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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for jaegertracing/jaeger

Attack Surface: Denial of Service (DoS) on Agent/Collector/Query/Ingester

  • Description: Attacker overwhelms a Jaeger component, making it unavailable.
    • Jaeger's Contribution: Jaeger's reliance on network communication (UDP, gRPC, HTTP) for data transmission and querying creates DoS entry points.
    • Example: Flooding the Jaeger Agent with malformed UDP packets, causing it to crash.
    • Impact: Loss of tracing data, potential application performance degradation, inability to monitor.
    • Risk Severity: High.
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Rate Limiting (all components).
      • Strict Input Validation.
      • Resource Quotas.
      • Network Segmentation.
      • Monitoring and Alerting.
      • Use gRPC instead of UDP.
      • Load Balancing (Collector/Query).

Attack Surface: Unauthorized Access to Trace Data (Query Service)

  • Description: Attacker gains unauthorized access to trace data via the Query Service API.
    • Jaeger's Contribution: The Jaeger Query Service API is a direct entry point for accessing trace data; if unsecured, it's vulnerable.
    • Example: Attacker accesses the Query Service endpoint without authentication, retrieving all traces.
    • Impact: Data breach, exposure of sensitive application logic, potential for further attacks.
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on data sensitivity).
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strong Authentication and Authorization (OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect).
      • Role-Based Access Control (RBAC).
      • API Gateway.
      • Network Segmentation.
      • Audit Logging.

Attack Surface: Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks (Agent-Collector, Collector-Backend, etc.)

  • Description: Attacker intercepts/modifies communication between Jaeger components.
    • Jaeger's Contribution: Jaeger's distributed architecture relies on network communication; unencrypted communication is vulnerable.
    • Example: Intercepting unencrypted communication between Agent and Collector, capturing sensitive span data.
    • Impact: Data breach, exposure of sensitive information, data manipulation.
    • Risk Severity: High.
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • TLS Encryption (all communication).
      • Mutual TLS (mTLS).
      • Network Segmentation.

Attack Surface: Storage Backend Attacks (Indirect via Collector/Query/Ingester

  • Description: Attacker targets the storage backend (e.g., Cassandra, Elasticsearch) used by Jaeger.
    • Jaeger's Contribution: Jaeger components (collector, query, ingester) interact with the backend; backend vulnerabilities expose the tracing system.
    • Example: Exploiting a vulnerability in Elasticsearch to steal Jaeger data.
    • Impact: Data breach, data loss, tracing system disruption.
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on data sensitivity and backend security).
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Secure Backend Configuration (strong passwords, access control, encryption).
      • Least Privilege (for Jaeger component access).
      • Regular Security Updates (for the backend).
      • Monitoring and Alerting (for the backend).
      • Data Backup and Recovery.
      • Use dedicated user with restricted permissions.