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Attack Tree Analysis for jaegertracing/jaeger

Objective: Exfiltrate data, disrupt performance, or gain unauthorized access via Jaeger

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Exfiltrate data, disrupt performance, or gain unauthorized access via Jaeger ├── 1. Compromise Jaeger Components [HIGH-RISK] │ ├── 1.1 Compromise Jaeger Agent │ │ ├── 1.1.1 Exploit Agent Vulnerabilities (e.g., buffer overflows, insecure deserialization) [HIGH-RISK] │ │ └── 1.1.4 Configuration Errors (e.g., weak authentication, exposed ports) [HIGH-RISK] │ ├── 1.2 Compromise Jaeger Collector [HIGH-RISK] │ │ ├── 1.2.1 Exploit Collector Vulnerabilities (e.g., in gRPC/HTTP handling) [HIGH-RISK] │ │ ├── 1.2.3 Unauthorized Access (bypass authentication/authorization) [HIGH-RISK] │ │ └── 1.2.4 Configuration Errors (e.g., weak credentials, exposed ports) [HIGH-RISK] │ └── 1.4 Compromise Storage Backend (e.g., Cassandra, Elasticsearch, Badger) [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK] │ ├── 1.4.1 Exploit Storage Backend Vulnerabilities (specific to the chosen backend) [HIGH-RISK] │ ├── 1.4.2 Unauthorized Access to Storage Backend (bypass authentication/authorization) [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK] │ └── 1.4.3 Data Corruption/Deletion in Storage Backend [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Compromise Jaeger Components [HIGH-RISK]

  • 1.1 Compromise Jaeger Agent

    • 1.1.1 Exploit Agent Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK]

      • Description: Attackers exploit software flaws in the Jaeger Agent (e.g., buffer overflows, insecure deserialization, code injection) to gain control of the agent process. This often leads to Remote Code Execution (RCE).
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High (RCE, full system compromise)
      • Effort: Medium to High
      • Skill Level: Advanced
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard
      • Mitigation:
        • Regularly update the Jaeger Agent to the latest version.
        • Perform security audits and penetration testing.
        • Use a vulnerability scanner.
        • Run the agent with minimal privileges (least privilege principle).
        • Implement robust input validation and sanitization within the agent's code.
        • Employ intrusion detection/prevention systems (IDS/IPS).

    • 1.1.4 Configuration Errors [HIGH-RISK]

      • Description: Attackers take advantage of misconfigurations in the Jaeger Agent, such as exposed ports, weak or default credentials, or overly permissive access controls.
      • Likelihood: Medium to High
      • Impact: Medium to High (depends on the specific misconfiguration)
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Novice to Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Easy to Medium
      • Mitigation:
        • Follow the principle of least privilege.
        • Restrict network access using firewalls and network policies.
        • Use strong, unique passwords/tokens.
        • Regularly review and audit the agent's configuration.
        • Use configuration management tools to enforce secure configurations.
        • Disable unnecessary features and services.

  • 1.2 Compromise Jaeger Collector [HIGH-RISK]

    • 1.2.1 Exploit Collector Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK]

      • Description: Attackers exploit software flaws in the Jaeger Collector (e.g., vulnerabilities in gRPC/HTTP handling, storage interactions, or data processing logic) to gain control. This can lead to RCE or unauthorized data access.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High (RCE, data access)
      • Effort: Medium to High
      • Skill Level: Advanced
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard
      • Mitigation:
        • Keep the Jaeger Collector updated.
        • Perform security audits and penetration testing.
        • Use a Web Application Firewall (WAF).
        • Implement robust input validation and sanitization.
        • Employ IDS/IPS.

    • 1.2.3 Unauthorized Access [HIGH-RISK]

      • Description: Attackers bypass authentication and authorization mechanisms to gain direct access to the Jaeger Collector, allowing them to manipulate trace data or potentially gain further access to the system.
      • Likelihood: Low (if auth is configured), High (if no auth)
      • Impact: High (data access, manipulation)
      • Effort: Low to Medium
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium
      • Mitigation:
        • Implement strong authentication (e.g., API keys, OAuth 2.0, mTLS).
        • Implement strong authorization (role-based access control).
        • Enforce the principle of least privilege.
        • Regularly review and audit access logs.
        • Use multi-factor authentication (MFA) where possible.

    • 1.2.4 Configuration Errors [HIGH-RISK]

      • Description: Similar to agent misconfigurations, attackers exploit weaknesses in the Collector's configuration, such as exposed ports, weak credentials, or insecure storage settings.
      • Likelihood: Medium to High
      • Impact: Medium to High
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Novice to Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Easy to Medium
      • Mitigation:
        • Follow security best practices for configuration.
        • Restrict network access.
        • Use strong, unique credentials.
        • Regularly review and audit the configuration.
        • Use configuration management tools.

  • 1.4 Compromise Storage Backend [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK]

    • 1.4.1 Exploit Storage Backend Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK]

      • Description: Attackers exploit vulnerabilities specific to the chosen storage backend (e.g., Cassandra, Elasticsearch, Badger) to gain access to the data or compromise the backend system.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: Very High (data breach, data loss)
      • Effort: Medium to High
      • Skill Level: Advanced
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard
      • Mitigation:
        • Follow security best practices for the specific storage backend.
        • Keep the backend updated with security patches.
        • Perform regular vulnerability scans.
        • Implement backend-specific security monitoring.

    • 1.4.2 Unauthorized Access to Storage Backend [CRITICAL] [HIGH-RISK]

      • Description: Attackers bypass authentication and authorization to gain direct access to the storage backend, allowing them to read, modify, or delete trace data.
      • Likelihood: Low (if auth is configured), High (if no auth)
      • Impact: Very High (data breach, data loss)
      • Effort: Low to Medium
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium
      • Mitigation:
        • Implement strong authentication and authorization for the storage backend.
        • Enforce the principle of least privilege.
        • Regularly review and audit access logs.
        • Use database-specific security features (e.g., encryption at rest, auditing).

    • 1.4.3 Data Corruption/Deletion in Storage Backend [CRITICAL]

      • Description: Attackers, having gained unauthorized access, intentionally corrupt or delete the trace data stored in the backend.
      • Likelihood: Low to Medium
      • Impact: Very High (data loss, service disruption)
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard
      • Mitigation:
        • Implement strong access controls.
        • Regularly back up the data.
        • Implement data integrity checks (e.g., checksums, replication).
        • Monitor storage access logs for suspicious activity.
        • Implement robust disaster recovery and business continuity plans.