Description: Attackers manipulate input parameters (URL path, query string, form data, headers) to inject malicious code or data. This leverages Echo's mechanisms for accessing these parameters.
Echo Contribution: Echo provides convenient methods to access and bind request parameters (Param, QueryParam, FormValue, Bind). The framework facilitates access to these potentially malicious inputs, making proper validation by the developer absolutely critical. Echo does not automatically sanitize or validate these inputs.
Example:
* SQL Injection (via Param): e.GET("/users/:id", func(c echo.Context) error { id := c.Param("id"); // ... use 'id' directly in a SQL query ... }) Echo extracts the :id parameter, and if the developer doesn't sanitize it, an attacker can inject SQL.
* Command Injection (via FormValue): e.POST("/run", func(c echo.Context) error { cmd := c.FormValue("command"); // ... execute 'cmd' directly ... }) Echo retrieves the command from the form data; lack of sanitization allows command injection.
* XSS (via c.Render and unescaped parameters): e.GET("/greet/:name", func(c echo.Context) error { name := c.Param("name"); return c.Render(http://StatusOK, "greet.html", map[string]interface{}{"name": name}) }) Echo renders the template, but if greet.html doesn't escape name (e.g., using {{ .name | html }}), XSS is possible.
Impact: Data breaches, data modification/deletion, server compromise, client-side code execution (XSS).
Risk Severity: Critical (SQLi, Command Injection) / High (XSS, other injections).
Mitigation Strategies:
* Input Validation (with Echo's Bind): Use a validation library in conjunction with Echo's Bind to enforce strict rules on all parameters. This is the primary defense.
* Parameterized Queries: For database interactions, always use parameterized queries. This is not directly related to Echo, but is crucial in preventing SQLi when using data obtained through Echo.
* Output Encoding (using Echo's template functions): When using Echo's c.Render, always use the appropriate escaping functions (e.g., {{ . | html }}) to prevent XSS. This directly uses Echo's features for mitigation.
Attack Surface: Unintended Route Matching/Exposure (Due to Echo's Routing)
Description: Poorly defined routes in Echo, especially those using wildcards or regular expressions, can lead to unintended matches, exposing internal functionality.
Echo Contribution: This vulnerability is entirely due to Echo's routing system and how the developer configures it. The flexibility of Echo's routing is a double-edged sword.
Example: e.GET("/admin/*", adminHandler) might unintentionally match /admin/../../sensitive/file. The wildcard (*) in Echo's route definition is the direct cause.
Impact: Unauthorized access to sensitive data or functionality, bypassing authentication.
Risk Severity: High
Mitigation Strategies:
* Strict Route Definitions: Define routes as specifically as possible within Echo. Avoid overly broad wildcards in Echo's route definitions.
* Route Testing: Thoroughly test all possible route combinations within Echo's context to ensure they match as intended.
* Explicit Method Handling: Always specify the allowed HTTP methods (GET, POST, etc.) for each route in Echo.
* Authentication/Authorization (using Echo Middleware): Apply authentication and authorization middleware using Echo's middleware system to all routes requiring protection.
Attack Surface: Misconfigured Middleware (Specifically Echo's Middleware)
Description: Incorrect configuration of Echo's middleware, particularly CORS and authentication/authorization middleware, creates vulnerabilities.
Echo Contribution: This vulnerability stems directly from how the developer uses and configures Echo's middleware system. The framework provides the tools, but incorrect usage leads to problems.
Example:
* CORS Misconfiguration (using middleware.CORSWithConfig): e.Use(middleware.CORSWithConfig(middleware.CORSConfig{AllowOrigins: []string{"*"}, ...})) This Echo-specific configuration allows requests from any origin.
* Auth Middleware Bypass: If Echo's authentication middleware is not applied to all relevant routes within Echo, an attacker can bypass it.
* Incorrect Middleware Order: Applying Echo's logging middleware before Echo's authentication middleware.
Impact: Cross-origin attacks, unauthorized access, information disclosure.
Risk Severity: High
Mitigation Strategies:
* Restrictive CORS (using Echo's CORS config): Configure Echo's CORS middleware with the most restrictive settings. Avoid wildcards for AllowOrigins.
* Comprehensive Middleware Coverage (using Echo's grouping): Use Echo's group-level middleware to ensure consistent application of security middleware.
* Correct Middleware Order (within Echo's setup): Carefully plan and document the order of middleware within Echo's configuration.
Attack Surface: Unrestricted File Uploads (Using Echo's FormFile)
Description: If file uploads are allowed, failing to properly validate files obtained through Echo can lead to server compromise.
Echo Contribution: Echo provides the FormFile function to access uploaded files. This function is the entry point for the vulnerability; the framework provides the mechanism to receive the potentially malicious file.
Example: An attacker uploads a shell script, and the application, using c.FormFile("file") in Echo, saves it without proper validation.
Impact: Server compromise, remote code execution.
Risk Severity: Critical
Mitigation Strategies:
* File Type/Size/Content Validation: Validate files obtained via c.FormFile before saving them. This validation is not built into Echo; it's the developer's responsibility.
* Secure Storage: Store files outside the web root (not directly related to Echo, but crucial).
* Unique Filenames: Generate unique filenames (not directly related to Echo, but a best practice).