentials (Storage Backend, Jaeger Components) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   ├── 5.3. Lack of Authentication and Authorization (Query UI/API, Collector API) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   ├── 5.4. Unpatched Jaeger Components (Known Vulnerabilities) [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Client Library Vulnerabilities (Code Injection, DoS) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting known vulnerabilities in Jaeger client libraries (language-specific libraries).
  • Details:
    • Attackers identify and exploit publicly disclosed vulnerabilities in Jaeger client libraries.
    • Vulnerabilities could include buffer overflows, injection flaws, or logic errors.
    • Successful exploitation can lead to:
      • Code Injection: Executing arbitrary code within the application's process, potentially gaining full control.
      • Denial of Service (DoS): Crashing the application or making it unresponsive by sending crafted malicious data.
  • Mitigation:
    • Regularly update Jaeger client libraries: Apply security patches promptly.
    • Vulnerability scanning: Periodically scan application dependencies for known vulnerabilities.
    • Security code reviews: Review application code interacting with Jaeger clients.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Jaeger Agent Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

  • Critical Node: Jaeger Agent is a core component responsible for receiving spans.

  • Attack Vector 2.1: Exploit Agent Service Vulnerabilities (RCE, DoS) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

    • Details: Exploiting vulnerabilities in the Jaeger Agent service itself.
    • Examples: Network vulnerabilities, buffer overflows in UDP packet processing, or other service-level flaws.
    • Impact:
      • Remote Code Execution (RCE): Gaining control of the Agent server.
      • Denial of Service (DoS): Crashing or overwhelming the Agent, disrupting tracing.
    • Mitigation:
      • Keep Jaeger Agent updated: Apply security patches.
      • Network security: Firewall Agent ports, restrict access.
      • Regular security audits and pen-testing: Identify and fix vulnerabilities.

  • Attack Vector 2.2: Malicious Span Injection via Agent's UDP/gRPC Endpoint [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

    • Details: Directly sending malicious spans to the Agent's exposed UDP or gRPC ports.
    • Exploits: UDP is connectionless and easily spoofed. gRPC, while more secure, can still be targeted if not properly configured.
    • Impact:
      • Denial of Service (DoS): Overwhelming the Agent with a flood of spans.
      • Misleading Traces: Injecting false or misleading data into the tracing system.
      • Resource Exhaustion: Consuming Agent resources, impacting performance.
    • Mitigation:
      • Use gRPC over UDP if possible: gRPC offers better security features.
      • Network access controls: Restrict access to Agent ports.
      • Rate limiting: Limit span ingestion at the Agent level.
      • Anomaly detection: Monitor for unusual span traffic patterns.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Jaeger Collector Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

  • Critical Node: Jaeger Collector is a core component responsible for processing and storing spans.

  • Attack Vector 3.1: Exploit Collector Service Vulnerabilities (RCE, DoS) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

    • Details: Exploiting vulnerabilities in the Jaeger Collector service itself.
    • Examples: Input validation issues in span processing, database injection flaws (though less common with NoSQL backends, other injection types possible).
    • Impact:
      • Remote Code Execution (RCE): Gaining control of the Collector server.
      • Denial of Service (DoS): Crashing or overwhelming the Collector.
      • Storage Backend Compromise: Potentially using Collector as a pivot to attack the storage backend.
    • Mitigation:
      • Keep Jaeger Collector updated: Apply security patches.
      • Robust input validation: Sanitize and validate span data.
      • Regular security audits and pen-testing: Identify and fix vulnerabilities.

  • Attack Vector 3.2: Storage Backend Exploitation via Collector [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

    • Details: Leveraging the Collector's interaction with storage backends (Cassandra, Elasticsearch, Kafka) to exploit storage vulnerabilities.
    • Exploits: Injection attacks, data corruption through Collector's interaction.
    • Impact:
      • Storage Backend Compromise: Gaining control of the storage backend.
      • Data Breach: Accessing or exfiltrating sensitive trace data.
      • Data Corruption: Modifying or deleting trace data.
    • Mitigation:
      • Secure the storage backend independently: Follow storage backend security best practices.
      • Secure Collector-Storage interaction: Use parameterized queries, least privilege access.
      • Regularly update and patch storage backend: Apply security patches.

  • Attack Vector 3.3: Collector Configuration Exploitation [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

    • Details: Compromising the Collector's configuration files.
    • Exploits: Gaining access to the Collector server or misconfigurations allowing access to config files.
    • Impact:
      • Disruption of Tracing: Modifying configuration to stop span processing.
      • Data Exfiltration: If configuration contains storage credentials, attackers can access the storage backend directly.
      • Unauthorized Access: Potentially gaining access to other systems if configuration contains other sensitive information.
    • Mitigation:
      • Secure Collector configuration files: Restrict file system permissions.
      • Access controls and monitoring: Monitor configuration changes.
      • Secure secret management: Avoid storing sensitive information directly in config files.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Exploit Jaeger Query/UI Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Critical Node: Jaeger Query/UI provides access to trace data and is often exposed to users.

