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Attack Surface Analysis for kataras/iris

Attack Surface: Path Parameter Injection

  • Description: Attackers manipulate path parameters in URLs to access unauthorized resources or bypass security checks.
  • Iris Contribution: Iris's routing system heavily relies on path parameters defined within route patterns (e.g., /user/{id}). If developers don't properly validate and sanitize these parameters, they become injection points directly facilitated by Iris's routing mechanism.
  • Example: A route /files/{filename} intended to serve files from a specific directory. If filename is not validated, an attacker could use ../sensitive.txt to access files outside the intended directory, exploiting Iris's path parameter handling.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to sensitive data, information disclosure, potential command execution if parameters are used in system calls.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Input Validation: Validate all path parameters against expected formats and allowed values within Iris handler functions. Use regular expressions or whitelists to ensure parameters conform to requirements before processing them in Iris handlers.
    • Sanitization: Sanitize path parameters to remove or escape potentially harmful characters within Iris handlers before using them in file paths, database queries, or system commands. Utilize Go's standard library functions like filepath.Clean carefully within Iris handlers.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Grant the application only the necessary permissions to access resources. Avoid directly using path parameters to construct file paths in Iris handlers without rigorous validation and sandboxing.

Attack Surface: Middleware Bypass

  • Description: Attackers find ways to bypass middleware, causing security checks or processing steps to be skipped.
  • Iris Contribution: Middleware in Iris is a core feature for request processing. Flaws in middleware logic or reliance on easily manipulated conditions within Iris middleware implementations can lead to bypasses, directly impacting the security enforced by Iris middleware.
  • Example: Middleware designed to authenticate users for paths starting with /admin. If the middleware only checks for /admin prefix and an attacker requests /admin/../sensitive-endpoint, they might bypass the middleware if path normalization is not handled correctly within the Iris middleware or routing configuration. This bypass is directly related to how Iris middleware is applied and how path matching is performed.
  • Impact: Bypass of authentication, authorization, input validation, or other security measures implemented in middleware, leading to unauthorized access or actions.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Robust Middleware Logic: Ensure middleware logic is robust and not easily bypassed. Avoid relying solely on simple path prefixes or easily manipulated headers in Iris middleware.
    • Consistent Path Handling: Standardize path handling within middleware and routing in Iris configurations and middleware implementations to prevent inconsistencies that could lead to bypasses (e.g., always normalize paths using filepath.Clean consistently in Iris middleware and handlers).
    • Middleware Testing: Thoroughly test middleware within the Iris application context to ensure it functions as expected and cannot be bypassed under various conditions.
    • Chain of Responsibility: Design middleware chains to be independent and not rely on assumptions about previous middleware execution that could be manipulated within the Iris middleware chain configuration.

Attack Surface: Session Fixation

  • Description: Attackers force a known session ID onto a user, allowing them to hijack the user's session after successful login.
  • Iris Contribution: If Iris applications use default session management provided by Iris without proper security measures, they can be vulnerable to session fixation. This is directly related to the security of Iris's session management features and default configurations.
  • Example: An attacker obtains a valid session ID. They then send a link to a victim containing this session ID in the URL or cookie. If the application doesn't regenerate the session ID upon successful login using Iris's session management, the victim might log in using the attacker's pre-set session ID, allowing the attacker to hijack the session.
  • Impact: Session hijacking, unauthorized access to user accounts and data.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Session ID Regeneration: Always regenerate the session ID upon successful user login to invalidate any pre-existing session IDs. Configure Iris session management to regenerate session IDs on login.
    • Secure Session ID Generation: Use cryptographically secure random number generators for session ID creation to make them unpredictable. Iris's session management should ideally use secure random ID generation by default, but developers should verify this and potentially customize if needed.
    • HttpOnly and Secure Cookies: Set the HttpOnly and Secure flags for session cookies to prevent client-side JavaScript access and ensure cookies are only transmitted over HTTPS. Configure Iris session management to set these cookie flags.
    • Session Timeout: Implement appropriate session timeouts to limit the lifespan of sessions and reduce the window of opportunity for session hijacking. Configure session timeouts within Iris's session management settings.

Attack Surface: Template Injection (If Templates Used)

  • Description: Attackers inject malicious code into templates, which is then executed by the template engine, leading to code execution or information disclosure.
  • Iris Contribution: If Iris applications use template engines (like html/template or others) and dynamically construct templates with user-provided data without proper escaping, template injection vulnerabilities can occur. This is relevant when using Iris's template rendering features and integrating template engines.
  • Example: A web application displays user comments. If comments are rendered using a template engine integrated with Iris without proper escaping and a user submits a comment containing template directives (e.g., {{.Execute "os/exec" "command"}}), the template engine might execute the injected command on the server when processed by Iris's template rendering.
  • Impact: Remote code execution, information disclosure, server compromise.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Context-Aware Output Encoding/Escaping: Always escape user-provided data before embedding it into templates when using Iris's template rendering. Use template engine's built-in escaping mechanisms that are context-aware (e.g., HTML escaping, JavaScript escaping) within Iris template rendering logic.
    • Avoid Dynamic Template Construction: Minimize or avoid dynamically constructing templates from user input when using Iris templates. If necessary, carefully sanitize and validate user input before incorporating it into templates rendered by Iris.
    • Template Security Review: Regularly review templates for potential injection vulnerabilities, especially when handling user-generated content in Iris applications using templates.
    • Principle of Least Privilege (Template Engine): If possible, configure the template engine to operate in a restricted environment with limited access to system resources when integrated with Iris.

Attack Surface: Directory Traversal via Static Files

  • Description: Attackers exploit vulnerabilities in static file serving to access files outside the intended static file directory, potentially gaining access to sensitive system files.
  • Iris Contribution: Iris's iris.StaticWeb and similar functions are used to serve static files. Misconfiguration or improper path handling when using Iris's static file serving features can lead to directory traversal.
  • Example: An application serves static files from a directory /public using iris.StaticWeb("/public", "./public"). If the static file handler doesn't properly sanitize requested paths within Iris's static file serving implementation, an attacker could request /public/../../../../etc/passwd to access the system's password file.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to sensitive files, information disclosure, potential system compromise.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Static File Configuration: Carefully configure static file serving paths in Iris using iris.StaticWeb or similar functions and ensure they are restricted to the intended directories.
    • Path Sanitization: Sanitize requested file paths to prevent directory traversal attempts. Iris's StaticWeb should ideally handle path sanitization, but developers should verify and potentially add extra sanitization in custom handlers if needed. Use functions like filepath.Clean and ensure paths stay within the allowed static file directory when implementing custom static file serving logic in Iris.
    • Principle of Least Privilege (File System Access): Grant the application only the necessary file system permissions to serve static files. Avoid serving static files from the root directory or directories containing sensitive data when configuring Iris static file serving.
    • Regular Security Audits: Regularly audit static file serving configurations in Iris applications to ensure they are secure and prevent directory traversal vulnerabilities.