  • Attack Vector 4.1: Exploit Query Service Vulnerabilities (RCE, DoS, SSRF) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

    • Details: Exploiting vulnerabilities in the Jaeger Query service itself.
    • Examples: API vulnerabilities, Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), other web service flaws.
    • Impact:
      • Remote Code Execution (RCE): Gaining control of the Query server.
      • Denial of Service (DoS): Crashing or overwhelming the Query service.
      • Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF): Accessing internal network resources from the Query server.
      • Data Disclosure: Accessing sensitive trace data.
    • Mitigation:
      • Keep Jaeger Query updated: Apply security patches.
      • Robust input validation: Sanitize API requests.
      • Regular security audits and pen-testing: Focus on API endpoints.

  • Attack Vector 4.2: Exploit UI Vulnerabilities (XSS, CSRF) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

    • Details: Exploiting common web UI vulnerabilities in the Jaeger UI.
    • Examples: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF).
    • Impact:
      • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): Injecting malicious scripts that execute in user browsers, potentially leading to session hijacking, credential theft, or UI defacement.
      • Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF): Forcing users to perform unintended actions on the Jaeger UI.
    • Mitigation:
      • Input sanitization and output encoding: Prevent XSS vulnerabilities.
      • CSRF protection: Implement CSRF tokens or other protection mechanisms.
      • Regular security audits and pen-testing: Focus on UI components.

  • Attack Vector 4.3: Information Disclosure via Query API [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

    • Details: Exploiting insecure access controls or API vulnerabilities in the Query service to gain unauthorized access to trace data.
    • Exploits: Missing authentication or authorization checks on API endpoints.
    • Impact:
      • Information Disclosure: Gaining unauthorized access to sensitive trace data, revealing application internals, performance data, and potentially security vulnerabilities.
    • Mitigation:
      • Strong authentication and authorization: Implement for Query API and UI.
      • Role-Based Access Control (RBAC): Restrict access based on user roles.
      • Regularly review access control configurations: Ensure proper configuration.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Exploit Insecure Jaeger Deployment & Configuration Practices [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

  • Critical Node: Secure deployment and configuration are fundamental for overall Jaeger security.

  • Attack Vector 5.1: Insecure Network Configuration (Exposed Ports, Lack of Network Segmentation) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

    • Details: Exposing Jaeger components to the public internet or placing them in the same network segment as sensitive application components without proper segmentation.
    • Exploits: Network scanning to identify exposed ports, direct access to Jaeger services from untrusted networks.
    • Impact:
      • Increased Attack Surface: Easier access for attackers to target Jaeger components.
      • Lateral Movement: If Jaeger is in the same network as sensitive systems, compromise can lead to further attacks.
    • Mitigation:
      • Network segmentation: Isolate Jaeger components in a dedicated network segment.
      • Firewalls: Restrict access to Jaeger ports.
      • Principle of least privilege: Only expose necessary ports and services.

  • Attack Vector 5.2: Weak or Default Credentials (Storage Backend, Jaeger Components) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

    • Details: Using weak or default credentials for storage backends or Jaeger components.
    • Exploits: Credential guessing, using lists of default credentials.
    • Impact:
      • Full Compromise: Easy access to Jaeger components and potentially the storage backend.
      • Data Breach: Access to trace data and potentially other data in the storage backend.
      • System Control: Gaining administrative access to Jaeger components.
    • Mitigation:
      • Enforce strong password policies: Use complex, unique passwords.
      • Never use default credentials: Change default passwords immediately.
      • Secure secret management: Use dedicated tools to manage and store credentials securely.

  • Attack Vector 5.3: Lack of Authentication and Authorization (Query UI/API, Collector API) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

    • Details: Failing to implement proper authentication and authorization for Jaeger components, especially Query and Collector.
    • Exploits: Direct access to unprotected API endpoints and UI.
    • Impact:
      • Unauthorized Access: Anyone can access trace data and potentially control tracing pipeline.
      • Data Manipulation: Attackers can inject or modify trace data.
      • Information Disclosure: Sensitive application data revealed in traces.
    • Mitigation:
      • Implement strong authentication and authorization: For Query UI/API and Collector API.
      • Integrate with existing authentication systems: Use SSO or other established methods.

  • Attack Vector 5.4: Unpatched Jaeger Components (Known Vulnerabilities) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

    • Details: Running outdated and unpatched Jaeger components with known vulnerabilities.
    • Exploits: Publicly available exploits for known vulnerabilities.
    • Impact:
      • Exploitation of Known Vulnerabilities: Leading to RCE, DoS, data breach, or other severe consequences depending on the vulnerability.
    • Mitigation:
      • Regular patching and updates: Establish a process for applying security patches promptly.
      • Vulnerability scanning: Periodically scan Jaeger infrastructure for known vulnerabilities.
      • Subscribe to security advisories: Stay informed about Jaeger security updates.